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 Since 1996, Justice Anthony Kennedy has authored the four Supreme Court decisions 
recognizing the rights and dignity of homosexuals in America. In Romer v. Evans (1996),1 
Justice Kennedy struck down a state constitutional amendment barring anti-discrimination laws 
from covering sexual orientation. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003),2 he struck down state bans on 
homosexual sodomy. In United States v. Windsor (2013),3 he struck down the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal law that defined marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman. Recently he wrote the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 5-4 decision 
declaring that state bans on same-sex marriage and laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex 
marriages legally performed elsewhere were unconstitutional.4 While Anthony Kennedy will go 
down in history as the justice who first recognized and then cemented the idea that gays and 
lesbians deserve equal rights and dignity, he will also be remembered in some circles for what he 
did not say in his gay rights opinions.  
 In each of the cases above, Justice Kennedy managed to rule in favor of gay rights 
without determining the standard of review, or level of scrutiny, for laws that classify persons 
based on their sexual orientation. While in each of the cases before Obergefell there were reasons 
why Kennedy chose to not determine the standard of review, those in Obergefell have frustrated 
many since the decision came out. This paper seeks to examine Justice Kennedy’s gay rights 
jurisprudence to demonstrate the consistent characteristics of his opinions in Romer, Lawrence, 
Windsor, and finally Obergefell. While it is undeniable that his opinions asserted that the 
                                                
1 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
2 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
3 United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (2013).  
4 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 2 
Constitution guarantees homosexuals equal protection and due process under the law, ultimately 
his decision to eschew determining the standard of review for sexual orientation has resulted in 
concrete harm for homosexuals and the rest of the LGBT community.  
 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell had many undeniably positive aspects, and 
established that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded same-sex couples equal dignity and the 
fundamental right to marry. However, in many states gays and lesbians can still be legally fired 
from their jobs, denied a loan, or denied service in a restaurant simply for being homosexual. 
While determining the standard of review would not have ended all discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, it would have given the LGBT community and those defending their rights 
a concrete tool to use against persons who, especially after Obergefell, seek a right to be exempt 
from issuing marriage licenses or following anti-discrimination laws because of religious 
objections.  
 Chapter I will briefly discuss the gay rights movement and how the push for same-sex 
marriage developed in the twentieth century. Chapter II discusses Justice Kennedy’s background 
as a lawyer and judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and on the Supreme Court. Section 
two of that chapter examines an opinion he wrote in 1980 ultimately ruling against gay rights, 
while also revealing his progressive attitude towards gay rights and homosexuals as human 
beings in a legal context. Section three of that chapter outlines Justice Kennedy’s gay rights 
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court, with detailed analysis of his opinions in Romer, Lawrence, 
and Windsor. Chapter III outlines Obergefell v. Hodges from the case’s beginnings with various 
same-sex couples in four different states, to the decision. Chapter IV outlines and analyzes the 
arguments of the four dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges and the merits of each. 
Chapter V discusses and analyzes the criticisms of Kennedy’s opinion on the part of those who 
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agreed with the ultimate outcome but decried the opinion for not determining the standard of 
review. The concluding chapter will examine the situations that have arisen in light of the lack of 
a clear standard of review and will conclude with recommending a remedy for the current 
situation. This paper argues that the Court will eventually have to rule that sexual orientation is a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class and eventually the federal government will amend anti-
discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and gender identity.  
 While throughout the paper I discuss the rights of homosexuals and the need for a clear 
standard determining the level of scrutiny for laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation, 
I write with the understanding that should the Court determine the standard, or had Kennedy 
done so in Obergefell, it would protect the LGBT community in a comprehensive sense. 
Therefore, while at many points of this thesis I discuss the rights and dignity of same-sex 
marriage, gays, lesbians, and same-sex couples, that discussion is written with the understanding 
that the arguments I make and the analysis I provide apply with full force to other members of 
the LGBTQ community. That is not to demean the rights or liberties of persons discriminated 
against or denied protections based on gender identity, but to make this paper cohesive, it was 




















The Gay Rights Movement and the Road to Same-Sex Marriage 
 
Gay Rights in America: A Brief Summary 
 
 Although the gay rights agenda pursuing marriage equality has taken center stage in 
recent years, the gay rights movement and the struggle for equality outside of marriage began 
more than half a century ago. In the 1950s, the American Psychiatric Association considered 
homosexuality a “sociopathic personality disturbance,” and homosexuals were abhorred for their 
“lifestyle,” which was viewed as unclean and immoral by society.1 This grave misunderstanding 
of homosexuality created a sense of fear in hetero-normative America that led to the 
criminalization and oppression of homosexuals. During this time, homosexuals were legally 
barred from working for the U.S. government or serving in the military if they were open about 
their sexuality, and homosexual acts were sufficient to deny or revoke licenses to practice 
medicine, law, or nursing.2 Even organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
deemed laws condemning homosexual acts constitutional as homosexuals were “socially 
heretical or deviant.”3 Understandably, many homosexuals hid their sexuality in fear of social 
persecution, and as a result, there was very little organized activism for the gay rights agenda 
during this time. 
 In the 1960s, although every state in America had laws barring even private, consensual, 
same-sex intimacy,4 civil libertarians and organizations like the American Law Institute rejected 
                                                
1 "Timeline: Milestones in the American Gay Rights Movement," PBS, last modified June 24, 2011, accessed 
December 11, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/stonewall/.  
2 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, xx and 11. 
3 Ibid., 6 
4 Ibid., 3 
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the criminal punishment of private sex between consenting adult homosexuals.5 Simultaneously, 
American society started to change its perception of previously contentious issues such as 
divorce, contraception, sexual mores, and the sexual content of mass media.6 In 1965 the 
Supreme Court ruled in Griswold v. Connecticut that a Connecticut statute criminalizing the 
distribution of, or medical recommendation of, contraceptives was unconstitutional.7 Justice 
William Douglas wrote the majority opinion for the Court and argued that certain rights of 
privacy concerning the intimate relationships of consenting adults were beyond government 
control, particularly the right of marriage and marital intimacy.8 Furthermore, though these rights 
were not included in the Constitution, Douglas established that certain guarantees within the Bill 
of Rights include penumbras, or zones, which incorporate unenumerated rights not explicitly 
stated in the text. Justice Douglas reasoned in Griswold, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments offer additional protections that went beyond the exact language of the text and 
created a new constitutional right to privacy in marital relations. 
 Two years later, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Loving v. Virginia that state 
laws banning and criminalizing interracial marriages were unconstitutional.9 Chief Justice Earl 
Warren argued that the anti-miscegenation laws violated the fundamental right to marry and 
constituted invidious racial discrimination under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The Court also rejected the notion that equal application 
of a statute containing racial classifications was enough to protect the classification from 
Fourteenth Amendment review. In other words, the Court did not accept that the statutes could 
                                                
5 Ibid., 10 
6 Ibid., 8 
7 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
8 Ibid., 
9 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
10 Ibid., 12 
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be justified simply because the Virginia law punished blacks and whites equally.11 The Court 
also noted it regarded statutes that made distinctions between people because of their ancestry as 
“odious” and argued they were contradictory to the American doctrine of equality.12 Perhaps 
most importantly, the Court made clear that:  
 The Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in 
 criminal statutes, be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny,’…and, if they are ever to be 
 upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible 
 state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the 
 Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.13  
 
Using this strict standard of judicial review, the Court held the state had no compelling 
overriding purpose other than discrimination to justify the statutes. Regarding the Due Process 
Clause, the Court held that the laws denied the Lovings’ liberty without due process of law and 
held that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital rights essential to 
the orderly pursuit of the happiness of free men.”14 In a twelve page opinion, the Court 
unanimously struck down what was arguably the last form of legal, institutionalized, 
discrimination against blacks in America. 
 Though Griswold and Loving were steps in the right direction for marriage equality, there 
still was no significant organization or push for same-sex marriage within the gay rights 
movement itself. In the 1950s, homophile organizations like the Mattachine Society started 
merely discussing “marriage-like” relationships, and the Daughters of Bilitis did not see 
marriage as a priority.15 Other activists were more vocal about their opposition to marriage as an 
                                                
11 Ibid., 8 
12 Hirabayahi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) cited in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
13 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
14 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
15 Suzanne Sherman, introduction to Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private Commitments, Public Ceremonies 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 6.  
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oppressive, sexist, and inherently heterosexual institution that should not be pursued.16 Marriage, 
they argued, should be weakened and repealed by an alternative that allowed all people, 
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, to develop their own understandings of love and family.17 
These advocates argued that the twofold purpose of the gay rights movement was for the 
affirmation of gay identity in American society and the validation and acceptance of intimate, 
committed relationships other than marriage.18 According to them, the legalization of same-sex 
marriage encouraged gays to assimilate with hetero-normative society and strengthened the 
oppressive institution of marriage -- both of which undermined the main goals of the movement.  
 One such critic was Paula Ettelbrick, former lawyer of Lambda Legal,19 who argued that 
the legalization of same-sex marriage would make the homosexual community “invisible” as 
homosexual married couples joined the mainstream.20 Ettelbrick argued that homosexuals in 
America were proud of their differences from heterosexuals and subsequently wanted to be 
recognized and accepted by society considering those differences. Furthermore, society’s 
disqualification of marriage as the pinnacle of commitment and acceptance -- not the right to 
marry -- would give gays and lesbians justice and full recognition of their relationships.21 
Therefore, by arguing for equal treatment under the law and fighting to enter into the institution 
of marriage, homosexuals must accept all of its oppressive characteristics and have their 
                                                
16 Andrew Sullivan, Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con: A Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 117; Joyce 
Murdoch and Deb Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. The Supreme Court (New York: Basic Books, 
2001), 168; David L. Chambers, "Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership," in Creating Change: 
Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights, by John D'Emilio, William B. Turner, and Urvashi Vaid (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2000), 282. 
17 Sullivan, Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con, 117; Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 
168.  
18 Paula L. Ettelbrick, "Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private 
Commitments, Public Ceremonies, ed. Suzanne Sherman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 21 . 
19 "Who We Are," Lambda Legal, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us. (Lambda Legal 
is the oldest and largest national organization whose mission is to achieve full recognition of the civil rights of 
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender people and those with HIV through impact legislation, education, and 
public policy work.) 
20 Ettelbrick, "Since When Is Marriage," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 21.  
21 Ibid., 22 
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relationships regulated by the state.22 In other words, if same-sex couples were allowed to marry, 
society may look upon same-sex couples that choose not to marry with disdain just as society 
does for heterosexual couples who choose not to marry.23 To Ettelbrick, the agenda of the gay 
rights movement was simple:  
 Until the Constitution is interpreted to respect and encourage differences, pursuing the 
 legalization of same-sex marriage would be leading our movement into a trap; we would 
 be demanding access to the very institution that, in its current form, would 
 undermine our movement to recognize many different kinds of relationships.24 
 
This is not to say that opponents of same-sex marriage within the gay rights movement did not 
understand why some same-sex couples would want to seek marriage. To this point, Ettelbrick 
notes, “[m]arriage provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal, intimate relationships 
in our society, and gives those who marry an insider status of the most powerful kind.”25 Given 
the importance society gives to marriage, it therefore was not surprising that some same-sex 
couples wanted to enter into the institution and become insiders.26 However, Ettelbrick also 
recognized that this right would not be for the homosexual community as a whole; rather, it 
would be sought by couples who are closer to the “norm” of society with their race, gender, and 
economic status because:27 
 The law looks to the insiders as the norm, regardless of how flawed or unjust their 
 institutions, and requires that those seeking the law’s equal protection situate themselves 
 in a similar posture to those who are already protected. In arguing for the right to legal 
 marriage, lesbian and gay men would be forced to claim that we are just like heterosexual 
 couples, have the same goals and purposes and vow to structure our lives similarly. 
 The law provides no room to argue that we are different but are nonetheless entitled to 
 equal protection.28   
 
                                                
22 Ibid., 21 
23 Ibid., 22 
24 Ibid., 23 
25 Ibid., 20-21 
26 Ibid., 20-21 
27 Ibid., 24 
28 Ibid., 23 
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 In contrast to this view, there were some within the gay rights movement who thought 
marriage should be the center, or at least considered part, of the gay rights agenda. Even activists 
like Thomas Stoddard -- who worked with Ettelbrick at Lambda, and served as its executive 
director from 1986 to 1992, who viewed marriage as oppressive, and who did not want to seek 
marriage for himself -- saw value in marriage.29 He argued there were compelling practical, 
political, and philosophical reasons why every homosexual should have the right to marry the 
person of their choice, and why the gay rights movement should aggressively seek legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.30 In a practical sense, there are immense economic advantages 
to marriage. These include: inheriting from your spouse if there is no will; ensuring a surviving 
spouse receives social security benefits; obtaining citizenship for one’s foreign-born spouse; and 
immunity from subpoenas requiring testimony against one’s spouse.31 Additionally, outside of 
the legal spectrum, many employers provide health insurance and inclusion in employee benefits 
packages. 
 Politically, the legalization of same-sex marriage would do the most to test the dedication 
of married heterosexuals to full gay equality, and would push society towards ending 
discrimination against homosexuals in America.32 Homosexuals also began to realize how 
attaching same-sex couples to love, an emotion strongly associated with marriage, helped to ease 
homophobic notions and made homosexuals appear more like heterosexuals.33 However, 
                                                
29 David W. Dunlap, "Thomas Stoddard, 48, Dies; An Advocate of Gay Rights," The New York Times, last 
modified February 14, 1997, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/14/nyregion/thomas-
stoddard-48-dies-an-advocate-of-gay-rights.html.  
30 Thomas B. Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private 
Commitments, Public Ceremonies, ed. Suzanne Sherman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 14. 
31 Ibid., 15; Michael J. Rosenfeld, The Age of Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-sex Unions, and the 
Changing American Family (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 174. 
32 Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 17. 
33 John D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage," in The 
Politics of Same-sex Marriage, ed. Craig A. Rimmerman and Clyde Wilcox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 41-42. 
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activists did not believe that marriage was the quick fix for homophobia, and they understood the 
legalization of same-sex marriage would not eradicate opposition to homosexuality, just as the 
Loving decision did not eradicate racism or opposition to interracial marriage.34 Despite this 
reality, however, Stoddard noted: 
 Griswold called marriage a “noble” and “sacred” institution and homosexuals have been 
 denied entry into it. The implicit message is this: two men or two women are incapable of 
 achieving such an exalted domestic state. Gay relationships are somehow less significant, 
 less valuable. Such relationships, may, from time to time and couple to couple give the 
 appearance of marriage, but they can never be of the same quality or importance.35 
 
Philosophically, Stoddard recognized that abolishing marriage as the cornerstone of relationships 
in America was rather unlikely, however, opening the institution of marriage to same-sex 
couples would “necessarily transform it into something new.”36 Furthermore he framed the issue 
as homosexuals desiring the right to marry not necessarily desiring to marry.37 
 While the arguments for marriage were beginning to surface in some circles, the overall 
consensus within the movement was that there were other, more important aspects of gay 
equality in America to focus on first. During this time gay rights organizations began to attract 
more members and more progressive wings of the movement began calling for equal rights and 
direct action. These progressives rejected the earlier generations’ desire to assimilate, educate the 
public, and let social scientists address the rights and treatments of homosexuals in America.38 
These “progressive” gay rights activists began to pursue legal action and had some success in 
challenging the closing of gay bars and dismissal of homosexual service members.39 One of the 
hallmark events of this period was the 1969 Stonewall Inn Rebellion in Greenwich Village where 
                                                
34 Rosenfeld, The Age of Independence, 189. 
35 Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 18. 
36 Ibid., 19. 
37 Ibid., 18. 
38 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 11. 
39 Ibid., 12 
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police raided the gay bar and patrons fought back in self defense. This was the “shot heard 
‘round the world” for the gay rights movement and set in motion a series of events that catalyzed 
significant constitutional changes in America.40 
A Call for Marriage: Baker v. Nelson and Beyond 
 
 Although the legalization of same-sex marriage was not at the forefront of the gay rights 
movement, there were murmurs from certain gay rights groups and same-sex couples who saw 
the validation of their relationships as the centerpiece of their push for gay equality. One such 
couple was Mike McConnell and Jack Baker, a Minnesota couple who first brought the question 
of same-sex marriage to the Supreme Court.  
 At a Halloween party in 1966, McConnell and Baker met and fell in love.41 In 1971 they 
filed for a marriage license in Minnesota, their application was denied, and they subsequently 
filed suit against the Hennepin County District Clerk.42 The plaintiffs argued that the Minnesota 
marriage statute did not expressly prohibit same-sex marriage and therefore their marriage 
should be authorized. Interpreting the state statute to allow only heterosexual marriage was 
unconstitutional under the Ninth Amendment, which states that rights not explicitly granted by 
the Constitution are not necessarily denied to them. Furthermore, they argued restricting 
marriage to heterosexual couples denied them due process and equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and constituted irrational and invidious discrimination. Lastly, as 
established in Griswold and Loving, they argued the government could not impede on the 
intimacy of two consenting adults, and that the Constitution guaranteed the right to marry the 
                                                
40 Ibid., 17-18 
41 Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001), 164. 
42 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, (Minn. Supreme Court 1971). 
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person of one’s choosing.43 Despite these arguments, they lost their case in the Minnesota trial 
court and appealed the decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.44 
 On October 15, 1971 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Nelson that there 
was no constitutional violation in denying Baker and McConnell a marriage license, and that 
restricting marriage to opposite sex couples was neither irrational nor proof of invidious 
discrimination.45 In other words, the court rejected the applicability of Loving, arguing there was 
a clear distinction between a marital restriction based on race and one based on sex.46 The Loving 
decision, therefore, did not imply that all restrictions on marriage were in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, just restrictions that were created to discriminate. Furthermore, the court 
held that states were able to control marital eligibility and Griswold applied only to heterosexual 
relationships. The court also focused on the link between marriage and procreation, citing the 
Book of Genesis to reason on biological grounds that marriage should be restricted to a man and 
a woman.47 
 The petitioners appealed this ruling to the United States Supreme Court, which then 
dismissed the case on the merits in 1972, stating that it did not present a substantial federal 
question.48 With the Supreme Court’s one line dismissal, the Baker decision in the Minnesota 
Supreme Court was binding. Though the ruling was a blow to same-sex marriage, it also marked 
a turning point in the gay rights movement because gay activists began to raise other issues 
                                                
43 Ibid., 
44 David L. Chambers, "Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership," in Creating Change: Sexuality, 
Public Policy, and Civil Rights, by John D'Emilio, William B. Turner, and Urvashi Vaid (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2000), 284. 
45 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, (Minn. Supreme Court 1971). 
46 Ibid., 
47 Ibid., (“The institution of marriage as a union of a man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and 
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis”). 
48 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (“Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. Dismissed for want of substantial federal 
question”). 
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concerning LGBT rights such as sodomy laws, bans on openly serving in the military, 
homophobic violence, and discrimination in employment, housing, and healthcare.49  
 In the 1970s about half of the states repealed their sodomy laws and by 1973 the 
American Psychiatric Association had removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses.50 
In 1975 the U.S. Civil Service Commission lifted its ban on employing homosexuals, and several 
localities began to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation.51 Despite these gains, efforts 
to revoke the bans on homosexuals serving in the military failed, and courts tended to reject 
challenges to the policy.52 Additionally, in cases brought regarding same-sex marriage in some 
states, courts rejected any legal argument for gay marriage and argued, similarly to Baker, that 
although many states did not define marriage between a man and a woman, the legislature 
intended to preserve that traditional understanding in the creation of its laws.53 However, there 
were some progressive judges who were becoming more supportive of the idea, and some even 
spoke of gays as a group entitled to special judicial protection because, as a group, they were 
historically disadvantaged and still suffering from invidious discrimination.54  
 The AIDS epidemic of the 1980s marked a tangible shift in the gay rights movement that 
slowly galvanized homosexuals to seek legal recognition of their relationships. Within the gay 
community, AIDS forced closeted homosexuals to come out about their sexuality, which in turn 
                                                
49 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 48; D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free?," in The Politics of Same-sex, 
40-41. 
50 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 13 and 23. 
51 Ibid., 23 
52 Ibid., 30 
53 Andrew Sullivan, Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con: A Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 96; Klarman, 
From the Closet to the Altar, 19. See Jones v. Hallahan 501 S.W.2d 588 (1973) (Kentucky Court of Appeals argued 
that marriage “has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been presented with no 
authority to the contrary”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 11 Wash. App. 247, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (Ct. App. 
1974)(Washington Court of Appeals held that not allowing same-sex couples to marry was not sex discrimination 
because child rearing is essential to marriage rights)). 
54 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 41 footnote 137. (NGTF v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 
(10th Cir. 1984); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. 
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). 
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made people see gays not as criminals and pedophiles, but as friends, family, and colleagues. 
Additionally, the epidemic revealed the vulnerability of same-sex relationships, as many 
homosexuals who lost partners to AIDS had little to no protections or rights when their partner 
was ill in the hospital, or after they had passed away from the disease.55 Additionally, many gay 
men faced hardships gaining access to medical insurance to pay for the expensive treatments, 
medications, and hospital visits since many employers offered coverage to spouses of employees, 
but not to a worker’s unmarried partner.56 Perhaps most importantly, more homosexuals who 
previously did not view their relationships as a fundamentally important aspect of their life began 
to see them in a new light while caring for ill partners who were infected with the AIDS virus.57 
 In the 1980s, the number of gay men who became involved in political efforts grew 
substantially because their lives were affected by AIDS, and many of them sought a more active 
and responsive role from the state.58 In San Francisco particularly, the push for legalizing 
domestic partnerships and putting more funds towards AIDS research and awareness gained 
support. This change was partly due to the work of Harry Britt, an openly gay member of the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors and its future president, who proposed domestic partnership 
legislation in 1982 only to have it vetoed by then Mayor Diane Feinstein.59 In 1989 a domestic 
partnership ordinance was adopted by the Board of Supervisors, rejected by voters, proposed 
                                                
55 Ibid., 39; D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free?," in The Politics of Same-sex, 49. (“Many [gay men] faced 
situations where the phrase ‘next of kin’ came into play: hospital visitation rights; decision making about medical 
care; choices about funeral arrangements and burials; the access of survivors to homes, possessions, and 
inheritance”). 
56 David L. Chambers, "Tale of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships in San 
Francisco and New York," Law and Sexuality 2 (1992): 184. 
57 Ibid.,  
58 Ibid.,  
59 Ibid., 183 (Britt also tried again in 1983, but Feinstein threatened to veto and the legislation was withdrawn) 
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again, and finally adopted in 1991.60 By that time, HIV had killed 4,000 gay men in San 
Francisco and had infected tens of thousands.61  
 At the time of its passage, domestic partnership legislation was not a new issue, but AIDS 
helped determine what issues people would be politically involved in. More specifically, 
according to Chambers, “AIDS seems to have affected both the timing of the legal activity and 
the language and tactics of both proponents and opponents” of domestic partnerships and same-
sex marriage.62 Even some lesbians who were previously campaigning against legislation for the 
validation of same sex relationships by the city changed their views. For example, Jean Harris, 
who worked as a lesbian activist and was Harry Britt’s assistant in 1989, observed, “AIDS made 
us realize that our lovers are our support systems. It made us more aware of the importance of 
primary relationships. It made love and relationships even more important than they had seemed 
before.”63  
 AIDS not only galvanized the effort to pass domestic partnership legislation within the 
gay community, but also brought the realities of AIDS to the forefront of the city’s political 
agenda. For example, there were significant efforts to persuade California lawmakers to 
authorize more funds for AIDS research and treatment, and to end the push for legislation 
requiring mandatory testing of persons believed likely to be infected.64 Additionally, with 
government inaction, gay activists started a variety of grassroots organizations to assist people 
infected with AIDS.65 Organizations like the San Francisco AIDS foundation and the AIDS 
Project Los Angeles worked to mobilize thousands of gay volunteers to serve as “buddies” to 
                                                
60 Ibid., 
61 Ibid.,  
62 Ibid., 181 
63 Interview with Jean Harris, Assistant to Harry Britt, President, San Francisco Board of Supervisors, in San 
Francisco, Cal. (May 31, 1990), cited in Ibid., 184 
64 Chambers, "Tale of Two Cities," 184. 
65 George Chauncey, Why Marriage?: The History Shaping Today's Debate over Gay Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 2004), 41-42. 
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cook meals for, and clean homes of AIDS patients, and intervene when doctors and other 
medical professionals were afraid to touch or interact with those infected.66 
 Given the severity of the crisis, AIDS acted as a springboard to gay marriage for some. 
However, there was still no consensus within the gay community on whether marriage should be 
pursued, and if so how aggressively. The arguments for and against gay marriage within the gay 
movement remained largely unchanged. Opponents still argued that enabling gays to marry 
would make gay couples the same as heterosexuals and inevitably stigmatize homosexuals who 
chose not to marry. Additionally, some activists worried that pursuing gay marriage was to 
privilege the concerns of middle class gays and divert focus from interests of those less 
privileged gays for whom marriage was possibly less relevant.67 Furthermore, outside of the gay 
community, AIDS only strengthened some people’s negative view of homosexuals and 
motivated their effort to deny gays validation of their relationships. For example, advertising 
campaigns used to “encourage gay men to use condoms simply reminded some people not of 
lives that might be saved but of conduct they considered immoral.”68 Furthermore, there was still 
a sense of indifference nationally towards AIDS: President Reagan did not say the word “AIDS” 
publicly until 1985 when his friend, actor Rock Hudson, was diagnosed, and he did not give a 
speech on the issue until 1991 after 20,000 Americans had died from the disease.69 
 In response, pro-gay marriage activists argued that marriage was the centerpiece of 
American society’s social structure and no other political issue would test the dedication of 
heterosexuals to gay equality.70 Additionally, they argued that until gays had the same rights as 
heterosexual couples, homosexuality would remain a second class status. Lastly, they argued that 
                                                
66 Ibid., 42 
67 Ettelbrick, "Since When Is Marriage," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 24. 
68 Chambers, "Couples: Marriage, Civil Union," in Creating Change: Sexuality, Public, 185.  
69 Chauncey, Why Marriage?: The History, 41. 
70 Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 17. 
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without the right to marry, same-sex couples would need funds to hire lawyers to gain protection, 
and couples without the means to retain a lawyer would have difficulty securing their 
relationship rights.71 Therefore, legalizing same-sex marriage would give all same-sex couples 
the right to marry, not just well-off couples who could afford legal counsel.72 Ultimately, the 
organizational push for same-sex marriage garnered more support and slowly progress began to 
be made in the validation of same-sex relationships.  
 By the 1990s, the gay rights movement had made significant progress in the courts for the 
gay rights agenda and most gay activists showed greater concern for securing equal rights in 
employment, housing, and health care.73 By 1993, about twenty-five cities across the country, 
including New York, Berkeley, West Hollywood, and Madison, had enacted domestic 
partnership ordinances that entitled partners to health insurance, hospital visitation rights, leave 
to take care of a sick partner, and other legal benefits.74 There were small enclaves, usually in 
liberal urban areas, where gay activists achieved tangible results; however, most of America 
remained opposed to gay rights. In all of these cities, however, the domestic partnership status 
and the benefits it entailed only covered municipal employees of the city. Despite their 
limitations, domestic partnerships started to get the attention of young gay individuals, who 
tended to be more supportive of same-sex marriage than older generations.75 Simultaneously, 
there was a societal change in the understanding of marriage to be more about a commitment to 
another individual rather than procreation.76 This change helped support the campaign to allow 
                                                
71 Ibid., 16 
72 Ibid.,  
73 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 48. 
74 Ibid., 45 
75 Ibid., 11 
76 Ibid., 49 
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same-sex couples to adopt children, which in turn made the denial of marriage rights much more 
difficult to defend.77  
 Though these changes may seem like small steps to full equality for homosexuals in 
America, they do show the strong relationship between gay rights activism and concrete legal 
change. Activists did not wake up one day and decide they wanted to marry their partners; rather, 
there was debate, often hotly contested, that for years split the movement between those wanting 
to seek recognition of their relationships and those who did not. The issue was not black and 
white and both sides recognized the value of the other’s argument. There were many societal, 
political, and legal implications and considerations the movement needed to make in deciding to 
move forward with pursuing same-sex marriage.  
 Starting in the 1990s, at least a few judges in states like Hawaii and Alaska were willing 
to look seriously at the issue of same-sex marriage, despite the opposition of a majority of 
Americans at the time.78 Though the first legalization did not take place until 1993 in Hawaii,79 
during this time the social arguments and the constitutional arguments for and against same-sex 
marriage, which will be discussed in chapter three, were articulated and have remained mostly 
unchanged in the last two decades. 
                                                
77 Ibid., 51 
78 Ibid., xxi 






Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence and the Road to Same-Sex Marriage   
 
Justice Kennedy and Levels of Scrutiny 
 
 To fully understand the Obergefell v. Hodges decision, it is important to analyze the steps 
the litigants took to achieve that result. While there were several cases that the Supreme Court 
chose not to hear, of those granted certiorari, four most affected the Court’s answer to the same-
sex marriage question: Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and United 
States v. Windsor.1 While Bowers was the first case heard by the Court and ultimately served a 
major loss for the gay rights movement, the latter three set the stage for Obergefell and the 
recognition of gay rights in America.   
 Other than affirming the rights of homosexuals, the three cases leading up to Obergefell 
are also linked because they were all written by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Known as the swing 
vote on the Court today, Kennedy’s opinions in Romer and Lawrence paved the way for his 
reasoning in Windsor and Obergefell, particularly regarding his application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to gay rights issues. Though only 
Windsor dealt specifically with the issue of same-sex marriage, Romer and Lawrence also 
provide a substantial rationale for Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell.  
 One point of controversy in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence on gay rights, however, is 
his eschewal of assigning the level of scrutiny the Court should apply when determining the 
constitutionality of laws that single out homosexuals. Currently there are three levels of review, 
                                                
1 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, (1986). (In this case the Court upheld Georgia’s sodomy laws, reasoning that 
homosexuals did not have a right to same sex sodomy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, (2003); United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. 1 (2013). 
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or scrutiny, the Court can use when considering a law that targets, or “classifies,” a specific 
group of people: strict, heightened, or rational basis. Laws that classify based on race, national 
origin, or religion (known as suspect classes)2 are subject to strict scrutiny, and are assumed to be 
unconstitutional unless the state offers a very good reason for the classification.3 Laws that 
classify according to gender (a semi-suspect class)4 are subject to heightened scrutiny and can be 
upheld for some reasons (i.e. some physical characteristics in certain employment situations), but 
not many. Laws that classify on age, social class, or other non-suspect classes are subject to the 
rational basis test and only need a plausible reason to be upheld. While laws that undergo strict 
or heightened scrutiny are rarely upheld as constitutional, laws subject to the rational basis test 
are much more likely to pass the Court’s standard. 
 Determining the standard of review is important because the more rigorous the scrutiny, 
the more difficult it is for the government to defend a law. Particularly in cases involving the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the pre-determined standard nearly ensures that laws classifying people 
based on race or gender, for example, are rarely upheld. While these classifications have proven 
beneficial for racial minorities and women, homosexuals have never received the same level of 
certainty from the Court. As the author of all four Supreme Court decisions over a nineteen-year 
period that expanded and recognized homosexual rights, Justice Kennedy arguably had ample 
                                                
2 Generally, the Court defines a suspect class as a group that has suffered a history of discrimination; they exhibit an 
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristic; and is a minority with less political power than non-suspect 
classes. See Brett Parker, "What Level of Legal Scrutiny Should Sexual Orientation-Based Classifications 
Receive?," The Stanford Political Journal, last modified January 19, 2015, accessed October 30, 2015, 
http://stanfordpolitics.com/2015/01/what-level-of-legal-scrutiny-should-sexual-orientation-based-classifications-
receive/. 
3 Laws that restrict a fundamental right are also subject to strict scrutiny. See Garrett Epps, "Gay Marriage Gets Its 
Day in Court," The Atlantic, last modified April 27, 2015, accessed February 21, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/gay-marriage-gets-its-day-in-court/391487/.  
4 The Court defines a quasi or semi-suspect class as one that has suffered from a history of discrimination; exhibits 
an obvious, distinguishable, or immutable characteristic; but is not a minority or politically powerless. See Parker, 
"What Level of Legal," The Stanford Political Journal. 
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time and opportunity to determine what level of review laws targeting homosexuals should 
receive, but chose not to do so.  
Justice Kennedy: A Classic Pragmatist 
 Anthony McLeod Kennedy was born July 23, 1936 in Sacramento, California to Anthony 
J. Kennedy, an attorney and lobbyist, and Gladys Kennedy, a teacher.5 Growing up, Kennedy 
took an interest in politics and was a star student; he attended Stanford University and finished 
his requirements in three years before spending his fourth year at the London School of 
Economics.6 Kennedy then attended Harvard Law School, and after graduating in 1961 he 
returned to his hometown to teach at McGeorge Law School and take over his father’s law firm.7 
While practicing law and teaching, Kennedy also worked as a lobbyist for the Republican Party 
in California and became an acquaintance of Edwin Meese, who would later become a top aide 
to then Governor Ronald Reagan.  
 In 1975 Ronald Reagan recommended the President Gerald Ford appoint Kennedy to a 
seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, who then nominated Kennedy for the 
seat. At 38, Kennedy was the youngest federal appellate judge in the country. During his time on 
the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy took a narrow case-by-case approach in his opinions and did not 
appear to be influenced by ideological principles or rhetoric.8 Despite the ideological differences 
between him and the other more progressive judges on the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy had a polite 
demeanor that kept negotiations cordial when the Court was divided. During this time as the 
Ninth Circuit’s minority leader, he earned a positive reputation amongst lawyers and judges.9  
                                                
5 Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, "Anthony M. Kennedy," Oyez, accessed February 21, 2016, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_m_kennedy.   
6 Ibid., and Jeffrey Toobin, The Oath: The Obama White House and the Supreme Court (New York: Doubleday, 
2012), 51. 
7 Toobin, The Oath: The Obama, 51. 
8 Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, "Anthony M. Kennedy," Oyez. 
9 Ibid.,  
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 While on the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy wrote an important gay rights opinion, Beller v. 
Middendorf.10 The case dealt with the constitutionality of the U.S. Navy rule that prohibited 
enlisted members from engaging in homosexual acts.11 While Kennedy’s opinion ultimately 
upheld the Navy’s regulations as constitutional, his reasoning was quite significant given the 
time and arguably it foreshadowed his later opinions on gay rights.  
 In his opinion, Kennedy stated that “the real stigma imposed by the Navy’s actions . . .is 
the charge of homosexuality,” but because the plaintiffs did not charge that the Navy’s policies 
discriminated against homosexuals, the court did not have to determine the regulation’s 
constitutionality in that context.12 Additionally, regarding substantive due process,13 Kennedy 
argued that the narrow question of the case did not require the court to determine whether 
consensual private homosexual conduct was a fundamental right.14 In addition, since the 
plaintiffs only argued that the regulations violated their fundamental right to privacy, and Beller 
dealt narrowly with a Naval regulation prohibiting homosexual conduct, the equal protection 
analysis was not required.15 In other words, had the plaintiffs argued that the regulations 
discriminated against homosexuals, or if the case dealt with criminalization of private consensual 
                                                
10 Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). (The Beller case consolidated the cases of three enlisted 
members who, with otherwise pristine performance records, admitted to engaging in homosexual conduct. After 
each case was heard before an administrative discharge board and reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy, each 
plaintiff in the case was discharged. The plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the Navy’s regulations and challenges 
were unconstitutional under the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
11 Ibid., citing Inst 1900.9A. (“Members involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who cannot be tolerated in 
a military organization. In developing and documenting cases involving homosexual conduct, commanding officers 
should be keenly aware that members involved in homosexual acts are security and reliability risks who discredit 
themselves and the naval service by their homosexual conduct. Their prompt separation is essential”).  
12 Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 1980). 
13 Substantive due process prohibits the government from infringing on fundamental constitutional liberties. For 
example, marriage is a fundamental right under the constitution and the state cannot deny or limit marriage without a 
compelling reason. 
14 Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980). (Kennedy noted that if the Ninth Circuit determined that 
it was a fundamental right, then the Court would have to apply strict scrutiny to the Navy’s regulations, and the 
Navy would have to offer a compelling reason for barring open homosexuals from serving). 
15 Ibid., (“These appeals were not presented to us as implicating a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. The 
attacks, rather, were based on the claim that the conduct prohibited by the regulation was protected as an aspect of 
the fundamental right of privacy. Substantive due process, not equal protection, was the basis of the constitutional 
claim, and we address the case in those terms”). 
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homosexual conduct outside of the military, Kennedy suggested the court might have applied 
equal protection analysis. 
 Therefore, Kennedy argued that there only had to be a rational reason for the Navy to bar 
and discharge open homosexuals from the service, and the Navy’s reasons were sufficient.16 
However, Kennedy noted that just because the court upheld the regulations as constitutional did 
not mean the regulations were wise. On the contrary, the judgment did not indicate the court’s 
view on the morality of the regulations since it was not within the power of the court to 
determine.17 
 Kennedy’s opinion in Beller v. Middendorf is important for three reasons. First, it 
demonstrated Kennedy’s tendency to write narrow opinions answering only the question at hand. 
Second, it showed that Kennedy emphasized individual rights in his analysis. Finally, his focus 
on discrimination laid the groundwork for his opinions regarding gay rights in the Supreme 
Court. However, the case also presented a breakthrough because it was the first time a federal 
appeals court suggested that government discrimination against gay people (outside the military) 




                                                
16 Ibid., 810-811 (“While it is clear that one does not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon entering the 
military, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional rights must be viewed in light of the special 
circumstances and needs of the armed forces. . . There are multiple grounds for the Navy to deem this regulation 
appropriate for the full and efficient accomplishment of its mission. The Navy can act to protect the fabric of 
military life, to preserve the integrity of the recruiting process, to maintain the discipline of personnel in active 
service, and to insure the acceptance of men and women in the military, who are sometimes stationed in foreign 
countries with cultures different from our own. The Navy, moreover, could conclude rationally that toleration of 
homosexual conduct, as expressed in a less broad prohibition, might be understood as tacit approval”). 
17 Ibid., 812 (“Upholding the challenged regulations as constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise. 
The latter judgment is neither implicit in our decision nor within our province to make”). 
18 See Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court (New York: 
Basic Books, 2001), 210. Citing Arthur Leonard.  
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The Big Leagues: Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court 
 On June 27, 1987, Justice Lewis Powell surprised Washington and the White House 
when he announced his resignation from the U.S. Supreme Court after serving for 16 years.19 
Despite Democratic warnings, President Reagan nominated Robert Bork a few days later to fill 
the vacancy.20 After an arduous battle, the Senate finally voted on October 23, 1987 to block 
Bork’s appointment 42-58.21  
 A few weeks later, President Reagan nominated Kennedy for the seat. Justice Kennedy’s 
confirmation hearings began in December 1988, an election year, and in February he was 
unanimously approved by the Senate 97-0 and sworn in.22 Much as he did on the Ninth Circuit, 
Kennedy took a pragmatic approach to the cases heard by the Court. Though he voted with the 
conservatives on the Court for the first few years, he rocked the boat in 1992 when he co-
authored the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.23 Then, 
four years later, the Court voted to hear its first gay rights case since Bowers v. Hardwick.24 
 Roy Romer v. Richard G. Evans 
                                                
19 Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, "Lewis F. Powell Jr.," Oyez, accessed February 21, 2016, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr.   
20 Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Byrd Says Bork Nomination Would Face Senate Trouble," The New York Times (New 
York, NY), June 30, 1987, accessed February 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/30/us/byrd-says-bork-
nomination-would-face-senate-trouble.html. (Bork was unanimously known as a staunch conservative with a crass 
personality and had been involved in the Watergate Scandals as Solicitor General). 
21 Associated Press, "Senate's Roll-Call on the Bork Vote," The New York Times (New York, NY), October 24, 
1987, accessed February 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/24/us/senate-s-roll-call-on-the-bork-vote.html.   
22 Linda Greenhouse, "Washington Talk: Court Politics; Nursing the Wounds from the Bork Fight," The New York 
Times (New York, NY), November 30, 1987, [Page #], accessed February 21, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/30/us/washington-talk-court-politics-nursing-the-wounds-from-the-bork-
fight.html.    
23 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). (5-to-4 decision, reaffirming Roe v. 
Wade). 
24 (Interestingly, Justice Powell, whom Kennedy replaced, voted to uphold the Georgia laws criminalizing 
homosexual conduct and later admitted he regretted the decision). See Michael J. Rosenfeld, The Age of 
Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-sex Unions, and the Changing American Family (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 165.  
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 In 1992 the state of Colorado placed a constitutional amendment on the ballot for a 
referendum vote. Known as Amendment 2, it sought to remove all anti-discrimination 
protections for homosexuals in the state that currently existed, and barred them from being 
reinstated in the future:  
 No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither 
 the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments nor any of its agencies, 
 political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt, or enforce any 
 statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual 
 orientation, conduct or practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis 
 of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
 preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution 
 shall be in all respects self-executing.25 
 
 Almost immediately after voters approved Amendment 2, plaintiffs filed suit hoping they 
could stop it from ever taking effect. A district court judge issued a temporary order barring 
Amendment 2 from becoming part of the state constitution, arguing that the government needed 
a compelling interest to implement it.26 In response, the state Attorney General appealed to the 
Colorado Supreme Court, which upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction, though on 
different grounds.27 In the 6-1 opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled: 
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects the fundamental 
right to participate equally in the political process, and that any legislation or state 
constitutional  amendment which infringes on this right by ‘fencing out’ an 
independently  identifiable class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.28 
 
After this ruling, the case went back to the district court, where the state had to prove 
Amendment 2 was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.29 The district court 
found that Amendment 2 was not narrowly tailored to serve any interest the state provided. The 
                                                
25 Colorado Constitution., Article II §30b. Cited in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
26 Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 457.  
27 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (Evans I) 
28 Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 457. 
29 Ibid., 458. (In this case, the state offered six compelling interests that Amendment 2 served: it deterred political 
disagreement; protected the state’s political functions; freed the state to focus more on other civil rights protections; 
prevented government interference into individual, family, and religious privacy; blocked government subsidization 
of a special interest group; and promoted children’s well being). 
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Colorado Supreme Court then looked at the case again and found there was no compelling 
interest advanced by Amendment 2 and it was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Colorado court’s ruling “marked the first time that 
the highest court of any state had found it unconstitutional to deny certain rights to 
homosexuals.”31 
 The defendants32 in the case then appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
Court granted certiorari, scheduling oral arguments for October 10, 1995.33 While counsel for the 
respondents was somewhat confident given the lower court rulings, counsel Jean Dubofsky was 
also aware the Supreme Court had not taken a case regarding homosexual rights since Bowers v. 
Hardwick, and the Court had yet to rule positively on a case regarding homosexual rights. 
 Their worries about the case’s outcome soon abated. Less than one minute into 
Colorado’s presentation at oral argument, Justice Kennedy asked the Colorado Solicitor General 
if he could cite any precedent where the Court upheld a law like Amendment 2, which Kennedy 
described as making a classification “for its own sake.”34 Kennedy then rejected the Solicitor 
General’s answer and stated “here, the classification is adopted to fence out. . .the class for all 
purposes, and I’ve never seen a statute like that.”35 Following Kennedy’s lead, Justices Stevens, 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter attacked the state’s argument. Even Justice O’Connor, who had 
voted in the majority in Bowers, questioned whether the language of the Amendment meant that 
                                                
30 Ibid., 459. (The Colorado Supreme Court took the case and looked at the 6 previously listed compelling interests 
well as a seventh: “allowing the people themselves to establish public, social, and moral norms.” Amendment 2 
advanced that interest, Colorado claimed, by preserving heterosexual marriage and branding gay men, lesbians, and 
bisexuals immoral). See Evans v. Romer 882 P.2d 1335 (1994) (Evans II) 
31 Ibid.,  
32 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996). (“Although Governor Romer had been on the record opposing the 
adoption of Amendment 2, he was named in his official capacity as the defendant, together with the Colorado 
Attorney General and the state of Colorado”). 
33 Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 464 
34 Ibid., 466 
35 Ibid.,  
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“a public library could refuse to allow books to be borrowed by homosexuals, and there would 
be no relief from that”36 While the Solicitor General argued it did not, O’Connor pressed further 
and asked, “well, how do we know that?”37 
 By the time the Solicitor General’s thirty minute argument was over, counsel and 
plaintiffs for Evans were confident they had at least a 6-3 majority on their side. When Dubofsky 
stood to present her argument,38 she spent much of her allotted time answering “that is correct” 
from the six justices. Even when Justice Scalia tried to imply that Amendment 2 served to 
prohibit “special provisions giving special protections” for those with “homosexual orientation,” 
Dubofsky reminded him that the anti-discrimination laws banned discrimination on sexual 
orientation, and since all people have a sexual orientation, the laws Amendment 2 sought to 
repeal protected everyone, not just homosexuals.39  
 The oral argument for Romer v. Evans marked a distinctive shift in the gay rights 
movement in the eyes of the judiciary. As Murdoch and Price put it in Courting Justice: 
 Never before had the U.S. Supreme Court justices talked publicly about gay people as 
 ordinary folks who check out library books, eat in restaurants, hold jobs and might need 
 police protection or kidney dialysis. Never before had a majority of justices hammered 
 away at a blatant attempt to discriminate against gay people. Never before had a majority 
 sounded so ready to wrap gay and bisexual Americans in the Constitution’s protection.40  
 
 When it came time to decide who was going to write the majority opinion, serendipity 
might have played a role. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the minority in Romer, the 
most senior member of the winning side, in this case Justice Stevens, got to choose the author of 
                                                
36 Ibid., 467 
37 Ibid.,  
38 Ibid., 461-462. She encouraged the Court to use the same reasoning the Colorado Supreme Court did and subject 
Amendment 2 to strict scrutiny. (“Under Amendment 2, all efforts by the government to protect gay people from 
discrimination are swept away. . .from the police officer who refuses to patrol gay neighborhoods or provide backup 
assistance to lesbian police officers [like Amendment 2 challenger] Angela Romero, to the judge who decides cases 
based on animus towards lesbians and gay men, even state actors who irrationally and maliciously discriminate 
based on sexual orientation are immune from state legislative, executive, and administrative or judicial remedy”). 
39 Ibid., 471  
40 Ibid., 471 
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the majority opinion. Though it is hard to say exactly why Stevens chose Kennedy to write the 
opinion, the testimony of some clerks on the Court that term is that Stevens chose Kennedy to 
keep O’Connor in the majority.41 Regardless of why Kennedy was elected to write the opinion, 
he did, and on May 20, 1996, the Court announced in a 6-3 decision that Amendment 2 violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.  
 In Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy focused on two main ideas to determine that 
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional. First, that Amendment 2 had an inexplicably large sweep by 
both repealing all existing anti-discrimination legislation and barring more protections from ever 
being adopted in the future. Second, he wrote that there was no rational reason, other than 
animus, for a law to make it more difficult for one group of citizens to seek protections from the 
government:42 
 We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper 
 legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A 
 state cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the 
 Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Colorado is 
 confirmed.43  
 
 Kennedy argued that even if the amendment was narrowly construed, it made Colorado’s 
gay and bisexual community totally vulnerable to irrational and arbitrary discrimination that 
Colorado law otherwise protects against.44 Kennedy wrote that the amendment demands that 
homosexuals be put in a “solitary class” and withdraws “from homosexuals, but no others, 
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement 
of these laws and policies.”45  
                                                
41 Ibid., 474 (Justice O’Connor voted to uphold the sodomy bans in 1986 in Bowers).  
42 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
43 Ibid., at 635 
44 Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 471. 
45 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627-628 (1996). 
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 Additionally, Kennedy rejected the state’s argument that Amendment 2 was intended to 
conserve resources to fight discrimination against suspect classes, because Amendment 2 did not 
say anything about other non-suspect classes protected under Colorado law.46 On the contrary, 
Kennedy noted: 
 [T]he Amendment imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone. Homosexuals 
 are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without  constraint. . . We find 
 nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken 
 for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them; 
 these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions 
 and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.47 
 
 Second, Kennedy acknowledged that while all laws classify persons for certain reasons, 
and those classifications may disadvantage a group, the classification can be upheld “so long as it 
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”48 Kennedy further argued Amendment 2 had no 
rational relation to a government interest because it not only imposed a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, but also because the scope of the amendment 
could leave no explanation except animus for the class that it affected.49 Kennedy wrote that 
“Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”50 
 While it is notable that Kennedy argued that Amendment 2 could not pass even the 
lowest level of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, he simultaneously rejected the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning that Amendment 2 should be subject to strict scrutiny. In 
other words, Kennedy’s opinion focused more on the negative effects and unconstitutionality of 
                                                
46 Ibid., at 629: Colorado had passed anti-discrimination laws for age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, 
parenthood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability, in addition to sexual 
orientation. The state’s argument that sexual orientation could not be covered because it gives homosexuals an 
unfair advantage doesn’t make sense, Kennedy asserts, because all of those other groups are protected. Therefore, 
Amendment 2 was passed to harm homosexuals in a way that no other group was.  
47 Ibid., at 630 
48 Ibid., at 631 emphasis added 
49 Ibid., at 632 
50 Ibid., at 621 
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Amendment 2 than on the level of scrutiny or majority rights.51 While it is unclear exactly why 
Kennedy chose not to determine the level of scrutiny for laws that classify based on sexual 
orientation, scholars have offered some possible reasons.  
 As one brief submitted to the Court in Romer argued, the Supreme Court did not have to 
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws classifying homosexuals because 
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause on its face and could not even pass rational 
basis.52 Therefore, the Court may have found it unnecessary to get bogged down in levels of 
scrutiny. Additionally, Kennedy may have been less likely to garner a majority if he had insisted 
upon heightened or strict equal protection scrutiny in Romer because a lower court had rejected 
the plaintiffs’ arguments that sexual orientation was a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.53 
Furthermore, because challengers to Amendment 2 did not appeal that specific part of the lower 
court ruling, the Supreme Court did not have a reason to rule on it.54  
 Another possible reason why Kennedy eschewed determining the level of scrutiny for 
sexual orientation could be the case-by-case approach that Kennedy employed throughout his 
time on the Ninth Circuit. The question in Romer the Court had to answer was whether 
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Kennedy answered it 
without making a sweeping decision on scrutiny that would have protected gays more fully under 
the law. Just as the Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision 
simply answered the separate-but-equal question and did not address voting rights or bans on 
                                                
51 Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 471. 
52 Ibid., 462. Citing Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hartely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, as Amici Curiae Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
53 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994). 
54 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 138. 
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interracial marriage, Kennedy’s opinion did not address gay rights issues not directly raised in 
Amendment 2.55 Nevertheless, as Murdoch and Price argue: 
 [T]he Court broke with its own antigay past to declare that hatred is not a legitimate 
 reason to treat gay Americans as second class citizens. Measuring Amendment 2 against 
 the minimal requirement that it bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, 
 Kennedy found that it simply did not make sense -- except as an expression of “animus” 
 or animosity.56  
 
Perhaps most importantly, with the Romer opinion Kennedy fulfilled the promise implicit in his 
1980 Beller ruling that gay constitutional claims had to be taken seriously and that laws created 
for no other purpose than to discriminate cannot stand under any standard of review.57  
 On the other hand, the ruling also gave little or no guidance to lower courts on how to 
proceed with cases regarding homosexual rights that did not deal specifically with anti-
discrimination laws. In other words, it was difficult to determine how much “equal protection” 
gay Americans had won because even though six justices “had drawn a line and scolded 
Colorado for having crossed it. . .they gave no reliable hint of what else -- if anything -- they 
would view as over the line.”58 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court ruled that gay Americans 
were not “strangers to the law,” and had rights under the Equal Protection Clause, the opinion 
and reasoning gave no indication that other laws that classified gays, such as bans on them 
serving in the military or bans on same sex sodomy, were unconstitutional as well.59 Because the 
Court did not provide a sweeping ruling that stated that any law which classified according to 
sexual orientation was subject to strict or heightened scrutiny, litigants would need to challenge 
each issue involving such classifications one by one. In other words, “[g]iven no guidance, most 
lower court judges [chose] the weak ‘rational basis’ standard that most always [meant] 
                                                
55 Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 478. 
56 Ibid., 476 
57 Ibid., 467 
58 Ibid., 481 
59 Ibid., 482 
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discrimination [won].”60 For example, though Romer stated that homosexuals could not remain 
“strangers to the laws,” gay soldiers were persecuted and discharged from the military until 
2011, when Don’t Ask Don’t Tell was repealed because -- for fifteen years after Romer -- 
barring open homosexuals from serving in the military was understood to be rationally related to 
serve a legitimate state interest.  
 Between Romer v. Evans and 2003 the Court refused to hear several cases on gay 
rights,61 but ruled on some cases that involved homosexuality in broader contexts.62 Perhaps the 
most interesting development during this time, however, was the change in the Court’s rhetoric 
about homosexuals generally. During this time the Court started to become more comfortable 
with discussing homosexuals as human beings.63 The cases that the justices turned away, 
however, revealed the contradictory ways the outside world was responding to gay demands for 
full equality.64 While the Court had said that homosexuals could not be strangers to America’s 
laws in Romer, many judges used the Bowers v. Hardwick sodomy decision as a homophobic 
                                                
60 Ibid., 525 
61 Paul G. Thomasson v. William Perry et al, 895 F. Supp. 820 (4th Cir. 1995). (Case challenged the Military’s 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy. Court denied certiorari on October 21, 1996); Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498, (9th 
Cir. 1997). (City of San Francisco fired Lumpkin, a pastor, from the city Human Rights Commission because he 
made statements condemning homosexuality. Lumpkin sued the Mayor of San Francisco arguing his rights under 
the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) had been violated. Court denied 
certiorari); Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, (11th Cir. 1997). (Shahar was hired by Attorney General Bowers in 
Georgia, but was fired when Bowers discovered Shahar was partaking in a commitment ceremony with her same-
sex partner. Court denied certiorari). 
62 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 530 U.S. 640 (2000). (Court ruled 5-4 that applying New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law to require BSA to allow open homosexuals serve as troop leaders violated the BSA’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of association. Kennedy voted in the majority); Board of Regents, University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth 529 U.S. 217 (2000). (Conservative students at the University of Wisconsin 
brought suit against the university saying that requiring them to pay a fee to subsidize campus groups that may 
promote gay equality violated their First Amendment rights. Court ruled unanimously that public universities could 
charge students an activity fee to subsidize campus groups without violating the First Amendment rights of students 
who find some campus groups objectionable. Kennedy authored the opinion).  
63 See Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 494. (“In grappling with gay related cases after 
Romer, the Justices demonstrated increasing sophistication in and increasing comfort in dealing with 
homosexuality.”) 
64 Ibid., 488-489: (“The Justices were offered glimpses of the most virulent strand of homophobia produced in the 
1990s, competing churches tug of war over homosexuality, the increasing efforts of many state and local 
governments to protect their gay citizens and the continued use of the Hardwick sodomy decision as an all purpose 
antigay weapon.”) 
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weapon.65 Perhaps the Court was waiting to take a case that was worth hearing; it turned out to 
be Lawrence v. Texas, and once again, Kennedy was given an opportunity to give equal rights to 
gays. 
Lawrence et al v. Texas  
 In Lawrence, the Court decided that all laws criminalizing sodomy were unconstitutional 
under the Due Process Clause. Though every state in America had laws banning sodomy at one 
point, by the time the Court ruled in 2003, only 11 states still had them in place.66 In Texas 
specifically, the state had passed a sodomy law in 1859 and it applied to heterosexual and 
homosexual sodomy alike.67 In 1970 a federal judge in the state declared that the state sodomy 
law was unconstitutional as applied to married couples.68 During this time Texas also liberalized 
many of the state’s sex laws for heterosexuals by decriminalizing adultery, fornication, 
seduction, and even bestiality.69 However, despite these progressive rulings, homosexuals were 
still considered second-class citizens whose actions could be criminalized. In fact, in 1973, Texas 
tightened its sodomy law to criminalize “deviate sexual intercourse” and a “Homosexual 
Conduct” provision of the law made deviate sexual conduct a crime only if performed “with 
another individual of the same sex.”70 While it is unclear how often the law was enforced,71 it 
                                                
65 Ibid.,  
66 However, it is important to note that while all 50 states had sodomy bans at one point, it was only in the 1970s 
that any state singled out homosexual sodomy and only 9 states -- Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, Tennessee, Texas, Oklahoma -- ever enacted such laws. Since the Court ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
Arkansas, Montana, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Nevada all repealed their sodomy laws targeting homosexuals. See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003). 
67 The law, however, was unenforceable until 1879. See Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence 
v. Texas : How a Bedroom Arrest Decriminalized Gay Americans (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), 9.  
68 Ibid., 11. 
69 Ibid.,  
70 Ibid., 11-13 
71 Ibid., (“In the entire 143 year history of the Texas sodomy law, from its enactment until struck down in Lawrence, 
there are no publicly reported court decisions involving the enforcement of the law against consensual sex between 
adult persons in a private space.”) 
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took three decades for a challenge to the law to be successful and the law to be declared 
unconstitutional.  
*** 
 On September 17, 1998, a Houston police officer responded to a reported weapons 
disturbance at a private residence. Upon arrival at the residence, the officer found John Lawrence 
and Tyron Garner engaging in a sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were then arrested and charged 
with violating Texas Penal Code Ann. 21.06(a) which read: “[a] person commits an offense if he 
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”72 Lawrence and 
Garner pleaded no contest and were each charged $125 and then appealed the decision to the 
Harris County Criminal Court.73 The lawyers for Lawrence and Garner argued the law violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because it only prohibited sodomy against same-sex couples and not 
heterosexual couples.74 Additionally, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the law violated the 
plaintiffs’ right to privacy and contended that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided.75 The 
judge in Harris County rejected the arguments and charged Lawrence and Garner $200 each.76  
 Counsel for the defendants then appealed the decision to a three-judge panel77 of the 
Texas Court of Appeals, which declared that the Texas law was unconstitutional under the 1972 
Equal Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution.78 The judge found the law “inexplicable on 
any rational ground of public policy” and concluded that there was no legitimate justification to 
                                                
72 The law had been changed to signal just homosexuals in 1973 and was effective January 1, 1974.(21.01 
DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (I) “deviate sexual intercourse” means: (A) any contact between any part of the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of 
another person with an object). See Ibid., 24 and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). 
73 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story, 140. 
74 Ibid., 148 
75 Ibid., 148-149 
76 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). 
77 Only three of the nine judges on the court heard arguments and ruled on the case.  
78 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story, 164-167. (Found that the law violated the 1972 Equal Rights 
Amendment to the Texas Constitution which bars discrimination based on sex, race, color, creed, or national origin) 
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target only gay people.79 However, the panel’s decision was reversed by the entire court of 
appeals which upheld the constitutionality of the law 7-2, rejecting both the equal protection and 
due process arguments.80 Attorneys for Lawrence and Garner appealed to the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, and after their request was denied, filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court on July 16, 2002. In December of that year their petition was granted.81 
 As with Romer, we do not know why the justices voted to hear the case, or why, once 
again, Justice Kennedy was chosen to write the majority opinion. On June 26, 2003, the Court 
announced in a 6-3 decision that the Texas law was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. According to Michael J. Rosenfeld: 
 The basis of the Lawrence decision (consistent with Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and 
 Loving) was that the individual right to privacy was more important than community 
 standards, more important than popular opinion, and more important than the original 
 intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution.82  
  
 Furthermore, in his opinion Kennedy focused more on the implicit right to privacy 
established in Griswold than on scrutiny and equal protection.83 He highlighted three main 
points: (1) that homosexuals had a protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity; 
(2) that homosexuals’ moral and sexual choices were entitled to constitutional protection under 
the Due Process Clause; (3) and that moral disapproval did not provide a legitimate justification 
for Texas to criminalize homosexual sodomy. Regarding the first point, Kennedy noted there 
was substantial precedent outlining “[the] broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty 
under the Due Process Clause.”84 Moreover, he argued that the Court in Bowers had approached 
                                                
79 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story, 167. 
80 Ibid., 175 
81 Ibid., 184-185 
82 Michael J. Rosenfeld, The Age of Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-sex Unions, and the Changing 
American Family (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 166. 
83 Refer to Chapter I’s discussion of Griswold v. Connecticut 
84 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925): ("the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept 
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the case incorrectly by focusing on determining if there was a right to engage in certain 
homosexual conduct, and by doing so, the Court belittled the liberty interest at stake.85 
Furthermore, Kennedy asserted:  
 When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
 conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty 
 protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.86  
 
 Regarding the second point, Kennedy explained why the statute is invalid under the Due 
Process Clause and not the Equal Protection Clause:  
 Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected 
 by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on 
 the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law 
 which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain 
 even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual 
 conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in it of itself is an 
 invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private 
 spheres. The central holding in Bowers has been brought into question by this case and it 
 should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual 
 persons.87  
 
 In other words, while Kennedy acknowledged that counsel for Lawrence and some briefs 
argued the statute should be struck on equal protection grounds similarly to Romer, he refused to 
do so given that the law upheld in Bowers treated homosexuals and heterosexuals equally, and 
therefore could not be overturned using the equal protection grounds he employed in Romer. 
More specifically, Kennedy wrote:  
 [W]ere we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might 
 question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the 
 conduct both between same sex and different sex participants.88  
                                                                                                                                                       
instruction from public teachers only.”) cited in Lawrence regarding the broad reach of liberty; Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): (The Court reasoned there was a protected interest in the right to privacy and 
placed emphasis on the marital bedroom); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972): (The Court determined that 
there was a right to make certain decisions about sexual conduct outside the marital relationship, and unmarried 
couples or and single people have rights to sexual privacy too just like married people.) 
85 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
86 Ibid.,  
87 Ibid., at 575 
88 Ibid., at 575 
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In looking at the case through due process, therefore, Kennedy declared that laws banning 
anyone from making independent decisions about their sex lives are unconstitutional, and that 
reasoning goes beyond what an equal protection argument could.  
 Regarding the third point, concerning moral disapproval, Kennedy conceded that the 
Bowers court sought to establish that homosexual conduct, which had been condemned for a 
long time, was immoral. However, Kennedy noted that “this Court’s obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code,”89 and the issue before the Court therefore was 
“whether the majority can use the Power of the state to enforce these views on the whole society 
through operations of the criminal law.”90 Kennedy argued that the state was prohibited from 
doing so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects the liberty 
of all persons under the law, writing that “liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”91 In making 
autonomous choices about their sexual conduct, Kennedy argued, homosexuals assert their 
liberty right, and the ruling in Bowers denied homosexuals this right. Therefore, it could not 
stand.  
 Furthermore, Kennedy explicitly stated that the reasoning used in Stevens’ dissent in 
Bowers was correct in stating that moral disapproval of a group or practice is insufficient to 
uphold a law targeting a group or banning a practice.92 Kennedy further asserted that “Bowers 
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding 
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”93 In his 18-page opinion, he 
                                                
89 Ibid., at 559 citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
90 Ibid., at 571 
91 Ibid., at 574 
92 Ibid., at 577 
93 Ibid., at 578 
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struck down all sodomy laws in America and deemed any state control of sexual conduct, for 
heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, unconstitutional.  
 While there is much to celebrate in his decision in Lawrence, as in Romer, Kennedy 
avoided determining the level of scrutiny the Court should use when confronted with laws 
classifying on the basis of sexual orientation. As mentioned, Kennedy’s stated reason for not 
deciding the case on equal protection grounds is because he wanted to overrule Bowers and 
thought deciding Lawrence on equal protection grounds made it impossible to do so. That said, 
some scholars contend that Kennedy could have used the reasoning in Loving to apply the due 
process clause to overrule Bowers and then apply the equal protection clause to declare that 
sexual orientation was a suspect or semi-suspect classification.94  Alternatively, Kennedy could 
have overruled Bowers using the reasoning in Loving, that bans on interracial marriage were 
unconstitutional even if whites and blacks were punished equally, because the “equal 
application” of a criminal statute did not mean it was valid under the Equal Protection Clause.95 
Therefore, Kennedy could have argued that simply because the statute upheld in Bowers 
exemplified “equal application” of a criminal statute to all people, not just homosexuals, the 
Court’s opinion was strictly framed in terms of the absence of a right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy, not sodomy generally. 
                                                
94 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 139. (“Yet even if he felt compelled to address the due process 
claims and overrule Bowers, Justice Kennedy could have also addressed the class-based equal protection claim by 
following the example of Loving v. Virginia. There the Court struck down miscegenation laws alternatively on the 
ground that they violated the fundamental right to marry and the ground that they constituted class-based 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”) 
95 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967). (“Because we reject the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a 
statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State’s contention that these statutes should 
be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose. . .the case of equal 
application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth 
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”) While I acknowledge there is not a 
perfect comparison between race and sexual orientation, my argument focuses more on the benefits of being 
protected as a suspect or semi-suspect class. 
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 While Kennedy arguably missed another prime opportunity to protect homosexuals more 
broadly from discrimination, the decision did provide precedent for later cases. Most notably, 
almost immediately after Lawrence v. Texas was decided, the American press and public went 
into a frenzy about what the ruling could possibly mean for same-sex marriage. As one scholar 
noted, “[p]rint media, television journalists, and online commentators all seemed to converge 
around the assumption reflected in the Los Angeles Times headline: ‘Ruling Seen as Precursor to 
Same-Sex Marriages.’”96 While Justice Kennedy’s opinion never mentioned same-sex marriage 
in Lawrence, and, on the contrary, attempted to distance the Lawrence ruling from same-sex 
marriage,97 Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent called direct attention to it.98 In the world outside the 
courthouse, Ontario’s legalization of same-sex marriage in early June 2003,99 and the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s pending decision on same-sex marriage in the state,100 almost 
immediately linked Lawrence and same-sex marriage for many on both sides of the argument.101  
 Potentially reacting to the fear that America was moving too quickly in the direction of 
full equality for gays, overall support for same-sex marriage declined among all ideological 
                                                
96 John D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage," in The 
Politics of Same-sex Marriage, ed. Craig A. Rimmerman and Clyde Wilcox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 43. Citing David G. Savage, "Ruling Seen as Precursor to Same-Sex Marriages," LA Times (Los Angeles, 
CA), June 28, 2003, accessed February 21, 2016, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/28/nation/na-scotus28.  
97 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). (Kennedy explicitly writes the ruling “. . .not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”) 
98 Scalia’s dissent was both scathing and direct; he charged “today’s opinion dismantles the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar 
as formal recognition of marriage is concerned. Ibid., at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he argued Justice 
Kennedy’s reasoning “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.” Ibid., at 
601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
99 D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free?," in The Politics of Same-sex, 43. Canada. Klarman, From the Closet to 
the Altar, 87. 
100 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). Goodridge was decided November 18, 2003. 
(“For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for 
either due process or equal protection. Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not consider 
the plaintiffs' arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny”).  
101 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 87. Additionally, the day after Lawrence was decided, a state judge in 
New Jersey heard arguments in a gay marriage case. In September 2003, New York’s Democratic Party became the 
third in the nation to endorse same-sex marriage. 
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groups in the period of time immediately after Lawrence.102 However, as Kennedy stated in 
Lawrence: 
 [T]imes can bind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
 thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
 persons in every generation can invoke its certain principles in their own search for 
 greater freedom.103  
 
While Kennedy understood that in 2003 only heterosexual marriage could be permitted, he also 
understood that with time, some laws might be challenged in order to promote greater freedom 
for all. Kennedy was given that opportunity to invoke newfound principles to search for greater 
freedom for homosexuals a decade later in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. 
Perry.104 
 United States v. Windsor 
 Unlike both Romer and Lawrence, United States v. Windsor was the only case the 
Supreme Court heard leading up to Obergefell that dealt with a federal law and homosexuals. 
The case directly addressed Section 3 of the federal 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),105 
                                                
102 Ibid., 88 
103 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
104 Hollingsworth v. Perry 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). While the case Hollingsworth v. Perry marks an important part of 
the path to same-sex marriage in the United States, this thesis focuses solely on Justice Kennedy’s opinions. The 
case dealt with the constitutionality of Proposition 8, which, in 2008, California voted to amend the California 
Constitution to provide that: "only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California." The 
respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of 
California's marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could 
not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district 
court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
Ultimately in this case the Supreme Court voted that the officials did not have standing to bring the issue to the 
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy dissented. See Solomon, Winning Marriage: The inside, 319; Chicago-Kent 
College of Law at Illinois Tech, "Hollingsworth v. Perry," Oyez, accessed February 22, 2016, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-144;  
105 DOMA was introduced to the United States House in May 1996 in response to the same-sex marriage case in 
Hawaii. DOMA provided that states did not have to recognize marriages that were legally performed in other states, 
and Section 3 stated: “in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means 
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the words ‘spouse’ refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife. 1 U.S.C §7.” DOMA had overwhelming support and passed the 
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which defined ‘marriage’ as a union between a man and a woman, and ‘spouse’ as someone of 
the opposite sex.106 Under DOMA, same-sex couples could not receive federal benefits of any 
kind even if their marriage was legal in the state where they lived. Under DOMA, only marriage 
between a man and a woman would receive social security survivorship benefits, immigration 
rights, and the privilege of filing joint tax returns.107  
*** 
 In 2007 New York residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in Ontario, 
Canada after living together for forty-four years.108 At the time, New York did not allow same-
sex marriage; however, Windsor and Spyer were able to live in New York as a married couple 
because the state fully recognized same-sex marriages that were legally performed elsewhere.109 
In 2009 Thea Spyer passed away and left her entire estate to Windsor. When Windsor attempted 
to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, she was prohibited from doing so 
under §3 of DOMA and had to pay $363,053 in estate taxes. She then sought a refund from the 
IRS but was denied. Windsor filed a federal lawsuit and argued that DOMA violated equal 
                                                                                                                                                       
House 342-67 and the Senate 85-14 before being signed by President Bill Clinton September 21, 1996. See 
Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 61-63.  
106 In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court voted in 1993 that restricting marriage to a man and a woman 
constituted a sex classification and under the Hawaii Constitution’s equal rights amendment, and the law was 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Hawaii returned the case to the trial court for a hearing on whether the state could 
demonstrate they had a compelling state interest in excluding same-sex couples from marriage. The trial in Baehr 
was rescheduled for September 1996 and in December Judge Kevin Chang ruled that the state had no compelling 
justification for excluding same-sex couples from marriage. In response to the ruling, the legislature passed a 
constitutional amendment that limited marriage to a union between one man and one woman. The amendment was 
put on the ballot for a referendum in November 1998 and was approved 69 percent to 31 percent. By the time 
Hawaii passed the Amendment, over thirty states had passed defense of marriage acts. See Klarman, From the 
Closet to the Altar, 56, 66. While the case in Hawaii is important for same-sex marriage and how states in particular 
reacted to the issue, this paper will not discuss the actions of the state at length. See table 1 in appendix for 
information about Hawaii’s path to same-sex marriage.  
107 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 61. 
108 Marc Solomon, Winning Marriage: The inside Story of How Same-Sex Couples Took on the Politicians and 
Pundits--and Won (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2014), 285. 
109 Jeremy Peters, "New York to Back Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere," The New York Times, May 29, 2008, 
accessed February 22, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/29/nyregion/29marriage.html?_r=2; "The Freedom to 
Marry in New York," Freedom to Marry, accessed February 22, 2016, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/new-
york.   
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protection principles in the Fifth Amendment made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Using rational basis review, the district court found §3 unconstitutional 
and ordered the U.S. Treasury Department to refund Windsor’s tax with interest.110 The United 
States111 appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district 
court’s ruling.112 The United States then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari December 7, 2012.  
 Oral argument for United States v. Windsor was held on March 27, 2013. Solicitor 
General Donald Verrilli for the United States made three main arguments about the interests 
DOMA furthered: DOMA induces couples to marry and have children within marriage; DOMA 
encourages uniformity in the administration of federal benefits; and DOMA saves the federal 
government money.113 Additionally, counsel for the United States argued that states were 
traditionally able to decide their marriage laws; marriage was traditionally understood as a union 
between a man and a woman; and the Court should be cautious in declaring DOMA 
unconstitutional.114 In contrast, Windsor’s brief contended that while the Court should apply 
heightened scrutiny to DOMA because it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, even 
                                                
110 Brief for Edith Schlain Windsor, as Merits Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11, United States v. Windsor, U.S. 
570 (2013). Citing district court’s opinion which stated there was no logical relationship between DOMA and the 
goal of promoting responsible procreation or child rearing by straight couples. Court asserted DOMA had no direct 
impact on heterosexuals at all. 
111 Before the district court released the initial ruling, the Attorney General (Eric Holder) notified Speaker of the 
House (John Boehner) that the Department of Justice would no longer defend Section 3 as constitutional. In 
response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives voted to intervene and 
defend Section 3’s constitutionality.  
112 Brief for Edith Schlain Windsor, as Merits Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-13 United States v. Windsor, 
U.S. 570 (2013). The Second Circuit applied heightened scrutiny to Section 3 of DOMA (“considering the factors 
that this Court has used to decide whether to treat a particular classification as suspect or quasi-suspect, the Second 
Circuit found that ‘all four factors justify heightened scrutiny’ of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: 
‘A) homosexuals as a group have historically endured persecution and discrimination; B) homosexuality has no 
relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; C) homosexuals are a discernible group with non-obvious 
distinguishing characteristics, especially in the subset of those who enter into same-sex marriages; and D) the class 
remains a politically weakened minority.”) Citing lower court ruling 15a-16a 
113 Brief for the United States, as Merits Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. 
1 (2013). 
114 Ibid., 17 
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under the rational basis test DOMA was unconstitutional.115 Counsel argued the law could not 
withstand the lowest level of scrutiny because it targeted an unpopular group, imposed sweeping 
disabilities without factual context, and was outside of America’s “constitutional tradition.”116  
 On June 26, 2013, ten years to the day after Lawrence v. Texas, the Court announced in a 
5-4 decision that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional. In his majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy focused on the history of state regulation of marriage, the purpose of DOMA, and the 
equal dignity and liberty interest of same-sex couples protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Kennedy asserted that states have always defined and regulated their own marriage laws, and 
while these laws must respect the constitutional rights of citizens, states had the power to create 
the laws.117 Furthermore, while Kennedy acknowledged that states are able to pass and enforce 
their marriage laws, within the confines of an individual state, marriage laws must be applied 
equally to all married couples. In other words, because New York had the right to legalize same-
sex marriage, the federal government had to make marriage benefits accessible to same-sex 
couples in New York and all other states that legalized same-sex marriage.118 Furthermore, 
Kennedy argued that while the federal government could regulate the meaning of marriage to 
further a federal policy, like establishing income based criteria for social security benefits, 
DOMA was applicable to “over 1,000 federal statutes and [a] whole realm of federal 
regulations”119 that broadly affected citizens’ everyday lives. 
 Kennedy also argued that the 11 states and the District of Columbia that had legalized 
same-sex marriage before Windsor had given same-sex couples who seek to marry “a dignity and 
                                                
115 Ibid., 15 
116 Ibid., 16 
117 United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. 1, 16 (2013). 
118 Ibid., 18 
119 Ibid., 16 
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status of immense report,” but that DOMA sought to strip them of that dignity.120 Quite bluntly, 
he asserted that while New York sought to give protection and dignity to same-sex marriages and 
same-sex couples, DOMA’s aim was to injure same-sex couples and “impose a disadvantage, a 
separate status, and so a stigma upon all those who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful 
by the unquestioned authority of the states.”121 And he goes on to say: 
 As the title and dynamics of the bill indicate, its purpose is to discourage enactment of 
 state same-sex marriage laws and to restrict the freedom and choice of couples married 
 under these laws if they are enacted. . . The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that 
 if any state decides to recognize same-sex marriage, those unions will be treated as 
 second class marriages for the purposes of federal law.122 
 
 In terms of the constitutionality of DOMA, Kennedy asserted that DOMA denied same-
sex couples the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Kennedy 
further argued that DOMA “writes inequality into the entire United States code” by identifying a 
subset of state-sanctioned marriages and declaring them unequal to heterosexual marriages and 
unworthy of federal recognition.123 Kennedy asserted that DOMA had several negative 
consequences including the humiliation of the “tens of thousands of children now being raised by 
same-sex couples,” who, because of the law, could not “understand the integrity and closeness of 
their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily 
lives.”124 He concluded by stating that “the federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the state, by its 
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”125 
                                                
120 Ibid., 18 
121 Ibid., 21 
122 Ibid., 21-22 
123 Ibid., 22-23 
124 Ibid., 23 
125 Ibid., 25-26 
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 For all the eloquent language on behalf of gays and lesbians in Windsor, Kennedy’s 
opinion, as in Romer and Lawrence, did not determine that sexual orientation was a suspect or 
semi-suspect classification. Moreover in contrast to Romer and Lawrence, it avoided addressing 
equal protection in terms of scrutiny or a law’s relationship to a state interest at all. While 
Kennedy arguably rejected DOMA on its face for putting same-sex couples in a solitary class 
below heterosexual couples, his opinion was not explicit in language or reasoning to that end. On 
the contrary, he discussed the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
right to intimate association in terms of a right to privacy he discussed in Lawrence. For the first 
time, he based his reasoning on the idea that DOMA violates same-sex couples’ right to equal 
dignity. 
 While Kennedy’s failure to specify a level of scrutiny for sexual orientation 
classifications in Romer and Lawrence may have been reasonable, in Windsor it is much harder 
to defend. Unlike in Romer and Lawrence, there were no procedural hurdles in Windsor that 
stood in the Court’s way to determine a level of scrutiny. Nevertheless, Kennedy “issued a 
murky opinion” to declare DOMA unconstitutional.126 As SCOTUSblog’s William Duncan 
wrote, not only did Kennedy not touch on the level of judicial review, but “the test that was 
applied [in Windsor] appeared to be notably indistinct.”127 Others argued that formulating a test 
for determining whether a statute interferes with the “equal dignity” is nearly impossible, if not 
equivocal.128  
                                                
126 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 139. 
127 Lyle Denniston, "Opinions Recap: Giant Step for Gay Marriage," SCOTUSblog, last modified June 26, 2013, 
accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinions-recap-giant-step-for-gay-marriage/.  
128 William Duncan, "Bad News for Marriage, Good News for Government Power," SCOTUSblog, last modified 
June 26, 2013, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/bad-news-for-marriage-good-
news-for-government-power/.  
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 Windsor, like Romer and Lawrence, could reflect Justice Kennedy’s desire to look at the 
issue narrowly and not give any guidance to lower courts for other gay rights issues. Arguably he 
did not need to address the level of scrutiny because he believed DOMA was unconstitutional 
whether strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, or the rational basis test was used. Another 
possibility is that Kennedy and the rest of the majority in Windsor knew that the arguments to 
apply a higher level of scrutiny were compelling and if they chose to determine the level in 
Windsor, it would have effectively ended the entire marriage debate nationwide.129 Windsor was 
also a case involving a federal law with very broad implications for a whole range of issues.  
 However disappointing it may be that Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Romer, Lawrence, 
and Windsor, did not secure broader protections of equality for homosexuals in America by 
determining a level of review for future gay rights cases, his opinions opened the door for 
acceptance and equal treatment of gays in America. While Kennedy sits right of center on some 
issues, his jurisprudence is notably progressive when it comes to some minority rights and 
individual freedom. Perhaps this can be attributed to the time he spent abroad as a student where 
he was exposed to more socially liberal views of his peers in the legal field. Perhaps it was that a 
close family friend during his childhood and legal mentor was gay. Perhaps it was the 
understanding that as time goes on, American law must adapt to invoke new principles and 
freedoms that were not considered before. 
                                                
129 Paul Smith, "The Court Opts for an Incremental Approach but a Major Victory Nonetheless," SCOTUSblog, last 





CHAPTER III  
 
Obergefell v. Hodges and a Call for Heightened Scrutiny 
 
Living in a Post-Windsor World 
 
 While United States v. Windsor did not give lower courts a clear decision on the level of 
scrutiny for cases regarding classifications on sexual orientation, soon after the decision was 
announced, state legislatures and courts began overturning same-sex marriage bans across the 
country. Between June 2013 and November 2014, twenty-two states changed their marriage laws 
to legalize same-sex marriage and to recognize same-sex marriages that were performed 
elsewhere.1 Despite these gains, however, fifteen states did not change their marriage laws after 
Windsor and same-sex couples in those states were still denied recognition of their relationships 
and all the benefits married couples receive.2  
 
Figure 1. States Where Same-Sex Marriage was Legalized Between Windsor and November 2014. Blue 
Indicates States Where Same-Sex Marriage was Legal Before Windsor. 
                                                
1 California, New Jersey, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Colorado, Indiana, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nevada, West Virginia, North Carolina, Alaska, Idaho, Arizona, Wyoming, 
South Carolina, Montana. See table 1 in the appendix for more information on individual states. 
2 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. See table 1 in the appendix for more detailed information.  
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 While lawsuits in nearly all fifteen states that kept their laws on the books were filed, 
only cases in four of those states were consolidated into one case in the Sixth Circuit and 
renamed Obergefell v. Hodges.3 Specifically, Obergefell was the combination of six cases from 
Tennessee,4 Michigan,5 Kentucky,6 and Ohio7 involving thirty plaintiffs.8 The plaintiffs had each 
filed federal suits arguing that laws in their respective states violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                
3 Tanco v. Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, No. 14-571; DeBoer v. Snyder, Governor of Michigan, No. 14-571; 
Obergefell v. Richard Hodges, Director of Ohio Department of Health, No. 14-566; and Bourke v. Beshear, 
Governor of Kentucky, No. 14-574. 
4 The case Tanco v. Haslam was brought to Tennessee district court on October 21, 2013 by three couples 
challenging the state’s same-sex marriage recognition ban. On March 14, 2014 Judge Aleta A. Trauger, a Clinton 
appointee, granted the plaintiffs the preliminary injunction which effectively barred the state from enforcing the 
same-sex marriage bans and the anti-recognition laws against the plaintiffs in the case. See Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tanco v. Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, No. 3:13-cv-01159 (Oct. 21, 13); 
Preliminary Injunction, Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159 (March 14, 2014). 
5 The case DeBoer v. Snyder was brought in Michigan district court on January 2012 by one couple challenging the 
state’s adoption law that prevented both parties from legally adopting their children because they were unmarried. 
The state moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing; Judge Bernard A. Friedman, a Reagan appointee, agreed 
the plaintiffs did not have standing in the adoption case, but encouraged the plaintiffs to re-file their case to 
challenge the same-sex marriage ban instead. The plaintiffs did so and the court ruled in their favor on March 21, 
2014. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing DeBoer R. 151 at 3); and Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, DeBoer v. Snyder, ED Mi No. 12-10285 (Sep. 7, 2012). 
6 The case Bourke v. Beshear was brought to the Kentucky district court exactly one month after Windsor. Four 
couples brought suit challenging the state’s recognition ban. On February 12, 2014, Judge John Heyburn II, a 
George H.W. Bush appointee, ruled that the denial of recognition for valid same-sex marriages violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and ordered the state to start recognizing marriages March 21. After that ruling, two couples in 
Love v. Beshear requested the court also grant injunction for the same-sex marriage bans in the state. Heyburn 
denied the request arguing that the couples should go through the standard procedure. On July 1, 2014 Judge 
Heyburn then overturned the Kentucky’s same-sex marriage bans in Love v. Beshear using rational basis. See 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397, 398 (6th Cir. 2014) and Memorandum Opinion, Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-
cv-750-H (Feb, 12, 2014); Brett Barrouquere, "Federal Judge Weighing Challenge to Kentucky Gay Marriage Ban," 
EdgeMediaNetwork, last modified January 14, 2014, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://www.edgemedianetwork.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=national&sc2=news&sc3=&id=154209.  
7 The case Obergefell v. Kasich was brought to Ohio district court by two couples challenging Ohio’s marriage 
recognition ban in its application for death certificates of same-sex couples. Additionally, Henry v. Wymyslo, was 
brought by four couples challenging the recognition bans in the state in its application for adoptions. The Judge 
Timothy Black, an Obama appointee, granted relief in Obergefell and concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects a fundamental right to keep existing marital relationships intact, and that the state failed to justify its law 
under heightened scrutiny. The court also concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation deserve 
heightened scrutiny under equal protection, but even under rational basis review, the state could not defend the 
recognition bans. In Henry, the district court reached many of the same conclusions and expanded its recognition 
remedy to encompass all married same-sex couples and all legal incidents of marriage under Ohio law. See DeBoer 
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 398, 399 (6th Cir. 2014) and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order, Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501 (July 22, 2013).   
8 Cynthia Godsoe, "Perfect Plaintiffs," The Yale Law Journal 125, no. 136 (October 12, 2015): 136, accessed March 
3, 2016, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfect-plaintiffs.  
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by denying them the right to marry, or prohibiting recognition of their marriages that were 
lawfully performed in another state.9 Each district court ruled in the petitioner’s favor, but the 
states appealed the decisions to the Sixth Circuit,10 which consolidated the cases and then 
reversed on November 6, 2014.11 On November 17, 2014 the plaintiffs appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court, and on January 16, 2015 the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Obergefell v. 
Hodges, scheduling oral argument for April 28, 2015.12  
*** 
 There were two broad constitutional arguments in favor of same-sex marriage: marriage 
is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, and excluding homosexuals from marriage, 
or denying them recognition of their legal marriage performed elsewhere violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Regarding the Due Process Clause argument, proponents reasoned that 
marriage is a fundamental right and the government could only limit such a right for compelling 
reasons. Proponents argued that while the state has compelling reasons to place age restrictions 
on marriage and prevent close relatives from marrying, the immutable sexual orientation of two 
individuals was not a compelling reason to bar them from marrying. Proponents also often cited 
                                                
9 Michigan and Kentucky concern same-sex marriage bans and Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky concern the same-
sex marriage recognition bans. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
10 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 2014). (In Kentucky after the district court’s decision, the Attorney 
General of Kentucky, Jack Conway, announced that he would not appeal Heyburn’s order to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed elsewhere and would allow the ruling to take effect saying if he appealed the decision “I would 
be defending discrimination. That I will not do.” In response, Kentucky’s Governor Steve Beshear announced he 
would hire private attorneys to appeal the decision). See Brett Barrouquere, "Ky. AG Won’t Appeal Ruling That 
State Recognize Same-sex Marriages," LGBTQ Nation, last modified March 4, 2014, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/03/ky-wont-appeal-ruling-that-it-recognize-same-sex-marriages-from-other-
states/; Brett Barrouquere, "Ky. Governor to Hire Outside Counsel to Appeal Same-sex Marriage Ruling," LGBTQ 
Nation, last modified March 4, 2014, accessed March 8, 2016, http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/03/ky-governor-to-
hire-outside-counsel-to-appeal-same-sex-marriage-ruling/.  
11 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2014) (The court framed the question as: “Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit a State from defining marriage as a relationship 
between one man and one woman?” Additionally, the court argued that Windsor did not implicitly or explicitly 
overrule Baker v. Nelson).   
12 Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, "Obergefell v. Hodges," Oyez, accessed March 8, 2016, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556.  
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the Supreme Court’s decisions in Loving v. Virginia,13 Zablocki v. Redhail,14 and Turner v. 
Safley,15 all of which invalidated restrictions on the fundamental right to marry. Just as the 
restrictions in these cases were deemed unconstitutional by the Court, proponents of same-sex 
marriage argued marriage should not be limited to opposite sex couples.16  
 Same-sex marriage supporters also argued laws preventing same-sex couples from 
marrying constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation.17 Furthermore, they claimed 
that because homosexuals share many characteristics the Court considers relevant when 
extending higher levels of scrutiny for classifications of race and gender -- namely the 
immutability of the characteristic, a history of past discrimination, and a relative lack of political 
power -- the laws should be subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.18 Regarding the Equal 
Protection Clause, same-sex marriage supporters also argued that laws restricting marriage to 
opposite sex couples constituted sex discrimination in the same way that laws restricting 
marriage to mixed race couples constituted racial discrimination.19  
 In contrast, opponents of same-sex marriage denied that the fundamental right to marry 
included a right to marry someone of the same sex.20 Moreover, they also noted that the Court’s 
fundamental rights jurisprudence looks to tradition to define the scope of such rights, and for 
thousands of years marriage was limited to opposite-sex couples.21 They also noted that 
government restrictions on marriage -- such as setting minimum age requirements and forbidding 
                                                
13 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
14 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). (Court struck down a law preventing someone who is delinquent on 
child support payments to marry) 
15 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). (Court struck down restrictions on a prisoner’s right to marry) 
16 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 54. 
17 Ibid.,  
18 Idid.,  
19 Ibid., 
20 Brief for Respondent at 9, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). (“Heightened scrutiny cannot apply 
because there is no fundamental right to the recognition and protection of same-sex marriage”). 
21 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 54. 
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marriage between close family members -- are commonplace and accepted as constitutional.22 In 
response to the equal protection argument, gay marriage opponents denied that laws restricting 
marriage to opposite sex couples constituted sex classifications because the laws treated men and 
women alike, and therefore such laws did not nurture sexism in the same way that bans on 
interracial marriage maintained white supremacy.23 While arguments of both sides in Obergefell 
addressed each of these points, the specific facts of the case and the jurisprudence of the Court 
determined how the issue was framed for each side. 
Counsel for Obergefell and the Call for Heightened Scrutiny 
 Obergefell v. Hodges was unprecedented in many ways. It broke the record for the most 
briefs ever submitted to the Court -- 148 briefs, 80 for the petitioners and 68 for the 
respondents.24 While many of the briefs provided important arguments for the case, 41 of the 80 
briefs written supporting the petitioners discussed scrutiny in their argument. Two briefs urged 
the Court to definitively determine the level of scrutiny for sexual orientation, and 22 asked the 
Court to apply heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation was a quasi-suspect 
classification.25 Arguably the petitioner’s own brief gave the most compelling argument for the 
Court to be explicit about the standard of review, arguing that the recognition bans were 
                                                
22 Ibid., 
23 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 54-55. (Interestingly, opponents of same-sex marriage make this argument 
despite the Court’s rejection of the equal application theory to withstand the Equal Protection Clause in Loving). 
24 A total 80 briefs were written supporting the petitioners and 68 were written supporting the respondents. See 
"Obergefell v. Hodges," SCOTUS Blog, accessed March 8, 2016, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/ and Nina Totenberg, "Record Number Of Amicus Briefs Filed In Same-Sex-
Marriage Cases," NPR, last modified April 28, 2015, accessed October 31, 2015, 
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/04/28/402628280/record-number-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-same-
sex-marriage-cases.  
25 41 of the briefs explicitly discuss or mention the level of scrutiny, either in terms which standard should be 
applied or why. More specifically, two of the 41 briefs ask the Court to definitively determine the level of scrutiny 
for laws that classify on sexual orientation. Four say that although they agree with the petitioners that heightened 
scrutiny should be used, they argue that the bans cannot pass any level of review. Sixteen briefs called for the Court 
to use heightened scrutiny because classifications on sexual orientation are suspect or quasi suspect and the LGBT 
community is a suspect class. Five ask for heightened scrutiny because the laws classify based on sex. Four argue 
for heightened scrutiny because the laws abridge the fundamental right to marry. Five call for the Court to use 
rational basis. Five more have certain levels of scrutiny for other reasons. 
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unconstitutional under Windsor; Ohio’s refusal to recognize existing marriages of same-sex 
couples was subject to heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause; Ohio’s recognition 
bans triggered heightened Equal Protection scrutiny because they discriminated based on sexual 
orientation and sex; and Ohio’s recognition bans failed any standard of review.26 
 Regarding the first point, the brief claimed that, like DOMA, Ohio’s recognition bans 
have the “design, purpose, and effect” of imposing inequality.27 Moreover, because the 
recognition bans target the same narrow class of persons that DOMA did, and were designed to 
make the marriages of same-sex couples unequal, they should be struck down on the same 
grounds.28 Additionally, the recognition bans in Ohio have the practical effect of imposing a 
stigma on same-sex couples in the state, as DOMA did at the federal level, and therefore are 
unconstitutional.29 Furthermore, the brief argued that while Windsor struck a federal recognition 
ban on same-sex marriages, the Windsor principles apply to the states as well because the ruling 
“confirmed that federalism interests do not free states to trammel the constitutional marriage 
rights of the individual.”30 Finally, the brief asserted that Ohio’s recognition bans infringe on the 
sovereignty of other states that have legalized same-sex marriage.31 
 Regarding the second point, the brief argued that the recognition bans were subject to 
heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause either because they infringed on the 
fundamental right to marry, or because there was a protected liberty interest stemming from the 
importance of marriage in society.32 It asserted that Loving made clear that couples have a 
                                                
26 Brief for Petitioner at 20, 32, 38, 49, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). While the brief just mentions 
Ohio, it is understood that since the cases from the three other states were consolidated with this one that the 
arguments are the same and Counsel for Obergefell is writing on behalf of all the plaintiffs. 
27 Ibid., at 21 
28 Ibid., at 21 and 30 
29 Ibid., at 24 
30 Ibid., at 30-31 
31 Ibid., at 31 
32 Ibid., at 32 
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fundamental right to protection and recognition of their validly entered marriages.33 In Loving, 
the Court held that Virginia’s interracial marriage bans, criminalization of out-of-state marriages, 
and voiding marriages performed elsewhere “deprive[d] the Lovings of liberty without due 
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”34 
Therefore, petitioners in Obergefell also had a protected liberty interest for the legal respect of 
their existing marriages.35 Perhaps most importantly regarding their Due Process Clause 
argument, counsel asserted:  
 As Loving illustrates, the fundamental rights of marriage protected by due process are 
 not limited to receiving marriage licenses. The freedom to select the spouse of one’s 
 choice receives constitutional protection precisely because of the expectation that this 
 will be the single person with whom one will travel through life, sharing profound 
 intimacy and mutual support through life’s good times and bad.36  
 
 Regarding the third point, counsel argued that the recognition bans triggered heightened 
equal protection scrutiny because they discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and sex.37 
Counsel asserted that the Court’s decisions in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor implicitly rejected 
the notion that “government discrimination based on sexual orientation can be presumed 
legitimate and constitutional,” even though the Court did so without explicitly determining the 
standard of review for sexual orientation.38 Therefore, the brief gave several reasons for why the 
Court should make explicit a standard of review to use for laws that classify on the basis of 
sexual orientation.39 First, determining the level of review is necessary to affirm the equal dignity 
                                                
33 Ibid., at 33-34. (“Loving not only struck down Virginia’s laws prohibiting interracial marriages within the state, 
but also its statutes denying recognition and criminally punishing such marriages entered outside the state.” See 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1967)).  
34 Ibid., 34 citing U.S. 388 at 12. Emphasis added 
35 Ibid., 35 
36 Ibid., 34 
37 Ibid., 38 
38 Ibid., 
39 Ibid., 38 
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of gay people because using only rational basis review brands homosexuals as inferior.40 Not 
determining the level of review “tells gay people, their families, and everyone with whom they 
interact that laws infringing on their personhood should be viewed with no more skepticism than 
laws regulating packaged milk.”41  
 Second, the brief argued that determining the standard of review was appropriate because 
homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination; sexual orientation does not bear any 
relation to the class’ ability to contribute to society; sexual orientation is immutable; and 
homosexuals as a class do not have sufficient political power to protect themselves from the 
majority.42 Counsel also argued that the Court should apply heightened scrutiny to Ohio’s 
recognition bans for discriminating on the basis of sex because they restrict the rights of both 
men and women as individuals based on their sex.43 In other words, the recognition bans 
discriminated against Jim Obergefell for being male instead of female, and the opposite was true 
for the lesbian plaintiffs in the case.  
 Lastly, counsel argued that even if the Court did not determine the bans and all 
classifications on sexual orientation warranted heightened scrutiny, the bans could not be upheld 
even under the rational basis test because they do not bear a rational relationship to an 
independent and legitimate end.44 In other words, respondent’s arguments do not “provide an 
independent and legitimate end in itself for the infringement of the rights of same-sex couples 
and their families;” rather they describe how same-sex couples and their families came to have 
                                                
40 Ibid., 39-40 citing J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). 
41 Ibid., 40 citing United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
42 Ibid., 41. Citing City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 U.S. 432, 440-441 (1985) and 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). 
43 Ibid., 48 
44 Ibid., 49-51 citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 55 
their rights infringed.45 None of the state’s arguments provided an independent basis for 
maintaining the discriminatory practice of banning same-sex marriage.46 Additionally, the state’s 
argument indicated that marriage is merely a “government-run incentive program that channels 
heterosexuals toward responsible procreation,” and completely demeaned married couples -- 
especially childless couples -- to say that marriage was simply for procreation.47 
 While this thesis focuses primarily on the call for scrutiny of the petitioners in the case, 
the arguments made by the respondents are important as well. In their brief, the respondents 
made five main arguments for the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage bans and the 
recognition bans. First, Windsor left marriage recognition to the states because it only involved 
federal recognition of same-sex marriage and state, not federal, recognition is guaranteed in the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.48 Second, the same-sex marriage bans or the 
recognition bans do not stem from animus because the state was able to offer other explanations 
other than prejudice.49 In other words, the government did not depart from traditional practices 
and did not target a group for novel burdens.50 Third, heightened scrutiny did not apply because 
Ohio’s recognition ban did not reference sexual orientation and traditional marriage was not 
understood to discriminate against same-sex couples.51 Fourth, Ohio’s recognition ban was a 
reasonable response to those who wanted to evade the same-sex marriage ban by traveling to 
another state. Finally, counsel also argued that Ohio’s recognition laws did not discriminate 
                                                
45 Ibid., 51-56. (The State argued there were four legitimate interests to have the recognition bans and the same-sex 
marriage bans: wanting to leave the question to the democratic process; waiting to see long term consequences of 
recognizing same-sex marriage; upholding the traditional definition of marriage; and preventing irresponsible 
procreation. Counsel for Obergefell rejected these arguments). 
46 Ibid., 54 cites Williams v. Illinois 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970) (“[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of 
steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack.”)  
47 Ibid., 56 
48 Brief for Respondent at 5, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
49 Ibid., 7 
50 Ibid.,  
51 Ibid., 9 
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along suspect lines because they treated each gender equally, and traditional marriage, unlike 
interracial marriage bans, was not designed to demean any particular sex.52 
 On June 26, 2015, twelve years to the day after Lawrence v. Texas and two years to the 
day after United States v. Windsor, the Court announced in a 5-4 decision that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires states to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and, by 
default, to recognize a same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. Immediately following the 
decision there were celebrations, and same-sex weddings, all over the country. The White House 
was illuminated with rainbow colors and gay and lesbian couples in America were finally and 
fully able to make a legal commitment to each other. However, as wonderful as “Marriage 
Equality Day” was for America and homosexuals, the opinion itself in Obergefell left many 
questions, and calls, unanswered. 
Call Denied: Kennedy’s Opinion in Obergefell 
 Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion made four main points: marriage has always been 
important; marriage has evolved over time; there is a constitutional right to marry that applies 
with equal force to same-sex couples; and the right to marry is fundamental. Regarding the first 
two points, Kennedy acknowledged the importance of marriage: “[s]ince the dawn of history, 
marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together.”53 
Historically, he noted, marriage was understood as a union between a man and a woman, yet the 
institution “has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society.”54 Even marriage 
confined to opposite sex couples has evolved and this evolution has involved “not mere 
                                                
52 Ibid., 10 
53 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
54 Ibid., 2595 
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superficial changes. Rather, it has worked deep transformations, affecting aspects of marriage 
long viewed by many as essential.”55 Moreover, Kennedy argued: 
 These news insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.  Indeed, 
 changed understandings of marriage are characteristics of a Nation where new 
 dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through perspectives 
 that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and judicial 
 process.56 
 
 Therefore, while Kennedy acknowledged that respondents, and many “reasonable and 
sincere people,” contend that marriage by its nature is a “gender-differentiated union,” same-sex 
couples seeking to enter into marriage are not trying to devalue the institution.57 Rather, same-
sex couples’ desire to enter into marriage reflects their deep respect for the institution of 
marriage.58 Moreover, because of their “immutable nature,” same-sex marriage is the only option 
for homosexuals who wish to marry.59 Additionally, because of the discrimination gays and 
lesbians have faced in the past, the questions about the rights of homosexuals only became part 
of the legal discourse in the late twentieth century.60 Therefore, even though the Court was only 
considering opposite sex couples when it described the right to marry in precedent cases, and 
previously “made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is part,” given current 
understandings of homosexuals as human beings, it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to license same-sex marriages.61 
                                                
55 Ibid., 2595 emphasis added (For example, marriages used to be arranged by the couple’s parents for economic, 
religious, or political reasons, but now it is understood to be a voluntary decision of the parties. Second, married 
couples formerly were considered one unit by the state as the wife had no civil or legal recognition other than being 
dominated by her husband. This too, has dramatically changed over the course of time as women have become more 
independent, equal members of society with rights). 
56 Ibid., 2596 
57 Ibid., 2594  
58 Ibid., 2594 
59 Ibid., 2594  
60 Ibid., 2596 (Also see chapter one of this thesis). 
61 Ibid., 2598 
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 Regarding the third point, Kennedy argued that the established constitutional right to 
marry has long been protected under the Due Process Clause. Therefore since cases like Loving, 
Zablocki, and Turner all dealt with opposite sex couples, the Court must consider why marriage 
has been protected, and if those reasons apply to same-sex couples. Kennedy asserted there are 
four principles that determine why marriage is protected by the Constitution: personal choice; 
marriage supports a two-person union unlike any other; marriage is good for children; and 
marriage is a cornerstone of society.62  
 Regarding the first principle of personal choice, Kennedy argued “the right to personal 
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy,” and decisions 
concerning marriage and other life choices like contraception, procreation, family relations, and 
child bearing are some of the most intimate choices an individual can make.63 Choices like these, 
Kennedy argued, shape one’s destiny and the nature of marriage allows two people to make 
these decisions and find new “freedoms” of spirituality and intimacy together.64 Furthermore, 
Kennedy argued “this is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation,” and there is 
“dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry in their autonomy to 
make such profound choices.”65 The second principle is that marriage supports a two-person 
union so unique and important to the two persons involved: 
 Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no 
 one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that 
 while both still live, there will be someone to care for the other.66  
 
 The third principle is that marriage “safeguards children and families” in a unique way 
and leads to a better understanding of rights like childbearing, procreation, and education.67 
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64 Ibid., 2599 
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Kennedy noted that the Court has acknowledged marriage’s connection to other rights and has 
held that all of the varied rights unified as a whole are central to the protected liberty interest of 
the Due Process Clause.68 Moreover, while marriage provides material benefits to children, 
marriage also provides other profound benefits such as understanding the integrity and closeness 
of their family and its concord with their community; affording permanency and stability; and 
offering loving and nurturing homes.69 This idea is supported by the fact, Kennedy asserted, that 
most states allow gays and lesbians to adopt children and there is agreement -- between 
petitioners, respondents, and the law -- that same-sex couples provide loving and supportive 
homes to children, whether biological or adopted.70 Therefore:  
 [E]xcluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the 
 right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
 children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer 
 the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no 
 fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue 
 here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.71 
 
However, he also noted that childbearing is only one of the many aspects of the constitutional 
right to marry, and that right is not diluted or less meaningful for couples who do not or cannot 
have children.72  
 Finally, Kennedy argued marriage is protected under the constitution because the Court 
and the Nation have made it clear that marriage is a cornerstone of our society. Even as marriage 
has changed and evolved over time, marriage has remained “a building block of our national 
                                                                                                                                                       
67 Ibid., 2599 
68 Ibid., 2599 quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S., at 384 
69 Ibid., 2599 
70 Ibid., 2599 (As of March 31, 2016 same-sex couples are allowed to adopt in all 50 states.) See Mollie Reilly, 
"Same-Sex Couples Can Now Adopt Children in All 50 States," The Huffington Post, last modified March 31, 2016, 
accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mississippi-same-sex-
adoption_us_56fdb1a3e4b083f5c607567f.  
71 Ibid., 2600 
72 Ibid., 2601 (“An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage 
in any State”). 
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community.”73 Therefore, marriage is not just a relationship between the couple that vows to 
support one another, but with that vow, society also pledges to support the couple, “offering 
symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”74 Furthermore 
while the benefits for married couples vary from state to state, all states make marriage the 
cornerstone for “expanding governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”75 Therefore, “by 
virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of 
benefits that the States have linked to marriage” and are treated as second class citizens.76 
 In outlining the four reasons why the Constitution protects marriage, Kennedy then 
asserted that the principles apply to same-sex couples just as they do opposite sex couples and 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage harms same-sex couples “in more than just material 
burdens.”77 More specifically:  
 Same-sex couples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would 
 deem intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more 
 precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of 
 teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and 
 lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society. 
 Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek 
 fulfillment in its highest meaning.78 
 
 Therefore, because limiting marriage to opposite sex couples is inconsistent with the 
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry, there must be a recognition that laws 
“excluding same-sex couples from their right to marry imposes a stigma and injury of the kind 
                                                
73 Ibid., 2601 
74 Ibid.,  
75 Ibid., 2601 (“Taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate3 succession; spousal privilege in the law 
of evidence; hospital access; medical decision making authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; 
birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; 
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76 Ibid., 2601 
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prohibited” by the Constitution.79 Kennedy dismissed respondent’s argument that legalizing 
same-sex marriage would create a new right as “inconsistent with the approach the Court has 
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”80   
 Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage,’ Turner did not ask about a 
 ‘right of inmates to marry,’ and Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid 
 child support duties to marry.’ Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its 
 comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the 
 relevant class from the right. . .[Furthermore], if rights were defined by who exercised 
 them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued 
 justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected 
 this approach, both respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.81 
 
 In other words, just because something has always been one way, does not make it 
constitutional. The fact that many people believe same-sex marriage is wrong makes no 
difference: 
 [W]hen that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the 
 necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that 
 soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the 
 Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex 
 couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them 
 this right.82 
 
 In terms of the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage bans, Kennedy asserted the 
laws denied same-sex couples the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. 
Kennedy argued that the two clauses are connected and their liberty and equal protection 
concepts lead to stronger understanding of the other.83 This idea of intertwining the Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause were used in Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, and he 
then solidified that relationship between the two in Obergefell. Moreover, he noted that Loving 
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81 Ibid., 2602 see Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S., at 12 and Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S., at 566-567. 
82 Ibid., 2602 
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declared bans on interracial marriage invalid because of unequal treatment of interracial couples, 
and because the bans were “so subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process 
of law.”84 Kennedy then asserted that cases like Loving and Zablocki reveal how “new insights 
and and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental 
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”85  In other words, as society changes, 
so do the norms that are protected under the Equal Protection Clause, and while same-sex 
marriage was not always recognized as needing equal protection, it is now.86 Kennedy wrote:  
 It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it 
 must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the 
 marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are 
 denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a 
 fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, 
 this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. 
 The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate 
 them. . .These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a 
 fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and 
 Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not 
 be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may 
 exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied them.87  
 
 Kennedy therefore reasons that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional not because 
they violate the Equal Protection Clause and treat same-sex couples differently than opposite sex 
couples simply because of their sexual orientation, but because there is a fundamental right to 
marry for all people inherent in the Due Process Clause. 
                                                
84 Ibid., 2603 see Loving U.S. 388., at 12 
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   Finally, Kennedy addressed the most substantial arguments of the respondents. He 
dismissed their request for the Court to wait until there had been a sufficient democratic 
discourse on same-sex marriage by noting that there “have been referenda, legislative debates, 
and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and 
scholarly writings. There has been extensive litigation in state and federal courts,” as well as 148 
briefs submitted pointing that substantial attention has been given to the question of same-sex 
marriage.88 Additionally, while the democratic process should be used for change in most 
circumstances, the Constitution says that process is appropriate “so long as that process does not 
abridge fundamental rights.”89 Clearly, the democratic process regarding same-sex marriage has 
been used to deny and abridge same-sex couples their fundamental right to marry, so it is 
appropriate for the Court to rule in this case. Furthermore, it makes no difference where the issue 
of same-sex marriage is in the democratic process, but rather what matters is that the 
Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry. Moreover, the Court should be 
wary of leaving issues of fundamental rights to the democratic process because, as in Bowers, the 
Court did so and caused gays and lesbians “pain and humiliation.”90 Moreover, even though 
Bowers was overruled in Lawrence, “the substantial effects of these injuries no doubt lingered 
long after Bowers was overruled” because “[d]ignitary wounds cannot always be healed with the 
stroke of a pen.”91 Finally, Kennedy warns of the effects if the Court were to uphold the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision:  
Were the Court to uphold the challenged laws as constitutional, it would teach the Nation 
that these laws are in accord with our society’s most basic compact. Were the Court to 
stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability of 
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specific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many 
rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.92 
 
 Kennedy also rejected the claim that the institution of marriage would be harmed if same-
sex marriage was legalized. While respondents argued that allowing same-sex marriage would 
lead to fewer opposite sex marriages because same-sex marriage would sever “the connection 
between natural procreation and marriage,” Kennedy simply replied that “it is unrealistic to 
conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex 
couples may do so.”93 
*** 
 Though the decision as a whole is much to be celebrated as a step in the right direction 
for equality in America, Justice Kennedy’s opinion, below the surface, is strikingly unclear for 
gay rights in a broader context. As in his previous opinions, Kennedy chose not to determine the 
standard of review for sexual orientation. He refused to determine a clear standard even though 
he wrote about the history of discrimination against homosexuals; referenced the immutability of 
sexual orientation; and the minority status of homosexuals. Even though the briefs for petitioners 
and twenty-two friends of the Court called for the Court to explicitly determine the level of 
scrutiny for classifications on the basis of sexual orientation, Kennedy all but ignored their call.94 
Moreover, although he asserted that marriage is a fundamental right, he did not follow the 
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established reasoning that the Court uses when looking at the abridgment of fundamental 
rights.95  
 Instead, Kennedy focused on the intertwined nature of the Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause, the fundamental right to marry, and the evolution and expansion of what the 
Constitution directs. Regarding the first point, several scholars have written at length about what 
Obergefell achieved. In the words of Laurence Tribe -- arguably one of the most well respected 
constitutional law scholars:  
 [T]hat Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double 
 helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity -- and to have 
 located that doctrine in a tradition of constitutional interpretation as an exercise of public 
 education. Equal dignity, a concept with a robust doctrinal pedigree, does not simply look 
 back to purposeful past subordination, but rather lays the groundwork for an ongoing 
 dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of equality.96 
 
 In doing so, however, Kennedy departed from other cases regarding the fundamental 
right to marry and did not apply the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause in the same 
way. For example, “Loving generally treated the liberty and equality claims as parallel rather 
than intertwined,” whereas Obergefell viewed them as connected.97 Regarding the second point 
about fundamental rights, Kennedy’s emphasis on that point was not surprising. As Tribe notes: 
 The idea that all individuals are deserving in equal measure of personal autonomy and 
 freedom to “define their own concept of existence” instead of having their identity and 
 social role defined by the state -- has animated Kennedy’s most memorable decisions 
 about the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, from Planned Parenthood v. 
 Casey to Parents Involved in Schools v. Seattle.98   
 
                                                
95 Laws that restrict a fundamental right are also subject to strict scrutiny. See Garrett Epps, "Gay Marriage Gets Its 
Day in Court," The Atlantic, last modified April 27, 2015, accessed February 21, 2016, 
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 In fact, Kennedy even hinted during the oral argument for Obergefell that he was inclined 
to focus more on the fundamental right to marry than the guarantee of equal protection for 
homosexuals in America. At the very end of the Solicitor General’s argument in support of the 
petitioners in the case, Kennedy asked him how a precedent case Washington v. Glucksberg 
required the Court to define fundamental rights in a narrow way. Solicitor General Verrilli 
answered:  
 We do recognize that there's a profound connection between liberty and equality, but the 
 United States has advanced only an equal protection argument. We haven't made the 
 fundamental rights argument under Glucksberg. . .And therefore, I'm not sure it would be 
 appropriate for me not having briefed it to comment on that.99  
 
Kennedy followed up asking if Verrilli could explain why the United States did not make a 
fundamental rights argument. Verrilli answered:  
 [T]his issue really sounds in equal protection, as we understand it, because the question is 
 equal participation in a State-conferred status and institution. . .[and] what the 
 Respondents are ultimately saying to the Court is that with respect to marriage, they are 
 not ready yet. And yes, gay and lesbian couples can live openly in society, and yes, they 
 can raise children. Yes, they can participate fully as members of their community. 
 Marriage, though, not yet. Leave that to be worked out later. . .But what these gay and 
 lesbian couples are doing is laying claim to the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 now. And it is emphatically the duty of this Court, in this case, as it was in Lawrence, to 
 decide what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. And what I would suggest is that in a 
 world in which gay and lesbian couples live openly as our neighbors, they raise their 
 children side by side with the rest of us, they contribute fully as members of the 
 community, that it is simply untenable -- untenable to suggest that they can be denied the 
 right of equal participation in an institution of marriage, or that they can be required to 
 wait until the majority decides that it is ready to treat gay and lesbian people as equals. 
 Gay and lesbian people are equal. They deserve the equal protection of the laws, and they 
 deserve it now. Thank you.100 
 
 Finally, Kennedy’s opinion also spoke to the evolution of equality and how 
understandings of equal treatment may change over time. Tribe addresses this point as well: 
 [A] too rarely noted aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinions in this realm, beginning in 
 Romer and Lawrence and culminating in Obergefell, is the belief that the Constitution is 
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 written and designed to shed light on society’s evolving experience, framing windows 
 through which to view and asses that experience, and to thereby educate us in how we 
 might proceed to form an ever more perfect union.101 
 
 Kenji Yoshino, a Constitutional Law Professor at New York University, also notes 
Kennedy’s understanding of the evolution of equality and how it is rooted in the Constitution: 
 [T]he problem of the blindness of each generation, the modesty of the framers in 
 recognizing this blindness, their use of abstraction as a way to bequeath the question of 
 liberty to future generations, and the attendant responsibility of constitutional interpreters 
 in each generation to take up that legacy.102  
 
 For all its eloquence, Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion left homosexuals with more 
questions than answers in areas other than marriage. Legal scholars and interest groups on both 
sides of the debate attacked Kennedy’s opinion for its lack of clarity and transparency. Among 
those who applauded the outcome of the decision, there were many who denounced Kennedy for 
once again ruling in favor of gay rights without determining the standard of review. Opponents 
of the outcome inside and outside the Supreme Court attacked Kennedy for pulling his reasoning 
and arguments out of thin air. They argued the concept of liberty and dignity as they applied to 
homosexual rights were created by Kennedy and not based in the Constitution. 
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Criticisms of Kennedy’s Opinion: In Outcome and Reasoning 
 
 
 If you are among the many Americans -- of whatever sexual orientation -- who favor 
 expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the 
 achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of 
 commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate 
 the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it. -Chief Justice Roberts, Obergefell v. 
 Hodges Dissent. 
  
The Dissenters on the Court 
 
 Since the Obergefell v. Hodges decision was announced, there has been much debate and 
discussion regarding Kennedy’s opinion. While some groups and legal scholars praise the 
decision for both the reasoning Kennedy used and the outcome, most have criticized the 
reasoning, the outcome, or both.  
 Perhaps the most vocal adversaries of the reasoning and outcome of the decision are the 
four dissenting Justices on the Court. The dissenting Justices and their supporters argue that the 
Obergefell opinion exemplified judicial activism, created a new right, misinterpreted the 
meaning of liberty, reverted to an unprincipled expansive take on fundamental rights and due 
process used in Lochner v. New York,315 and ignored the Court’s traditional equal protection 
analysis. The Justices also raise concerns about the potential implications of the opinion on 
religious liberty and polygamy. While their claims hold some value, the main point of each of 
them was to provide a basis, other than discrimination or animus, to prevent homosexuals from 
accessing their fundamental right to marry. This section evaluates and analyzes the arguments 
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made by the Justices, focusing mainly on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, who 
wrote the most extensive and, in some ways, critical dissent.  
 One common theme in the Obergefell dissents is the discussion of how the decision robs 
the American people and the state legislatures of the opportunity to resolve the issue of same-sex 
marriage.316 Each of the dissenting Justices claimed that the Court’s decision in Obergefell was a 
blatant example of judicial activism, and that “commitment to democracy renders the Court’s 
intervention in the marriage wars fundamentally illegitimate.”317 This argument is not surprising 
because Justices on both sides of the ideological aisle often accuse their colleagues of engaging 
in judicial activism when writing about decisions with which they disagree. 
 On the surface, the dissenting Justices’ claims hold clout, particularly given that Justice 
Kennedy stressed the importance of states having the power to determine their own marriage 
laws to invalidate DOMA in Windsor. However, Kennedy wrote in his opinion that sometimes 
the Court has to remove certain topics from the will of democratic majorities in order to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts.318 Additionally, as Laurence Tribe writes, 
Kennedy reminds his critics that, “for all its presumptive virtues, democracy has its limits,” and 
people do not have to wait for legislative action to assert a fundamental right.319 Tribe also 
argues that the structures of federalism protect individual rights, and in his past decisions Justice 
Kennedy 
 [H]as made it clear that he views the sovereignty of the states as important much less as 
 an end in itself than as a means to the end of protecting the liberties of those who reside 
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 in those states -- both their negative liberties from oppressive regulation and their positive 
 liberties to take part in politically accountable self government.320  
 
 In other words, Kennedy believes states have sovereignty not just for the sake of the 
separation of powers, but because sovereign states are a means by which individuals living in 
those states have their liberties protected. Tribe further argues that for Kennedy “the 
Constitution’s implicit division of powers between the national government and the States exists 
principally to protect personal liberty and equality.”321 Consequently, Justice Kennedy’s 
proposition in Obergefell, “is thus fully consistent with the more fundamental demand that no 
level of government exercise its power in a manner that, however rooted in tradition, ends up 
depriving individuals of those rights.”322  
 Tribe further argues that this fundamental demand was made clear in “both public 
dialogue and lower court decisions in the wake of Windsor” as states began to see that they were 
depriving individuals of liberty and equality rights by prohibiting same-sex marriage.323 
Therefore, in writing Obergefell Kennedy did not need to root his analysis in federalism the way 
he did in Windsor because he recognized that the courts and the people had determined no level 
of government can take away the liberty and equality of homosexuals.324 
 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts further argued that the Court should have practiced 
“judicial restraint” and not decided Obergefell because proponents of same-sex marriage lost the 
“opportunity to win the true acceptance that comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the 
justice of their cause.”325 In other words, Roberts asserted that the Court’s decision will result in 
resentment of opponents of same-sex marriage because “[s]tealing this issue from the people will 
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for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much more 
difficult to accept.”326  
 While Roberts is correct in stating that the ruling would make people upset,327 to argue 
that is a reason to let the states continue to deny same-sex couples their fundamental rights is 
misguided.328 For example, in the short term after Brown v. Board of Education (1954), racial 
progress in the South was delayed and “radicalized, southern racial politics” allowed for the 
advancement of the careers of extreme segregationists like Bull Connor and George Wallace.329 
However, those possible implications were not a justification for the Supreme Court to step away 
from the case and decide that individual states could determine whether they wanted to integrate 
schools or not. As there was after Brown, and slightly less so after Loving, there has been and 
will continue to be backlash regarding the Obergefell ruling. However, all three cases determined 
that the Constitution demands full equality under the law and, implicit in Obergefell, the Court 
determined denying same-sex couples anything but marriage equal to that of opposite sex 
couples constituted the “separate but equal” doctrine overruled in Brown. Today, Brown and 
Loving are regarded as some of the best decisions the Supreme Court has ever produced, and 
both were decided independently of the negative consequences they would have on the South or 
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White Supremacy. Therefore, while the “we should wait and see” argument is not surprising, it 
does not make a convincing case for the denial of a fundamental right. 
  The second argument that the dissenting Justices make is that in its decision, the Court 
created a “new right” that was neither rooted in Court precedent or the Constitution. While 
Kennedy asserted that same-sex marriage is part of the fundamental right to marry in its 
comprehensive sense, Roberts argues the “fundamental right to marry does not include the right 
to make a State change its definition of marriage,”330 and “[n]either the petitioners nor the 
majority cites a single case or other legal source providing any basis for such a constitutional 
right. None exists, and that is enough to foreclose their claim.”331 Therefore, he frames it in a 
way that supports the idea that the legislatures, not the Court, should decide who can access the 
fundamental right to marry. Justice Alito, also argues that the Court “created” a new right, and 
argues “[t]he Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage.”332 
 While framing a question in a certain way can determine the answer, Roberts and Alito 
misconstrued the petitioners’ argument. Petitioners were not claiming they had a right to force 
the states to change their marriage laws, but that they had a right, as citizens protected under the 
law, to access their fundamental right to marry just like opposite sex couples. However, even if, 
as Roberts argues, petitioners were seeking a right to make the states change their definitions, the 
Court’s precedent supports that. In Loving, the Court forced the states with interracial marriage 
bans to change their definitions of marriage to include unions between interracial couples. 
Previously, Virginia and fifteen other states defined marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman of the same race. For the states that had to change their laws as a result of Loving, the 
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institution of marriage was changed significantly, and was even threatened as an institution.333 
Previously, those in support of the interracial marriage bans argued that marriage would be 
ruined if interracial couples were allowed to marry, that the human race would suffer if mixed 
race couples were able to reproduce,334 and that interracial marriage was against biblical 
teaching.335   
 Roberts distinguishes other precedent marriage cases by insisting that none of the laws at 
issue in Loving, Zablocki, or Turner tried to change the ‘core’ definition of marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman.336 He distinguishes Loving and Obergefell specifically, arguing 
that forcing the legalization of interracial marriage did not change the “core” institution of 
marriage any more than integrating schools changed schools after Brown.337 While integrating 
schools in Brown did not change the physicality of schools, for some their educational 
experience was completely changed by the Brown decision.338 As mentioned above, there was 
significant backlash, including backlash in the name of religion, from the Brown decision even 
though schools, as physical places where children are educated, did not change.339  
 Furthermore, Loving and Obergefell had less of an impact on marriage than Brown did on 
schools. Marriages between people of the same race before and after Loving were not affected by 
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the decision at all. Similarly, opposite sex marriages before and after Obergefell will not be, and 
have not been, changed at all by the decision. In contrast, Brown affected black and white 
children nationwide who were previously in segregated schools. In fact, Brown reconfigured 
social relations throughout the South and states closed public schools rather than integrate 
them.340 In other words, opening marriage to interracial couples and same-sex couples only 
affects interracial couples and same-sex couples who decide to get married. The existing or 
future marriages that do not fall within those categories are not affected in the same way that 
white and black children were both affected by Brown.  
 Both Roberts and Alito support their claim that same-sex marriage is not included in the 
fundamental right to marry by appealing to tradition, arguing that the traditional, or definitional, 
understanding of marriage has always been linked to procreation. Justice Alito specifically 
argues that, the Court’s “understanding of marriage, which focuses almost entirely on the 
happiness of persons who choose to marry, is shared by many people today, but it is not the 
traditional one,” and that tradition confirms that the fundamental right to marry only involves 
opposite sex couples who have the potential to procreate.341 Roberts also argues that because 
humans must procreate to survive, and children do better if their parents stay together, “sexual 
relations that can lead to procreation should only occur between a man and a woman committed 
to a lasting bond.”342  
 While it is true that historically people were married to have children or to cement 
political alliances, to say that is the only reason people get married today threatens to insult all 
the married couples who choose not to, or cannot, have children. Additionally, as Tribe notes: 
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 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the history of marriage is manifestly 
 structured not just to respond in legal terms to the dissenters’ claims that the institution 
 has had a fixed meaning for millennia, but also to make ordinary people focus more 
 closely on how the evolution of gender roles, among many other developments, has 
 silently but assuredly transformed the institution’s meaning.343 
 
  Therefore, Kennedy argues that allowing same-sex couples to marry does not redefine 
marriage. Additionally, excluding groups of people from accessing a fundamental right because 
they have traditionally been excluded is not a good enough justification for the exclusion.344 
While tradition is important in determining who has access to fundamental rights, it is not the 
only, or most important factor. Furthermore, understanding that all fundamental rights evolve, 
and the fundamental right to marry specifically has evolved, does not mean, as Justice Scalia 
claims in his dissent, that every state violated the Constitution for 135 years between the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, and Massachusetts legalizing same-sex marriage in 
2003.345 Nor does it mean that anyone who ever thought same-sex marriage was implausible, 
wrong, or unnecessary is an ignorant bigot.346 Rather, as Tribe writes, Kennedy understands that: 
 [A] governmental practice that limits the options available to members of a 
 particular group need not have been deliberately designed to harm the excluded group if 
 its oppressive and unjustified effects have become clear in light of current experience and 
 understanding.347 
  
 In other words, whether the limiting practice is deliberate or not, what matters is that as 
time goes on, those limits are reconsidered, and removed if necessary. That is why the Framers 
included the Ninth Amendment, which states: “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”348 The Framers 
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understood, as Kennedy does, that as time goes on, human understanding of rights, equality, and 
inclusivity change and those changes need to be accounted for.  
 Even though the dissenting Justices may detest this “evolution” of rights, it is not 
unprecedented, and not something that Kennedy created out of thin air. For example, the right to 
vote was once a right that only white, land owning males had access to.349 In 1870, the Fifteenth 
Amendment gave former slaves the right to vote, and in 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment gave 
women the right to vote.350 Therefore, to say that marriage, as a fundamental right, cannot be 
expanded because, as a matter of history, it has always been understood in one way cannot be 
supported with the development of other fundamental rights.  
 Though the fundamental right to marry differs from the fundamental right to vote in that 
it was expanded by the Court, not Constitutional Amendments, it is not unprecedented for the 
Supreme Court to expand or establish certain fundamental rights that are not explicitly included 
in the Constitution.351 For example, the Court has recognized the right to direct the education and 
upbringing of one’s children;352 the right to procreate;353 the right to bodily integrity;354 the right 
to privacy from government intrusion;355 and the right to sexual intimacy:356 
 Thus the line of cases Justice Kennedy invokes conspicuously protects rights resting 
 not on any particular clause, like the Freedom of Speech Clause or the Free Exercise of 
 Religion Clause, but instead on the dignity and autonomy of the individual standing 
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 against the forces of coerced conformity -- on principles underlying the written 
 Constitution but nowhere expressly articulated in its text.357  
 
 Furthermore, while the Court is able to expand and establish rights over time, it has used 
two approaches “for shaping the middle ground of calling for the creation of unenumerated rights 
and avoiding making everything a right.”358 First, an open ended common law approach 
associated with Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman359 and second, a more closed-ended formulaic 
approach associated with the majority in Washington v. Glucksberg.360 As Yoshino notes:  
 Obergefell did not categorically resolve the ongoing conflict between the two models, but 
 it heavily favored Poe. . .Kennedy also made sure to say that the Glucksberg approach 
 “may have been appropriate” in certain contexts, but not in discussing fundamental rights 
 of marriage and intimacy. By doing that he presents marriage and intimacy as exemplary 
 rather than exhaustive instances of rights for which the Glucksberg methodology would 
 not obtain.361 
 
 The third point of criticism of Kennedy in the dissenting opinions is his invocation of the 
rights to “liberty” and “dignity.” As Justice Thomas argues in his dissent, “[s]ince well before 
1787, liberty has been understood as freedom from government action, not entitlement to 
government benefits,” and since the petitioners have not suffered from government action, they 
have not been deprived of liberty.362 Thomas further reasons that when reading the history of the 
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Due Process Clause, “it is hard to see how the ‘liberty’ protected by the Clause could be 
interpreted to include anything broader than freedom from physical restraint.”363 Justice Thomas, 
like Roberts, frames the issue as petitioners trying to force their way into marriage, rather than 
the state barring homosexuals from accessing a fundamental right simply because they are 
homosexual.  
 For Thomas, the government banning same-sex couples from marrying, or banning the 
recognition of their marriages, does not represent government abridgment. Rather, Thomas 
contends that since the states allow same-sex couples to enter into relationships other than 
marriage, engage in sexual intimacy, make vows in public ceremonies, and raise children without 
issue, they have not been deprived of liberty.364 Additionally, he adds the states have not 
prevented “petitioners from approximating a number of incidents of marriage through private 
legal means, such as wills, trusts, and power of attorney,” and therefore have not deprived them 
of liberty.365  
 However, the Obergefell plaintiffs from Michigan originally brought suit challenging the 
state’s adoption law for that exact reason. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse were raising their 
adopted children together, but because of Michigan’s adoption law, the children could only have 
a legal relationship with one parent.366 Therefore, DeBoer was the legal adoptive parent of their 
daughter Ryanne, and Rowse was the legal adoptive parent of their two sons Nolan and Jacob.367 
Because of the adoption law, even if DeBoer wrote in her will that Rowse should have custody 
of Ryanne, her decision had no legal status. Therefore, a judge could have awarded the child to 
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someone else, and the surviving parent, who raised the child since birth, would effectively be a 
legal stranger to the child.368 Therefore, while Thomas is correct in his assertion that the 
plaintiffs were able to create wills, given that the wills held no legal status it is hard to argue that 
DeBoer, Rowse and other same-sex couples in their position were not deprived of liberty. There 
is no benefit to signing a legal document that offers no protection from government intrusion. 
 The fourth point of criticism of Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion is what the dissenting 
Justices claim as his “unprincipled” due process analysis. In his dissent, Roberts notes that even 
though the Solicitor General, who argued in support of the petitioners, “expressly disowned the 
due process argument before the Court [in oral argument]. . .The majority nevertheless resolves 
these cases for petitioners based almost entirely on the Due Process Clause.”369 He further 
contends “the majority’s argument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples a 
fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for society,” which is 
“indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.”370 Roberts acknowledges that substantive due 
process protects certain fundamental liberty interests “against state deprivation,” and these 
fundamental liberty interests can only be abrogated if the state offers compelling justification.371 
However, Roberts argues that there are limits to this approach and the Court should be wary of 
holding laws unconstitutional because it finds them “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony 
with a particular school of thought.”372  
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 Roberts claims that in its due process analysis and understanding of liberty, the Court 
broke with precedent and returned to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.373 As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the Court in Lochner determined that a New York law preventing bakers 
from working more than ten hours a day violated the liberty of the bakers protected by the Due 
Process Clause because bakers had the freedom of contract to bargain for themselves. While the 
Court has since repudiated that decision, to say that Kennedy invoked the same reasoning in 
Obergefell is incorrect. As Tribe argues, there is a significant difference between Lochner and 
Obergefell, namely that no one at the time of Lochner argued that the ruling provided a way to 
redress the economic subordination of bakers. In contrast, “the freedom to marry championed in 
Obergefell was understood by all to directly redress the subordination of LGBT individuals.”374  
 The fifth criticism of Kennedy’s opinion is the absence of traditional equal protection 
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent asserts “[t]he majority does not seriously engage with 
[the equal protection] claim. Its discussion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow,” and the main 
point the opinion makes is that there is a synergy between the Equal Protection Clause and Due 
Process Clause and other precedents relying on one clause have relied on the other.375 Perhaps 
most notably, however, Roberts writes:  
 Absent from this portion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual 
 framework for deciding equal protection cases. It is case book doctrine that the “modern 
 Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends 
 methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is 
 sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.”376. . .The majority goes on to assert in 
 conclusionary fashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternative basis for 
 its holding. Yet the majority fails to provide even a single sentence explaining how the 
 Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt 
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 to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against unnecessarily resolving 
 constitutional questions.377 
 
 While Yoshino in particular argues the absence of equal protection is intentional, he also 
argues it was ultimately better for same-sex couples because “the synergy that [Kennedy] 
discussed meant that equal protection analysis could inform substantive due process in such a 
way that would perforce change the usual framework of analysis.”378 Yoshino further discusses 
how Kennedy introduced this synergy in Lawrence, when he determined the case in terms of 
substantive due process because the liberty analysis advanced both due process and equal 
protection:379  
 [B]y engaging in the liberty analysis in Lawrence, Kennedy required the states to level 
 up to treat both straights and gays equally, which in that case meant the elimination of all 
 sodomy statutes. Put differently, the equality concerns implicated in that case were, 
 against intuition, better served under the Due Process Clause rather than under the Equal 
 Protection Clause. . .In Obergefell, a standard equal protection ruling would have 
 permitted the states either to level up by granting both same-sex couples and opposite 
 sex couples marriage licenses or to level down by refusing to grant licenses to both sets 
 of couples.380  
 
 Therefore, he argues Kennedy’s focus on due process “protects the true equality interests 
of gays and lesbians more than an equal protection decision ever could,”381 because:  
 An individual could take the principled view that the state should not be in the business 
 of running recreational facilities. Yet even that individual should have qualms if the 
 reason a municipality closes a public pool is to avoid integrating it on racial lines.382 
 Similarly, an individual could hold the principled view that the state should be out of the 
 marriage business. Yet even that individual should have qualms if the reason for shutting 
 down civil marriage is the threat of the same-sex couples entering the institution.383  
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 While it is correct that individuals should have qualms if civil marriage is shut down due 
to the threat of same-sex couples entering into the institution, that has not prevented some 
individuals from refusing to provide marriage licenses, or state representatives from suggesting 
the end to marriage all together.384 Therefore while in principle Yoshino’s argument is valid, in 
reality, due process has proven to provide little protection to some same-sex couples seeking 
marriage. 
 In addition to his argument about the absence of a traditional equal protection analysis, 
Roberts does claim that even if Kennedy did include it, the laws in question did not violate the 
clause, under rational basis, because they are rationally related to a “legitimate interest” in 
“preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”385 Interestingly, he does allow that “the equal 
protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused 
challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits,” signaling that if a case is brought in the 
future on equal protection grounds in which homosexuals are denied concrete benefits, then 
those claims may raise constitutional questions.386 
 All of the dissenting Justices also discuss the decision’s broader implications. First, 
Roberts, Alito, and Thomas raise concerns about the religious liberty of individuals who believe 
that marriage is a union between a man and a women and homosexuality is a sin. In his dissent, 
Chief Justice Roberts presents hypothetical examples such as a religious college that provides 
married students housing but only to opposite sex couples, or a religious adoption agency that 
declines placing children with same-sex couples.387  Justice Alito also argues that the decision 
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will have a negative impact on religious liberty and goes as far to say it will be used to “vilify” 
persons “unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.”388 Additionally, he argues that analogizing 
same-sex marriage bans to laws that denied equal treatment for African American and women is 
dangerous and “will be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of 
dissent.”389 Perhaps most scathing, however is his assertion that “those who cling to old beliefs 
will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those 
views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, 
employers, and schools.”390  
 In addition to the arguments about the implications of the opinion on religious liberty, 
Chief Justice Roberts also argues that the opinion in Obergefell may open the door for polygamy 
because it makes it more difficult for the states to maintain their definition of marriage as a union 
between two people.391 Roberts argues that if there is dignity in a same-sex couple using their 
autonomy to make the profound choice to marry, then it is hard to argue there is less dignity in 
the bond between three people who autonomously make the profound choice to marry.392 
Roberts argues that since both same-sex marriage and plural marriage seek to alter the “core” 
definition of marriage, there is no principled way to validate one but not the other. While there 
are some proponents of polygamy, Den Otter for example, that argue Obergefell laid the 
groundwork for plural marriage, same-sex marriage will not, and cannot lead directly to 
polygamous marriages. Even if polygamists bring suit to legalize plural marriage after 
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Obergefell, the likelihood of the bans being lifted is very slim because the state’s interest in 
limiting the number of marriage partners is strong.393 
 The dissenting Justices and their supporters argue that the Obergefell opinion was an 
example of judicial activism, created a new right, misinterpreted the meaning of liberty, reverted 
to Lochner’s unprincipled due process analysis, and ignored the equal protection clause. As 
shown in this chapter, the Justices framed the issue in Obergefell differently to arrive at a desired 
result. Both Alito and Roberts deny the fundamental right to marry exists in a comprehensive 
sense and justify that position by relying upon traditional definitions of marriage. As 
demonstrated, rights evolve, and excluding a group for their innate sexuality, or because 
marriage has always excluded them, are not compelling reasons to continue excluding them. 
Additionally, despite Justice Thomas’ effort to explain that the government has not abridged the 
liberty of same-sex couples, the plaintiffs from Michigan had no way to ensure their children 
would not be considered legal strangers to their family.  
 While Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas all disagree in the reasoning and the outcome 
of the Obergefell decision, Tribe and Yoshino both answer the questions of the dissents and 
show how, particularly in terms of due process, the Obergefell opinion was principled and rooted 
in precedent.394 Tribe and Yoshino argue it is both acceptable, preferable, and predictable that 
Kennedy fused his due process and equal protection analyses instead of making distinct 
arguments for equal protection and due process.  
                                                
393 There is not a concrete class of persons who could make a claim under the Equal Protection Clause the way that 
homosexuals did in Obergefell. Arguably polygamists could make a religious freedom claim, however, the state has 
compelling reasons to limit the marriage between two persons such as the potential harm to children with parents in 
polygamist relationships, the subordination of women, and the administrative nightmare of plural marriage (ie filing 
taxes, medical benefits, inheritance, power of attorney, etc). See Joseph J. Fischel, review of In Defense of Plural 
Marriage, by Ron C. Den Otter, The Journal of Politics 78, no. 1 (January 2016): E6, accessed November 16, 2015, 
DOI:10.1086/684311. Citing United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, (1938), (152n4). 
394 While I agree that some of the claims Tribe and Yoshino make provide good counterarguments to the dissenting 
Justices, they do not take into account all of the implications of the opinion in terms of equal protection and 




 Even those who emphatically agree with Justice Kennedy that the Constitution affords 
 same-sex couples the right to marry, many are quick to claim that his sweeping opinion 
 was heavy on rhetoric and light on legal reasoning -- a political masterstroke but a 
 doctrinal dud.1 
 
 Concurrences off the Court: With Outcome, Not Reasoning 
 Though there were no concurring opinions written by any of the Justices on the Court, 
there have been a number of legal scholars and journalists who, while agreeing with the ultimate 
outcome of the Obergefell decision, disagree with the reasoning Kennedy used to achieve that 
end. While the arguments of these groups focus on a variety of implications of the opinion such 
as tax reform,2 estate planning,3 and adoptions,4 the more important criticisms of the opinion 
pertain to Kennedy’s failure to determine the standard of review for sexual orientation. The main 
arguments of these critics are that the opinion avoided determining the standard by focusing too 
narrowly on the fundamental right to marry and by fusing the Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause instead of providing a clear independent analysis of each. As Peter Nicolas 
writes: 
That lack of transparency both leaves the Court’s decision vulnerable to criticism and as 
ipse dixit5. . .and denies litigants and lower courts the guidance they need to apply the 
constitutional principle consistently in future cases.6 For this reason, Obergefell and its 
                                                
1 Tribe, "Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name," 16. 
2 Infanti, Anthony C. "Victims of Our Own Success: The Perils of Obergefell and Windsor." Ohio State Law 
Journal 76 (2015): 79-85. Accessed November 29, 2015. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664248.  
3 Karibjanian, George D. "Obergefell: The Final Word (But Not Really) on Same-Sex Marriage." Trusts & Estates 
154, no. 8 (August 2015): 34-37. Accessed October 22, 2015. Index to Legal Periodicals Full Text (108765469). 
4 Zarembka, Arlene. "Advising Same-Sex Couples after Obergefell and Windsor." GPSolo 32, no. 4 (June/July 
2015): 34-37. Accessed October 22, 2015. Index to Legal Periodicals Full Text (108835520). 
5 Ipse dixit: a dogmatic and unproven statement 
6 See Cleburne v. Cleburne living 473 U.S. 432, 459-60 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[B]y failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s ‘second order’ rational-basis review, the Court 
provides no principled foundation determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”) Cited in Nicolas, 
"Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 144. 
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antecedents represent a somewhat unstable base upon which to build future gay rights 
victories.7 
 
 Of course, Kennedy may have deliberately tied the Equal Protection Clause and Due 
Process Clause tightly together, and avoided determining the standard of review for 
classifications on sexual orientation. To properly evaluate and analyze the claims of those who 
criticize him for doing so, it is necessary first to reconsider the arguments that help explain why 
Justice Kennedy avoided determining the standard in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, and then 
why he did so again in Obergefell.  
 As discussed in chapter II, in Romer the Court potentially did not have to determine the 
level of scrutiny because Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause on its face and 
could not even pass the rational basis test. Additionally, the state trial court had rejected the 
contention that sexual orientation was a semi-suspect or suspect classification and the petitioners 
in Romer did not appeal that part of the ruling to the Supreme Court so it would have been 
awkward for the Court to answer it.8 In Lawrence Kennedy stated in his opinion that he wanted 
to overrule Bowers and thought that rooting his decision in the Equal Protection Clause made it 
impossible to do so. Kennedy worried that using equal protection would mean sodomy bans 
could be upheld if they were drawn to prohibit sodomy generally and did not single out 
homosexual sodomy.9 That said, some scholars contend that Kennedy could have used the 
reasoning in Loving to apply the Due Process Clause to overrule Bowers and then apply the 
Equal Protection Clause to declare that sexual orientation was a suspect or semi-suspect 
classification.10 Additionally, given the Court’s rejection of the equal application argument in 
                                                
7 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 144. 
8 Ibid., 138 
9 Ibid., 139 
10 Ibid., 139. (“Yet even if he felt compelled to address the due process claims and overrule Bowers, Justice 
Kennedy could have also addressed the class-based equal protection claim by following the example of Loving v. 
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Loving, Kennedy could have used equal protection to determine the standard of review and 
argued that a general sodomy ban was still invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the 
bans treated same-sex couples and opposite sex couples equally.  
 In Windsor, Kennedy avoided addressing equal protection at all and stressed the right to 
dignity implicit in the Due Process Clause. As in Romer, the Court possibly declined to 
determine the standard of review in Windsor because on its face, DOMA was unconstitutional 
and could not pass the rational basis test. Additionally, in Windsor if the Court had used 
heightened or strict scrutiny, it would have effectively ended the entire marriage debate 
nationwide and overturned same-sex marriage bans in 38 states. Another possible reason is that 
Windsor also dealt with a federal law which had incredibly broad implications nationwide. 
 One potential reason why Kennedy may have focused so much on the fundamental right 
to marry instead of classifying sexual orientation as a semi-suspect or suspect classification in 
Obergefell is because Kennedy is deeply concerned about fundamental rights.11 Since Kennedy’s 
time on the Ninth Circuit, his opinions have made clear that he values individual rights over 
group based classifications. Another possible reason why Kennedy chose to focus on the 
fundamental right to marry and not the classification of homosexuals is because the questions 
asked in Obergefell dealt specifically with marriage. While it is true that the Supreme Court in 
Obergefell was answering questions regarding whether the states could deny same-sex couples 
marriage, that does not mean the Court was barred from using a class based approach to strike 
down the marriage bans. On the contrary, in each of the cases that determined race and gender 
                                                                                                                                                       
Virginia. There the Court struck down miscegenation laws alternatively on the ground that they violated the 
fundamental right to marry and the ground that they constituted class-based discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”) 
11 Ibid., 144 (“Kennedy might have a different view of the proper role of equal protection clause, preferring an 
approach that is rights focused, rather than class focused and moving away from the rigid tiered approach in favor of 
a more unitary approach.”) 
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were suspect and semi-suspect classifications respectively, the Court determined the level of 
scrutiny despite that not being part of the constitutional question they sought to answer directly. 
Therefore, the Court could have focused on the fundamental right to marry and the class based 
restriction of the marriage laws.  
 Another potential reason why Kennedy avoided focusing on the standard of review, is 
because it would have been too broad of an approach. However, because the Court focused 
narrowly on the fundamental right to marry, the Court now has to defend all of the government 
restrictions on marriage. Although, as discussed in the last chapter, the Court will likely be able 
to uphold the restrictions on plural marriage, that door may have not been opened at all if 
Kennedy took a class based equal protection approach in Obergefell. A class based equal 
protection decision would only apply to laws prohibiting marriage based on sexual orientation 
and would hold that denying marriage to a group of people for their sexual orientation cannot 
stand under the equal protection clause. Such a decision would not bring laws restricting 
marriage on the basis of age, genealogy, and number into question.12 
 Lastly, Kennedy may have chosen not to provide independent equal protection analysis in 
his opinion because he wanted to treat the constitutional guarantee of the Due Process Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause as unified and thereby solidify the reasoning that he first used in 
Lawrence emphasizing that the clauses reinforce each other. In other words, unlike in Loving 
where the Court treated liberty and equality claims as parallel rather than intertwined, Obergefell 
explicitly treated the two clauses as a double helix, such that: “each concept -- liberty and equal 
protection -- leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”13 While Tribe and Yoshino argue 
                                                
12 Ibid., 143 
13 Yoshino, "New Birth of Freedom?," 172. 
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there are benefits to deciding the case on due process grounds, and lumping equal protection with 
it, there are also potential problems.  
 For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services14 the Court said that the 
government did not have to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against the 
invasion of private actors. The Court argued that the Due Process Clause limits the state’s power 
to act, but it does not guarantee minimal levels of safety and security.15 While the facts of 
DeShaney and Obergefell are very different, the due process principles are similar. The 
Obergefell decision only protects homosexuals from government intrusion on their marriages, 
not in any other respect. While same-sex couples can get married, there is no protection from 
being fired from their jobs, or being discriminated against in housing, public accommodations, 
and credit. Additionally, some private actors are still able to discriminate against people on the 
basis of sexual orientation and, in many cases, legally deny gays and lesbians their “equal 
dignity” in contexts outside marriage because there are no anti-discrimination laws to prevent 
private actors from doing so.  
 Obergefell also arguably left gays and lesbians in a disadvantageous position in terms of 
their ability to fight against discrimination that occurs in the name of religious liberty. Under 
Obergefell, homosexuals who are discriminated against in the name of religion are only 
supported by their right to “equal dignity,” or under state or local anti-discrimination laws. 
However, since the federal government has no broad protections against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, and less than half of the states have such laws, only some 
                                                
14 498 U.S. 189 (1989). In that case, a toddler became comatose from severe head injuries received from an abusive 
father over a long period of time. While Social Services took steps to protect the child after numerous complaints, 
they did nothing to remove the child from the father’s custody. The child’s mother sued Social Services arguing the 
Department had deprived the child of liberty to bodily integrity under due process and did not do enough to protect 
the child from the father’s abuse. 
15 Yoshino, "New Birth of Freedom?," 161. 
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homosexuals, based on state and local laws, can file a lawsuit in court after facing 
discrimination. Even then, because they are not a protected class, there is no guarantee that the 
court will rule in their favor and that anti-discrimination laws serve a compelling government 
interest.  
 Additionally, in the 28 states that do not have anti-discrimination laws, if homosexuals 
are discriminated against in other contexts outside of marriage such as housing, credit, and public 
accommodations, they will be out of luck. If they are discriminated against within the context of 
marriage or denied the right to marry, as has happened since Obergefell, courts may have to 
measure their claim to “equal dignity” against the First Amendment right to religious liberty. If 
Kennedy determined the standard of review, a law that exempts government officials or other 
persons from providing marriage licenses or other marriage related services, would have to prove 
that the exemption serves a compelling interest. Furthermore, the government would have to 
prove it serves a compelling interest that overrides the compelling interest of ridding society of 
discrimination.  
 While the freedom of religion is a compelling interest, it is unclear whether it outweighs 
the compelling interest of rooting out discrimination. Regardless, it is more difficult to prove it 
outweighs the compelling interest of rooting out discrimination than it is to prove it outweighs 
guaranteeing same-sex couples’ equal dignity. Therefore, declaring sexual orientation a semi-
suspect class would have protected homosexuals not only from government intrusion, but also at 
least give them equal footing to counter private actors claiming they have a religious right be 
exempt from serving same-sex couples or facilitating the “gay lifestyle.” 
 While Kennedy was able to justify not determining the standard of review in Romer, 
Lawrence, and Windsor, the potential reasons for eschewing the issue in Obergefell are harder to 
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defend. Even if Kennedy felt he needed to use the fundamental rights claim to overrule the 
Court’s one line summary dismissal of Baker v. Nelson, he could have followed the Loving 
example and declared the statutes unconstitutional on substantive due process fundamental rights 
grounds, and class-based equal protection grounds.16 Again, as in Romer and Windsor, it is 
possible that Kennedy felt the laws were unconstitutional on their face and it did not matter what 
standard of review was used. However, in terms of race and gender, the Court’s precedent shows 
that the Court can determine the standard of review even if the laws would not even pass rational 
basis. 
 The process of determining race as a suspect classification subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny took the Court about thirteen years.17 In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court used 
the Equal Protection Clause to reason that laws discriminating based on race were 
unconstitutional.18 Though the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to the laws in question, which 
denied blacks equal access to educational opportunities, it nonetheless determined that laws 
based on race could not stand under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is possible that the Court did 
not determine those laws were subject to strict scrutiny because it sought to avoid deciding the 
constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws before the Court was ready to take on that 
controversy.19  Ten years later in McLaughlin v. Florida the Court re-characterized its 
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause to apply strict scrutiny to laws that made 
                                                
16 Peter Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 139-140. 
17 Ibid., 140 footnote 25 (Though there were some cases, namely Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) -- 
where the Court struck down statutes that discriminated against African Americans based on race, and stated that the 
laws denied the African Americans equal protection -- for the purposes of this paper, I am not including cases that 
were decided before Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) which started a new age of equal protection judicial 
review, in which African Americans were essentially unprotected by the Equal Protection Clause) 
18 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954). Interestingly, in the Obergefell opinion, Justice Kennedy does 
not mention Brown and talks about Loving solely in the context of the fundamental right to marry, not class-based 
equal protection side of the decision. 
19 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 140. Footnote 23 citing Evan Gerstmann, The Constitutional 
Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection 36 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999). 
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classifications based on race.20 In that case, the Court overturned a Florida criminal statute which 
prohibited unmarried interracial couples from habitually living in, and occupying the same room 
at night.21 In the ruling, the Court argued one “cannot conceive of a valid legislative 
purpose. . .which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal 
offense.”22 Three year later, strict scrutiny was used in Loving v. Virginia to invalidate bans on 
interracial marriage, and, as discussed previously, the Court held that the state had no compelling 
interest other than invidious racial discrimination to justify the laws.23  
 The trajectory for gender to be subject to heightened or intermediate scrutiny followed a 
similar pattern to that of race. In Reed v. Reed, the Court used the Equal Protection Clause to 
strike down laws that discriminated against women (by making sex-based classifications) for the 
first time.24 In that ruling the Court struck an Idaho law that specified “males must be preferred 
to females” in appointing administrators of estates25 as unconstitutional, reasoning: 
 To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, 
 merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind 
 of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause for the 
 Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not be lawfully mandated 
 solely on the basis of sex.26  
 
                                                
20 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
21 Ibid., 
22 Ibid., at 379 U.S. 184 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring) 
23 Peter Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential,”141 
24 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). (Section 15-314 is restricted in its operation to those situations where 
competing applications for letters of administration have been filed by both male and female members of the same 
entitlement class established by § 15-312. In such situations, § 15-314 provides that [males be preferred to females] 
and it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.)  
25 Ibid., at 72-72 (Idaho code 15-312 and 15-314: “Section 15-312 designates the persons who are entitled to 
administer the estate of one who dies intestate. In making these designations, the section lists 11 classes of persons 
who are so entitled, and provides, in substance, that the order in which those classes are listed in the section shall be 
determinative of the relative rights of competing applicants for letters of administration. One of the 11 classes so 
enumerated is "[t]he father or mother" of the person dying intestate. Under this section, then, appellant and appellee, 
being members of the same entitlement class, would seem to have been equally entitled to administer their son's 
estate. Section 1314 provides, however, that "[o]f several persons claiming and equally entitled [under § 1312] to 
administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the half blood.") 
26 Ibid., at 76-77 
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 Two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court then re-characterized the Reed 
ruling in a plurality opinion to apply strict scrutiny to the classifications.27 In that decision, the 
Court struck down a federal law that allowed wives of members of the military to automatically 
become dependents of their husbands, but did not allow husbands of female members of the 
military to become dependents, unless they were dependent on their wives for more than half of 
their support.28 By 1976 in Craig v. Boren, the Court agreed that intermediate scrutiny would be 
used for sex-based classifications.29 In that ruling, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma law that 
prohibited the sale of non-alcoholic 3.2 percent beer to males under twenty-one and to females 
under eighteen.30 Therefore, from beginning to end, it took the Court just five years to determine 
that gender was a semi-suspect class and laws that classified based on gender required 
heightened or intermediate scrutiny.  
 As of today, there is currently no judicial consensus on whether sexual orientation is a 
suspect, a quasi-suspect, or a non-suspect classification.31 Although some scholars agree that the 
Court has used a more “rigorous” form of rational basis review for laws that classify based on 
sexual orientation, the Supreme Court has not been explicit in its terminology. It is important to 
note that the Court is prudent when it avoids hastily classifying a group as suspect or semi-
suspect, as declaring the classification decides most or all future laws impacting a given group, 
                                                
27 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). (“With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude 
that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently 
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated by that stricter 
standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally invalid.”)  
28 Ibid.,  
29 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976). (Gender classifications require substantial relation to important 
government objectives to pass intermediate scrutiny) 
30 Ibid.,  
31 Karibjanian, "Obergefell: The Final Word," 34.; Brett Parker, "What Level of Legal Scrutiny Should Sexual 
Orientation-Based Classifications Receive?," The Stanford Political Journal, last modified January 19, 2015, 
accessed October 30, 2015, http://stanfordpolitics.com/2015/01/what-level-of-legal-scrutiny-should-sexual-
orientation-based-classifications-receive/. 
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and thus decides a large number of future controversies.32 The Court understandably wants to 
tread carefully before making such a declaration.33 However the Court has had more than enough 
time to tread and take a cautious approach to determine the standard of review for sexual 
orientation.  
 As Kennedy noted twice in his Obergefell opinion, there is substantial evidence 
supporting the notion that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic.34 Additionally, in its 
amicus brief filed in the case, the United States government presented strong evidence of how 
over the course of the last century gays and lesbians were “jailed for having sex, barred from 
immigrating to the United States, blacklisted from public employment, stripped of child custody, 
and subject to sterilization and castration at judicial whim.”35 Therefore, given homosexuals have 
been subject to a history of discrimination; they exhibit an obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristic; and they are a minority with less political power than non-suspect classes, it 
would appear that gays and lesbians meet the criteria to be considered a suspect or semi-suspect 
class. However, while the Court took approximately thirteen years to determine race was a 
suspect classification, and five years to determine gender was a semi-suspect classification, the 
Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws that target homosexuals without 
determining a clear standard of review since 1996, a twenty year period.  
 Historically there have been several negative consequences of not determining the 
standard of review. For one, lower courts have no guidance and have to interpret the 
classifications on a case by case basis. The Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect 
or semi-suspect classification in Romer and Lawrence resulted in concrete harm to gays and 
                                                
32 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 140. 
33 Ibid., 140 
34 Brief for American Psychological Association et al. at 7-17, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
35  Garrett Epps, "Gay Marriage Gets Its Day in Court," The Atlantic, last modified April 27, 2015, accessed 
February 21, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/gay-marriage-gets-its-day-in-court/391487/.  
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lesbians because lower courts have repeatedly upheld laws discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation, such as the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy,36 and laws prohibiting gays and lesbians 
from adopting,37 reasoning that only rational basis review applied and that the laws at issue 
satisfied that deferential level of review.38 
 Currently, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth circuits consider sexual orientation a semi-
suspect classification but the eight other circuits do not. This creates problems and inconsistency 
of treatment for homosexuals depending on where they live or file a lawsuit. Additionally, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, without a clear standard of review, state legislatures may 
pass laws that classify based on sexual orientation or target homosexuals in other ways. Even 
though some of these laws are being challenged in court, there is no guarantee they will need to 
pass anything more than the rational basis test. Additionally, the failure to declare sexual 
orientation a semi-suspect or suspect classification creates future harm because of the continued 
legal uncertainty it creates for gays and lesbians. For example, since Obergefell was laser 
focused on marriage without determining the standard of review, the case can be distinguished 
from other cases where homosexuals are discriminated against in contexts other than marriage.39  
As Garrett Epps notes, perhaps the most obvious implication of not determining the standard of 
review is that:  
 [E]very state discrimination -- whether in adoption, foster care placement, child custody, 
 health care, employee benefits, and so on, will have to be litigated to determine whether 
 there’s a [reason] strong enough to allow it. It will be tedious; it will be demeaning; and 
 (perhaps worse from the justices’ point of view) it will require the Supreme Court to 
 resolve the issue over and over again.40  
 
                                                
36 See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 60-62 (1st Cir. 1998) 
37 See Lofton v. Secretary of Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 815-18 (11th Cir. 2004) 
38 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 142. 
39 Ibid., 142.  
40 Epps, "Gay Marriage Gets Its Day in Court," The Atlantic. 
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 Not surprisingly, the most vocal opponents of determining the standard of review for 
sexual orientation are also staunch opponents of same-sex marriage and gay rights generally. 
Though it is more difficult now given the scientific evidence that sexual orientation is innate, 
they tend to argue that homosexuality is a choice, unlike race and therefore does not deserve to 
be treated as an immutable characteristic.41 Additionally, opponents deny that gays are lacking 
political power due to the number of gay rights laws enacted by states and Congress over the last 
couple of decades. However, as Epps notes:  
 [A] few years of mixed results cannot wipe out a century of hostility and exclusion. And 
 it hardly helps the case that some of those forecasting untroubled success for the gay 
 rights movement are the same people digging in their heels to retard and even reverse 
 it.42 
 
 Additionally, there are several benefits that determining the standard of review would 
give to gays and lesbians in America. For one, a clear determination of the standard of review 
from the Supreme Court would bind lower courts to use that standard and would also serve as 
precedent for any other case that is brought to the Court where a classification is drawn based on 
sexual orientation. Second, determining the standard of review would deter governmental actors 
from passing laws that classify based on sexual orientation knowing that the laws would be 
subjected to a level of scrutiny that the laws would not likely survive. Perhaps most importantly, 
a heightened level of scrutiny would “give gays and lesbians a measure of repose, affording them 
the same certainty that racial minorities and women have that laws targeting them are unlikely to 
be upheld by courts today.”43    
 That is not to say that declaring the standard of review would solve all of the problems 
homosexuals face in America and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would vanish. 
                                                
41 Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 54-55. 
42 Epps, "Gay Marriage Gets Its Day in Court," The Atlantic. 
43 Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 138. 
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If determining the standard of review was an antidote for discrimination, then racism and sexism, 
would no longer exist. Additionally, drawing parallels between sexual orientation and race and 
between Loving and Obergefell does not equate them. There are stark and significant differences 
between the Gay Rights Movement and the Civil Rights Movement, just as there are between 
sexual orientation and race. However, there are parallels between the two, and the comparison 
demonstrates that there are many benefits for a class of persons if they are considered a protected 
class under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
  While there was much to celebrate on the day of the Obergefell decision, for some the 
opinion produced a pang of uncertainty and disappointment. Despite homosexuals meeting all 
the requirements to be a suspect or semi-suspect class, and having four instrumental class based 
victories in the Court over the last two decades, the Court in Obergefell chose not to determine 
the standard of review. While it is true that Kennedy’s gay rights jurisprudence created the 
framework for his Obergefell opinion, and there are some undeniably positive outcomes of the 
reasoning used in Obergefell, the opinion also cemented the reality that the fight for gay rights is 







Where Do We Go From Here? 
  
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices. . .can a man excuse his practices 
to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name 
under such circumstances. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167 (1878). 
 
 
Anti-Discrimination Laws and Religious Liberty Before and After Obergefell 
 
 Before Obergefell there were several cases around the country that were brought against 
business owners and government officials who had religious objections to serving gay people in 
general, same-sex couples specifically, or providing their services for same-sex weddings.1 Of 
the cases brought, several were in states that had anti-discrimination laws covering sexual 
orientation in public accommodations.2 In some of the states, same-sex marriage was already 
legal and some states had Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRA)3 or RFRA-like language 
                                                
1 Robert Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., (Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), cert granted, Super Ct. (U.S. March 2, 2016) 
(No. 91615-2) (florist); Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, Civ. No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN, Order (Haw. Circ. Court 
1st Cir. Apr. 15, 2013) (bed and breakfast); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 WL 4760453 at *7 (bakery); 
Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. CRT 6145-09 (N.J. Div. On Civil Rights Oct. 22, 2015) at 11 
(wedding venue); Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Oct. 7, 2013); Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Matter of Gifford v. McCarthy No. 520410 (N.Y. App 
Div. Jan. 14, 2016) (photographer); Bureau of Labor and Industries of the State of Oregon in the Matter of: Melissa 
Elaine Klein, dba Sweet Cakes by Melissa No. 44-14 & 45-14 (2015) (bakery) 
2 Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Washington.  
3 In reaction to the Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990) Congress unanimously passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 
which stated: [The] Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, except. . .if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–1. In Smith, the Court abandoned the strict scrutiny 
standard traditionally used for First Amendment cases where plaintiffs sought exemptions. And determined that 
neutral, generally applicable laws were constitutional even if the laws burdened religious exercise. 
 99 
in their constitutions.4 The circumstances in these cases vary widely, however, this section will 
focus on three cases that represent the kinds of claims made by religious objectors. 
 First, business owners in states that had anti-discrimination laws and RFRA contended 
that RFRA demanded they be exempt from following anti-discrimination laws.5 In Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court found that Elane Photography 
violated the state’s anti-discrimination law when the owner refused to photograph a same-sex 
couple’s commitment ceremony.7 The court determined that the New Mexico Human Rights Act 
(NMHRA) did not violate New Mexico’s RFRA because RFRA was not applicable in a suit 
between private parties. The court also held that there was no exemption from anti-
discrimination laws for creative or expressive professions and the NMHRA sought to promote 
equal rights and access to public accommodations by prohibiting discrimination based on certain 
specified protected classifications.8 Furthermore, the court rejected Elane Photography’s claim 
that the NMHRA violated her freedom of speech and free exercise under the United States and 
New Mexico Constitutions. 
                                                
4 While the original RFRA applied to both the federal government and the states, in 1997 the Supreme Court found 
that as applied to the states, RFRA exceeded the power of Congress. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507, 508-509 
(1997)) (“All told, RFRA is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and 
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens, and is not designed to identify and 
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion”). Since that ruling, twenty-
two states have passed their own RFRA laws, and an additional 12 states have also proposed RFRA style bills in 
their state legislatures. While some of these “mini-RFRAs” are modeled after the federal law, several are broader 
than the federal version and go beyond the original intent of RFRA. For example, in Florida, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas, the state RFRAs define “free exercise” as an act or refusal 
to act that is substantially motivated by religious beliefs. See Fla. Stat. 761.01 et seq, Ill. Rev.Stat Ch. 775 35/1 et 
seq, Kan. Stat 60-5301 et seq, Ky. Rev. Stat 446.350, La. Rev. Stat. 13:5231 et seq, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.302, NM Stat. 
28-22-1 et seq, Tex. Civ. Prac. and remedies code 110.001 et seq.  
5 2006 New Mexico Statutes - Section 28-1-7(F). http://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2006/nmrc/jd_28-1-7-
bcb3.html  
6 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P3d at 73 (N.M. 2013). 
7 The case was first filed in 2006. Same-sex marriage was not legalized in New Mexico until December 2013. See 
table 1 in appendix more information on same-sex marriage in New Mexico. 
8 Citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) The Court held that “[i]nvidious private discrimination 
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has 
never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” 
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 Second, business owners in states that did not have a RFRA law but had anti-
discrimination laws also asserted the burden the law put on their conscience was so harmful, they 
needed to be exempt from the laws. For example, in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,9 the 
Court of Appeals determined that Masterpiece Cakeshop violated the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA)10 for refusing to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The 
court also determined that CADA did not violate Masterpiece’s freedom of speech and free 
exercise of religion protected by the United States and Colorado Constitutions.  
 Third, government officials in states that have RFRA and no anti-discrimination laws 
protecting sexual orientation, asserted RFRA required they be exempt from performing their 
official duties of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples because the action conflicted 
with their religious beliefs. In Miller v. Davis,11 a Kentucky district court determined the Free 
Exercise Clause did not excuse Kim Davis, an elected government official, from issuing 
marriage licenses because of her religious objection to same-sex marriage.12 Davis claimed that 
the state had a compelling interest to protect her religious freedom, and forcing her to sign the 
marriage licenses violated Kentucky’s RFRA. The court determined that Davis would not suffer 
irreparable harm by having her signature on a marriage license issued to a same-sex couple and 
her religious beliefs did not excuse her from performing the duties that she took an oath to 
perform.13  
                                                
9 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 WL 4760453 at *7 
10 Section 24-34-601(2)(a), C.R.S. 2014 
11 Miller et al., v. Davis et al., 192 L. Ed. 2d 994 (Ky Dist. Ct. 2015).  
12 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-44-DLB (Aug. 12, 2015) 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-KY-0006-0006.pdf info  
13 Judge Bunning was an appointee of George W. Bush and his father is former Republican Senator Jim Bunning. 
See Alan Blinder and Richard Pérez-Peña, "Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court," 
The New York Times, September 1, 2015, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-
sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html?_r=0. http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-KY-0006-0006.pdf  
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 In cases like Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock and Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Inc, the two conflicting rights were the right to not be discriminated against in places of public 
accommodation and the constitutional right to free speech and free exercise of religion. In Miller 
v. Davis, the rights in question were the fundamental right to marry and the right to free exercise 
of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. Each of the cases came down in favor of the 
LGBT plaintiffs, and although two of them were appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court did 
not take the cases.14 Additionally, some of the cases dealing with similar conflicts are awaiting 
resolution in the appeals process in various state courts.15 As a result of these small business 
owners and government officials losing in court, there has been legislation passed at the state 
level to grant them the exemptions they seek and to protect them from being sued for breaking 
anti-discrimination laws.16 Because religious groups were failing in their arguments in state 
courts, they developed an argument based on a countervailing right because it allows them to 
turn the discrimination question on its head. Religious groups now contend that by forcing 
business owners and people like Kim Davis to follow the law, religious observers are being 
discriminated against.17 
 This claim asserts that private business owners and government employees should be 
accommodated for their beliefs regardless if that accommodation results in the defiance of anti-
                                                
14 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P3d at 73; Miller et al., v. Davis et al., 192 L. Ed. 2d 994 (Ky Dist. Ct. 
2015);  
15 Robert Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., (Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), cert granted, Super Ct. (U.S. March 2, 
2016) (No. 91615-2). The Washington Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral arguments are expected in a matter 
of months.  
16 Some states have introduced RFRAs, others have introduced marriage related religious exemption laws, some 
have introduced First Amendment Defense Acts as well as acts to exempt government employees, commercial 
wedding services, and other things from generally applicable laws. Bills regarding religious exemptions in the 
realms of adoption and foster care, college and university student groups, access to health services, and more have 
also been introduced. See ACLU, "Anti-LGBT Religious Exemption Legislation across the Country," ACLU, 
accessed April 16, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/anti-lgbt-religious-exemption-legislation-across-
country?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbt-religious-refusals-legislation-across-country.  
17 Bobby Jindal, "Bobby Jindal: I'm Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage," The New York Times, April 23, 2015, 
accessed April 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/bobby-jindal-im-holding-firm-against-gay-
marriage.html?_r=0.  
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discrimination laws or the fundamental right to marry. While religious exemptions have been 
given in the past for military service, swearing oaths, school attendance, and alcohol use, those 
were for minorities, and exemptions on a large scale were limited to religious organizations or 
places of worship.18  
 This argument requires religious liberty to trump the state’s compelling interest in rooting 
out discrimination. While the courts in cases the discussed above rejected these claims, the fact 
that the defendants are making them at all is remarkable, particularly since no state has ever 
exempted commercial business owners or government employees from the obligation to provide 
services for interracial marriage, interfaith marriage, or marriage involving divorced individuals 
even though major religious traditions in America have opposed them.19 This fact undermines 
any argument that commercial business owners should be exempt from anti-discrimination 
laws.20  
 Interestingly, during the Civil Rights Movement the demand for religious exemptions 
from anti-discrimination laws was scarce, and the objections that were voiced were not taken 
seriously.21 While some religious exemptions did exist in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they did 
                                                
18 For example, during prohibition, the Catholic Church was still able to use wine. Also see Mark David Hall, 
"Religious Accommodations and the Common Good," The Heritage Foundation, last modified October 26, 2015, 
accessed October 30, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/religious-accommodations-and-the-
common-good. 
19 As Oleske notes, even though many Americans had religious objections to interracial marriage in the 1960s, 
federal and state anti-discrimination laws never included exemptions allowing business owners to deny services 
based on those beliefs. Additionally, although the New Testament quotes Jesus condemning divorce and remarriage 
as against the Ten Commandments, state laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital status do not contain 
exemptions allowing commercial businesses or individuals with “sincerely held religious beliefs” to refuse to 
facilitate the remarriages of divorced people. Oleske, "The Evolution of Accommodation," 144 footnotes 230-235. 
20 Ibid., 146 
21 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises 390 US 400, 402 n5 (1968) (The Supreme Court rejected as “patently 
frivolous” a restaurant owner’s argument that, by prohibiting racial discrimination, the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
“constitute[d] an interference with the free exercise of the Defendant’s religion” (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). The lower court opinion explicitly addressed this argument stating: “undoubtedly defendant 
Bessinger has a constitutional right to espouse the religious beliefs of his own choosing, however, he does not have 
the absolute right to exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other 
citizens. This court refuses to lend credence or support to his position that he has a constitutional right to refuse to 
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not go beyond protecting the right of churches and other places of worship to hire ministers and 
other officials of their faith.22 Additionally, while exemptions have been given in the past, it was 
generally understood that including broad exemptions for religiously or morally motivated 
individuals during the civil rights era would have made the laws less effective and would have 
changed the message sent by the laws:23  
 The message sent by allowing religious exemptions [in the commercial realm] is that 
 discrimination is wrong and illegal except when it is right and legal. It is illegal and 
 wrong unless your deeply held religious beliefs support [it]. . . The right to discriminate 
 can convey a message that it is right to do so.24 
 
 While these principles have generally been understood as reasonable in states that have 
anti-discrimination laws, today the religious right seeks broad exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws that apply to any individual or group that has a sincerely held religious belief 
about LGBT persons or same-sex marriage. While religious freedom has always been an 
important tenet of American society, it has also always been understood to have its limits. 
However, currently the arguments for exemptions in the name of religious liberty are unlimited, 
and religious liberty is seen as a trump card by those who seek exemptions for private business 
owners and government officials. Of course there is no doubt that their religious beliefs are 
sincere, or deeply held, but, as the courts in the cases described above recognized, there would be 
immense harm to individuals and society if exemptions for such individuals from anti-
discrimination laws were allowed.   
 In cases of civil servants such as clerks and magistrates, exemptions should not be 
granted to them because they are agents of the government and have a responsibility to enforce 
                                                                                                                                                       
serve members of the Negro race in his business establishments upon the ground that to do so would violate his 
sacred religious beliefs.” See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises 256 F.Supp 941, 945 (1966) emphasis added.  
22 Curtis, "A Unique Religious Exemption," 179-180. 
23 Ibid., 176 
24 Ibid., 203.  
 104 
and apply the laws equally. In cases of business owners who provide goods and services, they 
should not be granted exemptions because there is immense harm that arises when businesses 
open to the public deny services in such a way that discriminates, even if their objection is rooted 
in faith. Additionally, the harm to the individual and to society as a whole is not minimized 
simply because the individual can go somewhere else for the same service.25 
 While it is true that determining the standard of review for sexual orientation was not 
necessary to win those three cases before or after Obergefell, determining the standard of review 
would have helped. For one, even though the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state rather than 
private actors, in setting a clear standard, governments could argue there is a compelling state 
interest to root out discrimination in the private sector. Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
determined that laws have an improper purpose when they accommodate private prejudice.26 
Furthermore, determining the standard would make laws that place homosexuals, or same-sex 
couples, in a disfavored class because of their sexual orientation harder to defend. While there is 
a compelling interest in protecting the religious liberty of all people, there is also a compelling 
interest to not have that freedom interfere with other people’s freedom and civil liberties.27 
However, without a clear standard of review, the Court in Obergefell gave deference to the states 
to decide, which also gave states a freer hand to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 
                                                
25 Louise Melling et al., Drawing the Line: Tackling Tensions Between Religious Freedom and Equality, 22-23, 
September 2015, accessed April 25, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/inc15-report-
drawingtheline-rel1.pdf.  
26 For example in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court held the government “may not avoid the 
strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body 
politic. ‘Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot directly or indirectly, give them 
effect.’” 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1983) quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). However, by selectively 
accommodating commercial discrimination against same-sex couples that was not previously permitted against other 
disfavored couples, the proposed exemptions would give private objections validation. See Oleske 145 
27 Michael Nava and Robert Dawidoff, Created Equal: Why Gay Rights Matter to America (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1994), 88. 
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Therefore, determining whether there is a compelling state interest to root out discrimination will 
likely turn on state court interpretations of state law.  
 At the state level after Obergefell, attorney generals, governors, clerks, judges and 
senators across the country decried the decision as a blatant judicial overstep and some even 
vowed to have the decision overturned with a constitutional amendment.28 While there were 
varying degrees of the ferocity of responses, several conservative legislatures declared they 
would act tirelessly to ensure that religious observers would not have to act in any way that 
conflicted with their conscience. In the months preceding Obergefell and immediately following 
the decision, dozens of bills have been introduced in thirty-one states to protect persons whose 
religious convictions prevent them from serving the LGBT community in one way or another.29 
Of those 31 states, eleven have existing RFRA laws and of those eleven, four have existing anti-
discrimination laws covering sexual orientation.30  
                                                
28 In Kentucky, 60 clerks signed a petition to the Governor saying they objected to the ruling on religious grounds, 
however, most decided to issue licenses in fear of losing their jobs. In Alabama, probate judges in 13 of the 67 
counties refused to issue marriage licenses at all, and one Judge in Washington County called for a “landmark 
ruling” to defy the Supreme Court. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Kentucky Clerk Defies Court on Marriage Licenses 
for Gay Couples," The New York Times, August 13, 2013, accessed October 26, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/kentucky-rowan-county-same-sex-marriage-licenses-kim-davis.html; 
Andrew Rosenthal, "The Instant Republican Backlash on Gay Marriage," The New York Times, June 26, 2015, The 
Opinionator, http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/the-instant-republican-backlash-on-gay-marriage/.  
29 See ACLU, "Anti-LGBT Religious Exemption Legislation across the Country," ACLU, accessed April 16, 2016, 
https://www.aclu.org/anti-lgbt-religious-exemption-legislation-across-country?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbt-
religious-refusals-legislation-across-country.   
30 Existing RFRA laws: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, Maine, 




Figure 2. States that Introduced Religious Exemption Bills during 2015 or 2016.31 
 
 One of the most far reaching of these bills was passed in North Carolina.32 Known as 
HB2, the bill was drafted by Republican lawmakers in response to the passage of a Charlotte 
ordinance that expanded anti-discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, 
and allowed transgender persons to use public restrooms that aligned with their gender identity.33 
HB2 overrides Charlotte’s ordinance, forces people to use bathrooms that match their birth 
gender, prohibits any local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to protect LGBT 
                                                
31 Colored states indicates states where bills were introduced. Orange indicates states with existing RFRA laws, 
Green indicates states with existing RFRA laws and existing anti-discrimination laws.  
32 Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ G.S. 115C, 143-81, 95-25, 153A, 160A (2016). In 
May 2015, the legislature also passed a bill SB2 that allows state court officials to refuse to perform a marriage if 
they have a “sincerely held religious objection,” to it. The law is not limited to same-sex marriage -- a magistrate 
could also refuse to perform an interracial or interfaith wedding. Governor McCrory vetoed the bill stating “no 
public official who voluntarily swears to support and defend the Constitution and to discharge all duties of their 
office should be exempt from upholding that oath.” The GOP controlled state Senate overrode his veto on June 1, 
2015. Jonathan Katz, "North Carolina Allows Officials to Refuse to Perform Gay Marriages," New York Times, June 
11, 2015, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/us/north-carolina-allows-officials-to-refuse-
to-perform-gay-marriages.html?_r=0.   
33 The legislature introduced and HB2 in a matter of hours, and the Governor signed it the same day. Mark Berman, 
"PayPal Abandons Plans to Open Facility in Charlotte Because of LGBT Law," The Washington Post, April 5, 2016, 
accessed April 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/04/05/paypal-abandons-
plans-to-open-facility-in-charlotte-due-to-lgbt-law/. Steve Harrison, "Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT 
Protections in 7-4 Vote," The Charlotte Oberver (Charlotte, NC), February 22, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016, 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article61786967.html.   
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persons, and prevents individuals from suing for discrimination in state court.34 While the 
bathroom aspect of the bill has garnered the most attention from opponents of HB2 and the 
press,35 the most extreme aspect of the North Carolina law is the provision blocking the passage 
or enactment of any local laws that seek to protect the LGBT community. This provision is 
strikingly similar to Colorado’s Amendment 2 deemed unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans. In 
response, the ACLU has challenged HB2 and sued in a district court in North Carolina.36 While 
to some the bill is unconstitutional on its face and cannot even pass the rational basis test, it is 
uncertain how the case will be decided. However, had the standard of review been determined in 
Obergefell, North Carolina would have a difficult time convincing the court that the bill can 
withstand heightened scrutiny.    
 While North Carolina’s law has been in the spotlight since Governor McCrory signed it, 
it is not a novel piece of legislation. Similar bills were also passed in Georgia and South Dakota 
and the Governors in both states vetoed the legislation after immense pressure from the business 
community and civil rights groups in those states.37 Additionally, Mississippi passed a similar 
law that goes further than Georgia’s and North Carolina’s. The law prevents the government 
from “discriminating”38 against a “person”39 for acting on their religious convictions regarding 
                                                
34 Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ G.S. 115C, 143-81, 95-25, 153A, 160A (2016). 
35 Interestingly, just 10 days after HB2 was signed, the members in North Carolina’s House and Senate introduced 
versions of a bill that would do just that. While both measures have been sent to committee, the state legislature does 
not reconvene until weeks later. See ACLU, "LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills across the Country," 
ACLU, accessed April 16, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-nondiscrimination-and-anti-lgbt-bills-across-
country#affirmnondisc.   
36 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Joaquín Carcaño et al., v. Patrick McCrory et al No. 1:16-cv-236 
(2016). 
37 Alan Blinder and Richard Perez-Pena, "Georgia Governor Rejects Bill Shielding Critics of Gay Marriage," The 
New York Times, March 28, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016, http://nyti.ms/22UcDMp.; Ralph Ellis and Emanuella 
Grinberg, "Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal to Veto 'Religious Liberty' Bill," CNN, last modified March 28, 2016, 
accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/us/georgia-north-carolina-lgbt-bills/index.html; Stern, 
"Mississippi Governor Signs LGBTQ," Outward: Extending the LGBTQ Conversation (blog).  
38 H.B 1523 §4(a)-(g) 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016).  
39 H.B 1523 §9.3(a)-(d) 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016). Defines person as (a) an individual; (b) religious organization; 
(c) closely held company, sole proprietorship, partnership, association, organization, firm, corporation, trust, society, 
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sexuality and marriage.40 Under the law, the government cannot, for example, prevent businesses 
from firing a transgender employee, clerks from refusing to issue a marriage license to a same-
sex couple, or landlords from refusing to rent to an LGBT person.41 Additionally, persons and 
companies that provide marriage-related services like venue owners, photographers, bakers and 
florists are sheltered from being prosecuted for discriminating.42 
 While North Carolina’s bill is being challenged in court, had Kennedy determined the 
standard of review, it would be harder for the state and other states that pass similar laws to 
prove exemptions for public and private actors from anti-discrimination laws are substantially 
related to the compelling interest of protecting religious liberty. In other words, had Kennedy 
given a clear standard, it would be used as a tool by which civil rights groups could address the 
strength of the Equal Protection Clause argument made by challengers to the anti-discrimination 
laws. While it is undeniable that the First Amendment protects the right to believe that 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage are sins, never before have religious exemptions been 
validated as means to discriminate or harm other people by denying government services or 
public accommodations of various kinds.  
 Both Mississippi and North Carolina have paid a price for passing such laws that are so 
far reaching into the private commercial realm. For example, in North Carolina, businesses like 
                                                                                                                                                       
or other closely held entity; or (d) cooperatives, ventures, or enterprises comprised or two or more individuals or 
entities. 
40 H.B 1523 §2 (a)-(c) 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016). The sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions 
protected by this act are the belief or conviction that: (a) marriage is or should be recognized as a unions of one man 
and one woman; (b) sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and (c) Male (man) or female 
(woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at the 
time of birth. 
41 Sarah Kaplan, "Mississippi's Senate Just Approved a Sweeping 'Religious Liberty' Bill the Critics Say Is the 
Worst yet for LGBT Rights," The Washington Post, March 31, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/31/mississippis-senate-just-approved-a-sweeping-
religious-liberty-bill-that-critics-say-is-the-worst-yet-for-lgbt-rights/.; Stern, "Mississippi Governor Signs LGBTQ," 
Outward: Extending the LGBTQ Conversation (blog). 
42 Furthermore, the bill allows doctors to refuse to provide counseling, sex-reassignment surgery, fertility treatments, 
and other services and allows companies and schools to establish sex-specific policies regarding dress and bathroom 
use. See ibid.,  
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PayPal and Deutsche Bank backed out of multimillion dollar investments that would have 
brought thousands of jobs to the state.43 Additionally, the Governor of New York and Mayor of 
DC have issued official travel bans to North Carolina.44 The law also garnered international 
attention when the British government issued a travel warning for its citizens telling them to 
avoid North Carolina and Mississippi if they identify as a member of the LGBT community.45 
Given the fervent animosity towards the law, the Governor issued an executive order to alter the 
equal employment policy for state workers to cover discrimination claims related to sexual 
orientation and gender identity.46  
 Pressure from the business community may ultimately force states that pass these laws to 
abandon them because they are not economically viable. However, even with corporate pressure, 
without a clear standard of review, gays and lesbians will continue to be denied equal protection 
under the law, and then will have to go back to court for every issue that they encounter. 
Additionally, lower courts have no guidance and have to rely heavily on state laws and interpret 
them on a case-by-case basis.  
 Historically, the Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect or semi-suspect 
classification in Romer and Lawrence resulted in concrete harm to gays and lesbians because 
lower courts had, until recently, determined that laws barring homosexuals from openly serving 
in the military and laws prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting, passed the rational basis 
test. Determining the standard of review would not have stopped unfair treatment in every 
                                                
43 Berman, "PayPal Abandons Plans to Open.” 
44 Richard Fausset and Alan Blinder, "North Carolina Governor Tries to Step Back from Bias Law," The New York 
Times, April 12, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/us/north-carolina-governor-
pat-mccrory.html 
45 Laura Wagner, "Obama: North Carolina's Bathroom Law 'Should Be Overturned,'" NPR, last modified April 22, 
2016, accessed April 23, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/22/475295225/obama-north-
carolinas-bathroom-law-should-be-overturned.  
46 Richard Fausset and Alan Blinder, "North Carolina Governor Tries.” 
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situation, but it would have made it much harder for public and private actors to treat 
homosexuals as second class citizens in those cases and the same is true post-Obergefell. 
 *** 
 Eventually the Court will determine the standard of review for sexual orientation. Justice 
Kennedy may no longer be on the Court when the standard is determined, but given that 
homosexuals have been subject to a history of discrimination; they exhibit an obvious, 
immutable, or distinguishing characteristic; and they are a minority with less political power than 
non-suspect classes, it is undeniably clear that gays and lesbians meet the criteria to be 
considered a semi-suspect class. As shown throughout this thesis, failing to determine the 
standard of review for gays and lesbians almost guarantees present and future harm. When the 
Court does determine the standard, lower courts will have binding precedent to apply to laws that 
place members of the LGBT community in a disfavored class, and government officials at all 
levels may be deterred from passing such laws knowing they will be unlikely to survive. 
Additionally, determining the standard will also make it more difficult for private actors seeking 
exemptions from generally applicable laws to discriminate against the LGBT community in the 
name of religious liberty.  
 While it is uncertain how long it will take the Court to determine the standard of review, 
there are steps that can be taken in the meantime to protect homosexuals and other members of 
the LGBT community. For one, the federal government can amend existing anti-discrimination 
laws or pass new laws covering sexual orientation and gender identity. Currently there is not a 
comprehensive federal law that bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity in credit, education, employment, federal funding, housing, jury service, and public 
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accommodations.47 The absence of federal protections from discrimination means that 
homosexuals and other LGBT persons are more susceptible to discrimination and are largely 
powerless to combat such discrimination in many cases.48 Therefore, even though same-sex 
couples around the country have the right to marry after Obergefell, they still have no federal 
protections against being denied a loan for buying a home,49 being fired from their job,50 or being 
told they cannot be served in a restaurant.  
 The current lack of federal anti-discrimination laws barring discrimination based on 
sexual orientation has meant that many states and municipalities have been responsible for 
protecting, or not protecting, the LGBT community from discrimination. While some states have 
expanded existing anti-discrimination laws to protect LGBT persons, others have not. This 
inconsistency creates a patchwork of protections and uncertainty among homosexuals and the 
LGBT community as a whole. 
 Currently in the United States, 28 states have no laws prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, and 31 states lack explicit gender identity nondiscrimination 
protections.51 Within these states, some cities and counties have passed their own anti-
                                                
47 While anti-discrimination laws in each of this areas exist at the federal level, they are limited to barring 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or other categories. See 
Human Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage Equality: A Blueprint. 15 (credit); 21-22 (education); 30 (employment); 
39 (federal funding); 45 (housing); 51 (jury service); 57 (public accommodations).  
48 For example, under current laws private hospitals that receive federal funding through programs such as Medicaid 
and Medicare may discriminate against LGBT doctors, nurses, support staff or patients on the basis of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Ibid., 39 
49 Ibid., 15. 
50 For example, in 2010 Katrina Martir was fired from her job as a fourth grade science teacher at a public school in 
Kentucky when she told her principal she planned to get pregnant via artificial insemination and raise and child with 
her partner. Martir went to see a lawyer to sue for employment discrimination but was told there was nothing illegal 
in her being fired and there was nothing that could be done. See Timothy M. Phelps, "Next Frontier for Gays Is 
Employment and Housing Discrimination," LA Times, June 26, 2015, accessed April 15, 2016, 
http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-83869739/. 
51 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming  
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discrimination laws covering sexual orientation, gender identity, or a combination of both.52 
Additionally, some Governors have issued executive orders prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity in various states.53 However, these orders are frequently 
limited to state employees, and the protections can be rescinded by future Governors. 
 In contrast, 23 states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-discrimination laws 
that bar discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.54 Even within these 
states, however, the protections are inconsistent, as some laws only include sexual orientation, 
and not gender identity.55 Homosexual, bisexual, or transgender persons in America who lack 
protections against discrimination at the federal and state level, are subject to the personal views 
or biases of potential employers, lenders, merchants, or real estate agents. If the federal 
government was to amend existing anti-discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and 
gender identity, then it would offer protections for LGBT persons in 28 states without any anti-
discrimination laws. Additionally, should the federal government amend existing or pass new 
laws, then the state governments would have to enforce the federal laws.  
                                                
52 Oleske, "The Evolution of Accommodation," 136.; Human Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage Equality: A 
Blueprint.  
53 The Governors of Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia 
have all issued an executive order, administrative order, or personnel regulation banning discrimination against 
public employees due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. In Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, Montana, and 
Ohio, public employees are protected through an executive order from discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation only. Human Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage Equality: A Blueprint, 31. 
54 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, Wisconsin. As of April 24, 2016. 
55 For example, Massachusetts’ nondiscrimination laws bar discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity in employment, housing, and credit, but the laws only cover sexual orientation for public 
accommodations. Additionally, California, Delaware, DC, Hawaii, Nevada, and Oregon all have anti-discrimination 
laws covering sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, housing, and public accommodations, but have 
no protections against discrimination for either group in credit. See Human Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage 
Equality: A Blueprint and "Non-discrimination Laws," table, Movement Advancement Project, October 28, 2015, 
accessed October 31, 2015, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws.  
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Figure 3. Statewide Anti-discrimination Laws Protecting on the Basis of Sexual Orientation (LGB*) or Sexual 




Figure 4. Anti-discrimination Laws Protecting LGB(T) Persons from Discrimination in Employment57 
                                                
56 This map reflects states that have anti-discrimination laws in employment. Some of the states included do not 
cover housing, credit, or public accommodations. Those that cover more than employment may cover just sexual 
orientation in some areas, but cover sexual orientation and gender identity in others.  
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 Following the Obergefell decision in 2015, Rep. David Cicilline (D-RI) in the House and 
Senator Jeff Merkley reintroduced the Equality Act58 which would amend the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 to add sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of already protected classes.59 
Additionally the law included a provision to add sex as a class that is protected from 
discrimination in public accommodations, since that is not currently included, and the law would 
widen the definition of a public accommodation.60  While the bill has overwhelming Democratic 
support, the bill is unlikely to pass before the November elections. Therefore, it is unclear if the 
protections will come before the standard of review; however, if the standard comes first, the 
federal protections will likely follow.  
 That is not to say that declaring the standard of review would solve all of the problems 
the LGBT community faces in America and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity would vanish. If determining the standard of review was an antidote for 
discrimination, then racism and sexism would no longer exist. Scrutiny does not operate as a 
silver bullet to create a utopian society where no one is ever denied their civil rights. 
Nevertheless, a higher level of scrutiny allows anti-discrimination laws to ultimately be enforced.  
 Justice Kennedy’s gay rights jurisprudence on the Supreme Court has changed the 
trajectory of the Gay Rights Movement and helped solidify the progress homosexuals have made 
                                                                                                                                                       
57 Map does not show the patchwork of laws for discrimination laws in other areas such as housing, public 
accommodations, and credit.  
58 The Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015). Accessed October 30, 2015. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114hr3185ih/pdf/BILLS-114hr3185ih.pdf.  The Equality Act of 1974 was 
introduced by Representatives Bella Abzug (D-NY) and Ed Koch (D-NY). The act would have amended the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to ban discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, and sexual orientation in employment, 
public accommodations, public facilities, education, housing, and federally assisted programs. Also see Human 
Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage Equality: A Blueprint 36. 
59 Amanda Terkel, "Here’s the Next Major Fight for the LGBT Community," The Huffington Post, last modified 
July 23, 2015, accessed April 23, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/equality-
act_us_55afe880e4b08f57d5d35de7.  
60 As of now, the list reflects the 1964 definition specifying the “lunch counter” and “soda fountain.” The new bill 
would broaden the categories to reflect modern times and cover almost every entity that provides goods, services, or 
programs. Ibid., 
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in achieving justice and equality under the law. From the time of his Beller opinion on the Ninth 
Circuit to Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and finally with Obergefell, Justice Kennedy developed 
the language for the Court to talk about homosexuals as human beings, and afford them the equal 
dignity they deserve. While there are obvious reasons to celebrate the Obergefell decision, for 
some the opinion produced a pang of uncertainty and disappointment. Despite homosexuals 
meeting all the requirements to be considered a suspect or semi-suspect class, and having four 
instrumental class based victories in the Supreme Court over the last two decades, Kennedy in 
Obergefell chose not to determine the standard of review. While Justice Kennedy has single 
handedly enlarged the scope of legal protections for homosexuals, his failure to take the next step 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Explanation 
This table shows the trajectory of same-sex marriage in the 50 United States and the District of 
Columbia. The column titled “Ban” indicates whether or not a state ever had a ban on same-sex 
marriage in place (1 indicates yes, 0 indicates no). “Civil unions?” indicates whether or not the 
state ever enacted civil unions, which, before nationwide marriage equality, offered same-sex 
couples some benefits of marriage without the official designation. For the 16 states that did 
enact civil unions, the “When?” column corresponds with the year civil unions were passed and 
implemented in those states. The “Date of SSM Legalization” represents the date that the court 
ruling or legislation legalizing same-sex marriage went into effect. For some of the states, same-
sex couples were not able to marry until days, weeks, or months after a court ruled on a case or a 
Governor signed a bill. The “Overturned with Obergefell?” column indicates the states that were 
affected by the Obergefell decision. “Constitutional Ban” indicates states that had constitutional 
bans on same-sex marriage. Most of these were characterized by constitutional definitions of 
“marriage” as a union between a man and a woman. The next column demonstrates when the 
state passed the measure. Normally the constitutional amendments were approved by voter 
referendum. “Statutory Ban” indicates states that implemented statutory bans barring same-sex 
marriage, and the subsequent column indicates the date when the measure was passed. The 
“legalized via legislation” column indicates whether or not same-sex marriage was legalized by 
the state legislature. The “ban overturned by court ruling” indicates states that had their same-sex 
marriage ban(s) struck down by a judicial body. The next column indicates which court made the 




Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). 
 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. Supreme Court 1971). 
 
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 
Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. CRT 6145-09 (N.J Div. On Civil Rights 
Oct. 22, 2015). 
 
Board of Regents, University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 
BOLI v. Sweet Cakes by Melissa, No. 44-14 & 45-14 (Or. Bureau of Labor and Industries 2015). 
 
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
 
Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-cv-750-H (Feb. 12, 2014). 
 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987). 
 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
 
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). 
 
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-236 (Mar. 28, 2016). 
 
Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN (Haw. Cir. Court 1st Cir. Apr. 
15, 2013). 
 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 
Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 
 119 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,, No. 12CA1171 (Colorado Court of Appeals Aug. 13, 
2015). 
 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M 2013). 
 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 
 
Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993). 
 
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994). 
 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 
Gifford v. McCarthy, No. 520410 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 14, 2016). 
 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 
Hirabayahi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 69 U.S. 78 (1984). 
 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 
Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.,, No. 91615-2 (Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014). 
 
J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (1973). 
 
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 
 120 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 
Lofton v. Secretary of Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 
Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932). 
 
Miller v. Davis, 192 L. Ed. 2d 994 (Ky Dist. Ct. 2015). 
 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F. Supp. 941 (Sc Dist. Ct. 1966). 
 
NGTF v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 
Obergfell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501 (Oh Dist. Ct. July 22, 2013). 
 
Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, No. CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Oct. 7, 2013). 
 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
 
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
 
Paul G. Thomasson v. William Perry et al, 895 F. Supp. 820 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1954). 
 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 
 121 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1887). 
 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 
Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). 
 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 
Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159 (Tn Dist. Ct. Mar. 14, 2014). 
 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 
United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (2013). 
 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 
Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co, 446 U.S. 142 (1980). 
 
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 







ACLU. “Anti-LGBT Religious Exemption Legislation across the Country.” ACLU. Accessed 
April 16, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/anti-lgbt-religious-exemption-legislation-across-
country?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbt-religious-refusals-legislation-across-country. 
 
———. “LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills across the Country.” ACLU. Accessed 
April 16, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-nondiscrimination-and-anti-lgbt-bills-across-
country#affirmnondisc. 
 
Associated Press. “Senate’s Roll-Call on the Bork Vote.” The New York Times (New York, NY), 
October 24, 1987. Accessed February 21, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/24/us/senate-s-roll-call-on-the-bork-vote.html. 
 
Barrouquere, Brett. “Federal Judge Weighing Challenge to Kentucky Gay Marriage Ban.” 




Berman, Mark. “PayPal Abandons Plans to Open Facility in Charlotte Because of LGBT Law.” 




Blinder, Alan, and Richard Pérez-Peña. “Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, 




Blinder, Alan, and Richard Perez-Pena. “Georgia Governor Rejects Bill Shielding Critics of Gay 
Marriage.” The New York Times, March 28, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2016. 
http://nyti.ms/22UcDMp. 
 
Carpenter, Dale. Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence V. Texas : How a Bedroom Arrest 
Decriminalized Gay Americans. New York: W.W. Norton, 2012. 
 
Chambers, David L. “Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership.” In Creating 
Change: Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights, by John D’Emilio, William B. 
Turner, and Urvashi Vaid, 281-304. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 
 
———. “Tale of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships in San 
Francisco and New York.” Law and Sexuality 2 (1992): 181-208. 
 
Chauncey, George. Why Marriage?: The History Shaping Today’s Debate over Gay Equality. 
New York: Basic Books, 2004. 
 
 123 
Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech. “Anthony M. Kennedy.” Oyez. Accessed 
February 21, 2016. https://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_m_kennedy. 
 
———. “Hollingsworth v. Perry.” Oyez. Accessed February 22, 2016. 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-144. 
 
———. “Lewis F. Powell Jr.” Oyez. Accessed February 21, 2016. 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr. 
 
———. “Obergefell v. Hodges.” Oyez. Accessed March 8, 2016. 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556. 
 
Curtis, Michael Kent. “A Unique Religious Exemption from Anti-discrimination Laws in the 
Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who Discriminate against 
Married or Unmarried Gays in Context.” Wake Forest Law Review 47 (March 22, 2012): 
173-209. 
 
D’Emilio, John. “Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex 
Marriage.” In The Politics of Same-sex Marriage, edited by Craig  A. Rimmerman and 
Clyde Wilcox, 39-64. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
 
Denniston, Lyle. “Opinions Recap: Giant Step for Gay Marriage.” SCOTUSblog. Last modified 
June 26, 2013. Accessed November 22, 2015. 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinions-recap-giant-step-for-gay-marriage/. 
 
Duncan, William. “Bad News for Marriage, Good News for Government Power.” SCOTUSblog. 




Dunlap, David W. “Thomas Stoddard, 48, Dies; An Advocate of Gay Rights.” The New York 




Ellis, Ralph, and Emanuella Grinberg. “Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal to Veto ‘Religious Liberty’ 
Bill.” CNN. Last modified March 28, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2016. 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/us/georgia-north-carolina-lgbt-bills/index.html. 
 
Epps, Garrett. “Gay Marriage Gets Its Day in Court.” The Atlantic. Last modified April 27, 








Ettelbrick, Paula L. “Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?” In Lesbian and Gay 
Marriage: Private Commitments, Public Ceremonies, edited by Suzanne Sherman, 20-26. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 
 
Fausset, Richard, and Alan Blinder. “North Carolina Governor Tries to Step Back from Bias 
Law.” The New York Times, April 12, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/us/north-carolina-governor-pat-mccrory.html. 
 
Fischel, Joseph J. Review of In Defense of Plural Marriage, by Ron  C. Den Otter. The Journal 
of Politics 78, no. 1 (January 2016): e5-e7. Accessed November 16, 2015. 
DOI:10.1086/684311. 
 
“The Freedom to Marry in New York.” Freedom to Marry. Accessed February 22, 2016. 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/new-york. 
 
Fuerbringer, Jonathan. “Byrd Says Bork Nomination Would Face Senate Trouble.” The New 




Godsoe, Cynthia. “Perfect Plaintiffs.” The Yale Law Journal 125, no. 136 (October 12, 2015): 
136-55. Accessed March 3, 2016. http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfect-
plaintiffs. 
 
Greenhouse, Linda. “Washington Talk: Court Politics; Nursing the Wounds from the Bork 




Hall, Mark David. “Religious Accommodations and the Common Good.” The Heritage 




Harrison, Steve. “Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections in 7-4 Vote.” The 
Charlotte Oberver (Charlotte, NC), February 22, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2016. 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article61786967.html. 
 
Human Rights Campaign. Beyond Marriage Equality: A Blueprint for Federal Non-





Infanti, Anthony C. “Victims of Our Own Success: The Perils of Obergefell and Windsor.” Ohio 
State Law Journal 76 (2015): 79-85. Accessed November 29, 2015. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664248. 
 
Jindal, Bobby. “Bobby Jindal: I’m Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage.” The New York Times, 




Kaplan, Sarah. “Mississippi’s Senate Just Approved a Sweeping ‘Religious Liberty’ Bill the 
Critics Say Is the Worst yet for LGBT Rights.” The Washington Post, March 31, 2016. 




Karibjanian, George D. “Obergefell: The Final Word (But Not Really) on Same-Sex Marriage.” 
Trusts & Estates 154, no. 8 (August 2015): 34-37. Accessed October 22, 2015. Index to 
Legal Periodicals Full Text (108765469). 
 
Katz, Jonathan. “North Carolina Allows Officials to Refuse to Perform Gay Marriages.” New 




Klarman, Michael J. Brown V. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement: Abridged 
Edition of from Jim Crow to Civil Rights : the Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial 
Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
———. From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-sex 
Marriage. Oxford University Press paperback edition. ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014. 
 
Lichterman, Joseph. “Michigan Same-sex Marriage Ban Faces Federal Test in October.” 




Markon, Jerry. “Meet the Couples Who Will Be Part of History in the Same-sex Marriage 





Melling, Louise, Marvin Lim, Rosie Brighouse, and Noa Mendelsohn. Drawing the Line: 
Tackling Tensions Between Religious Freedom and Equality. September 2015. Accessed 




Millhiser, Ian. “When ‘Religious Liberty’ Was Used to Justify Racism Instead of Homophobia.” 
Think Progress. Last modified February 26, 2014. 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/02/26/3333161/religious-liberty-racist-anti-gay/. 
 
Murdoch, Joyce, and Deb Price. Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians V. the Supreme Court. 
New York: Basic Books, 2001. 
 
Nava, Michael, and Robert Dawidoff. Created Equal: Why Gay Rights Matter to America. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 
 
Nicolas, Peter. “Obergefell’s Squandered Potential.” California Law Review Circuit 6 




“Non-discrimination Laws.” Table. Movement Advancement Project. October 28, 2015. 
Accessed October 31, 2015. http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws. 
 
“Obergefell v. Hodges.” SCOTUS Blog. Accessed March 8, 2016. 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/. 
 
Oleske, James M., Jr. “The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal Treatment of 
Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages.” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 50 (March 23, 2015): 99-152. Accessed November 16, 2015. 
http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EvolutionOfAccommodation.pdf. 
 
Parker, Brett. “What Level of Legal Scrutiny Should Sexual Orientation-Based Classifications 
Receive?” The Stanford Political Journal. Last modified January 19, 2015. Accessed 
October 30, 2015. http://stanfordpolitics.com/2015/01/what-level-of-legal-scrutiny-
should-sexual-orientation-based-classifications-receive/. 
 
Peters, Jeremy. “New York to Back Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere.” The New York Times, 
May 29, 2008. Accessed February 22, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/29/nyregion/29marriage.html?_r=2. 
 
Phelps, Timothy M. “Next Frontier for Gays Is Employment and Housing Discrimination.” LA 
Times, June 26, 2015. Accessed April 15, 2016. http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-
1/article/p2p-83869739/. 
 
Reilly, Mollie. “Same-Sex Couples Can Now Adopt Children in All 50 States.” The Huffington 





Rosenfeld, Michael J. The Age of Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-sex Unions, and the 
Changing American Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007. 
 
Rosenthal, Andrew. “The Instant Republican Backlash on Gay Marriage.” The New York Times, 
June 26, 2015, The Opinionator. http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/the-
instant-republican-backlash-on-gay-marriage/. 
 
Savage, David G. “Ruling Seen as Precursor to Same-Sex Marriages.” LA Times (Los Angeles, 
CA), June 28, 2003. Accessed February 21, 2016. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/28/nation/na-scotus28. 
 
Sherman, Suzanne. Introduction to Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private Commitments, Public 
Ceremonies, 1-10. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 
 
Smith, Paul. “The Court Opts for an Incremental Approach but a Major Victory Nonetheless.” 




Solomon, Marc. Winning Marriage: The inside Story of How Same-Sex Couples Took on the 
Politicians and Pundits--and Won. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 
2014. 
 
Stoddard, Thomas B. “Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry.” In Lesbian and Gay 
Marriage: Private Commitments, Public Ceremonies, edited by Suzanne Sherman, 13-19. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 
 
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. “Jubilation and Weddings, but Also Confusion, Delay and Denunciation.” 
The New York Times, June 26, 2015, U.S. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/reaction-to-same-sex-marriage-ruling.html. 
 
Sullivan, Andrew. Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con: A Reader. New York: Vintage Books, 
1997. 
 
Terkel, Amanda. “Here’s the Next Major Fight for the LGBT Community.” The Huffington 
Post. Last modified July 23, 2015. Accessed April 23, 2016. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/equality-act_us_55afe880e4b08f57d5d35de7. 
 
“Timeline: Milestones in the American Gay Rights Movement.” PBS. Last modified June 24, 
2011. Accessed December 11, 2015. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/stonewall/. 
 




Totenberg, Nina. “Meet the ‘Accidental Activists’ of the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage 




———. “Record Number Of Amicus Briefs Filed In Same-Sex-Marriage Cases.” NPR. Last 




Tribe, Laurence H. “Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name.” Harvard Law Review 129, no. 1 
(November 10, 2015): 16-32. Accessed November 22, 2015. 
http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/11/equal-dignity-speaking-its-name/. 
 
Wagner, Laura. “Obama: North Carolina’s Bathroom Law ‘Should Be Overturned.’” NPR. Last 
modified April 22, 2016. Accessed April 23, 2016. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/04/22/475295225/obama-north-carolinas-bathroom-law-should-be-overturned. 
 
Yoshino, Kenji. “New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges.” Harvard Law Review 129, no. 
1 (November 10, 2015): 147-79. Accessed November 22, 2015. 
http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/11/a-new-birth-of-freedom-obergefell-v-hodges/. 
 
Zarembka, Arlene. “Advising Same-Sex Couples after Obergefell and Windsor.” GPSolo 32, no. 
4 (June/July 2015): 34-37. Accessed October 22, 2015. Index to Legal Periodicals Full 
Text (108835520). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
